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ABSTRACT 
 
MEASURING VALUES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC GOODS: 
INCORPORATING GENDER AND ETHNIC SOCIAL EFFECTS INTO STATED-
PREFERENCE VALUE-ELICITATION METHODS  
  
 This dissertation explores the theory and seemingly paradoxical results between 
the economic literatures of contingent valuation method and risk aversion and the 
interdisciplinary literature of perceptions of risk, specifically with regard to race and 
gender effects. While a review of the contingent valuation literature shows no systematic 
gender or race differences in willingness to pay to reduce risks associated with nonmarket 
goods and services, the risk aversion literature finds systematic gender and race 
differences in levels of aversion to risks. Women are found to be more risk averse than 
men and Blacks and Hispanics less risk averse than whites. It is hypothesized that an 
individual measure of willingness to pay to reduce risks associated with nonmarket goods 
should be directly related to individual levels of risk aversion and consistent with 
individual perception of risk. The results from the risk perception literature also find 
systematic gender and race differences. These results are consistent with the risk aversion 
literature for gender effects, but inconsistent for Blacks and Hispanics who are found to 
perceive more risks than whites. 
To explore this inconsistency, a theoretical model is constructed that connects the 
contingent valuation theory to that of risk aversion and perceptions of risk. Insights from 
the risk perception literature are used to create a model of absolute risk aversion in order 
to make a tractable connection to risk aversion and stated valuation in CVM. Data from a 
previously collected dataset by Loomis et al (2009) is fit to the model. The results 
reinforce the inconsistency found between the risk perception and contingent valuation 
literatures and indicate a possible shortcoming of traditional methodology used by 
contingent valuation studies and the need for use of proper payment vehicles. 
 The existence of social preferences has been well established in the experimental 
literature and is formally modeled in this dissertation by incorporating influences of self-
interest, altruism, reciprocity, fairness, and commitment in the context of stated 
willingness to pay in contingent valuation methodology. The models suggest that the 
existence of social preferences may explain some of the inconsistency between the 
relevant literatures.   
 A dichotomous choice stated valuation study of various vaccination programs was 
conducted among college students at Colorado State University. The finding indicate 
gender differences in willingness to pay for vaccination programs and that the payment 
vehicle may have substantial effects on valuation. The inclusion of social preferences is a 
substantial improvement to modeling of valuation and when not included, may lead to 
underspecified models that ignore existing gender effects.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Environmental policy initiatives and projects are frequently subject to benefit-cost 
tests in the worthwhile attempt to ensure that society’s resources are efficiently used to 
maximize social outcomes.  Since many aspects of the environment are public goods 
without market prices for assigning value, the measurement of benefits must depend on 
nonmarket valuation methods developed by environmental economists.  In many cases 
the only comprehensive and workable approach is a “stated preference” method, most 
notably the contingent valuation method (CVM).  CVM has been extensively developed 
as a methodology, and is accepted for federal cost-benefit purposes under Executive 
Order 12866 and EPA regulations.   
Because of the wide use and importance of CVM valuation estimates in policy-
making, the need for accuracy is of utmost importance. Use of proper technique, 
methodology, and modeling are essential in attaining accurate estimates of valuation from 
CVM. Accounting for the diverse motivation of CVM behavior will allow for proper 
econometric specifications. This dissertation will explain the theory behind CVM and the 
limitations of its methodology while introducing an alternative model that will try to fix 
the limitations and allow for more accurate measures of valuation. 
Chapter two describes the assorted uses of valuation techniques and which is most 
appropriate under which circumstances. Since this dissertation is dedicated to valuation 
for hypothetical nonmarket goods and services, the contingent valuation method (CVM) 
and its methodology is thoroughly described. A survey of the CVM literature is 
conducted with specific emphases on gender and race differences in valuation. The 
chapter also includes a review of critiques and potential limitations of CVM methods. 
The chapter concludes with a review of the risk aversion literature to assess the 
consistency between the gender and race effects found in these literatures. 
Chapter three introduces the risk perception literature as a way of exploring the 
critiques from chapter two. An extensive literature review of risk perception studies is 
conducted with an emphasis on gender and race differences in perceptions of 
environmental and health risks. A case study using reanalyzed CVM data is conducted to 
explore the validation of the risk perception literature and potential limitations of CVM 
methodology. The data supports the general risk perception findings and indicates a mis-
estimation resulting from traditional CVM methodology. To further explore these initial 
discoveries, a model of decision-making that incorporates the essence of risk perceptions 
into a risk-aversion model is created. Using the data from the previous study, results 
further substantiate the risk perception findings and question the appropriateness of 
traditional CVM methodology.   
Chapter four establishes a theoretical model of individual decision-making that 
includes motivations of self-interest, altruism, reciprocity, fairness, and commitment. A 
review of the experimental literature is investigated and supports the inclusion of social 
preferences in models of behavior. Sen’s theory of commitment is explored and modeled 
within the framework of self-interest and social preferences.  
Chapter five conducts an analysis to test the appropriateness of including social 
preferences in a stated valuation study. The data was collected through paper surveys 
distributed during various economic courses and filled out by volunteer Colorado State 
University students. The study was designed to estimate valuation of various vaccination 
programs amongst college students at Colorado State University. The findings suggest 
that social preferences and the choice of payment vehicle may substantially affect 
estimates of valuation.  
The findings of this dissertation are discussed in chapter 6. A list of references 




Chapter 2: Nonmarket Valuation Techniques 
In neoclassical theory, goods and services are valued at the price in which they 
are traded in markets. This concept of value is based on three fundamental assumptions 
of neoclassical theory: the purpose of all economic activity is to increase the welfare of 
all individuals, individuals are self-interested, and individuals are the best judge of their 
own welfare in given situations. Therefore, the preferences of individuals over alternate 
states give measures for valuation. Individual preferences are assumed to be exogenously 
given with the property that ‘more is better’ and with substitutability, meaning that trade-
off ratios between pairs of goods reveal the value of these goods. (Champ, 2003, p.11).  
 In cases where markets are nonexistent, prevailing market prices cannot be used 
as a measure of valuation. Two approaches are commonly used to estimate the economic 
value of environmental resources: physical linkage techniques and behavioral linkage 
techniques. The most commonly used physical linkage technique is the dose-response 
model. Unlike behavioral linkage techniques, the dose-response technique does not rely 
directly on individual preferences. The technique involves a two-step process. The first 
step includes determining the relationship between levels of environmental damage and 
the associated physical damages. The second step involves assessing costs to the damage 
function, usually estimated through market prices (Milne, 1991).  
 
Use of dose-response models are most appropriate in cases where individuals are 
unaware of the true effects of environmental changes. In cases where the community 
commonly understands environmental damages and their damage effects, use of a dose-
response model may be inappropriate. Another limitation of dose-response models is the 
need for extensive data. If the relationship between environmental damage and costs has 
not previously been analyzed, collection of the appropriate data could be very extensive 
and extremely costly. For the purposes of assessing valuation for nonmarket goods, the 
dose-response reliance on market prices to estimate costs may prohibit its use. Because of 
these shortcomings, the dose-response model is not an appropriate tool for estimating 
valuation of many nonmarket goods, especially hypothetical goods and services (Milne, 
1991).    
Within mainstream economic theory, three behavioral linkage techniques are 
commonly used to capture valuation in the absence of markets. Depending on the type of 
good or service in question or the situation given, the travel cost method, hedonics, or 
contingent valuation method is used to estimate value. When questions arise about the 
value of many environmental services or public goods, these techniques are commonly 
used. These nonmarket techniques are necessary and distinct from the neoclassical price 
theory since, unlike in price theory, individuals cannot always unilaterally choose the 
optimal level of these goods. The levels of environmental goods are usually determined 
by social choices, not individual choice (Champ, p. 27-28). 
 Nonmarket valuation makes the same assumptions as the neoclassical price theory 
of market goods; individuals maximize utility given a limited budget and exogenously set 
preferences. For nonmarket goods, individuals are not able to choose the specific amount 
of the good to be consumed. The nonmarket good is assumed to be rationed in such a way 
that the level is fixed. Therefore the basic neoclassical model is augmented to include the 
given level of the nonmarket good in question: 
 
       (2.1) 
st         (2.2) 
         (2.3) 
Where x is a vector of all market goods, q the quantity of the nonmarket goods, p is the 
price vector of all market goods, I is total income, and  is the fixed level of nonmarket 
goods. For individual i, the demand function for market goods is therefore x*=x(p, q, I).  
 Nonmarket goods have various attributes that can limit the techniques available 
for measuring their values. Two main groups of valuation through behavioral linkage 
techniques are used by economists depending on the nature of the good in question. 
Revealed preference valuation methods use values from actual market transactions made 
by individuals. These models are used to estimate the use values of environmental 
amenities and public goods. Estimations of value are based on data analyses from 
purchase decisions related to the specific good. Travel cost models and hedonic models 
are the most commonly used revealed preference techniques. Travel costs models are 
typically used for recreational values and hedonic modeling used to access the premium 
that households pay to purchase a property associated with a specific amenity in question.  
 Unlike revealed preference models, stated preference models use data from 
survey questionnaires asking respondents what choices they would make under 









perspective, stated preference techniques provide estimates of Hicksian surplus, whereas 
revealed preference techniques can be used for estimates of Marshalian surplus. Stated 
preference models can go beyond revealed preference methods to capture nonuse values 
of nonmarket goods as well as estimate values of levels of goods that have not been yet 
experienced. The hypothetical nature of stated preference techniques allows for the 
flexibility to capture these values.  
2.1 Contingent Valuation 
The most commonly used stated preference technique is contingent valuation 
method (CVM). CVM has been in use since the 1960’s to measure values of 
environmental amenities and was given further credibility from the NOAA (1993) panel 
report. Since stated preference methods provide estimates of Hicksian surplus, CVM uses 
the following methodology to measure the value of a policy that changes the quantity or 
quality of the good, service, or amenity in question:  
v(p0, q0, I-c) = v(p1, q1, I)      (2.4) 
Where v(.) is the indirect utility function, p0 is the initial price of the nonmarket 
good, q0 is the initial quantity or quality of the good, I is current income, c is the Hicksian 
compensating variation, q1 is the decreased level of the good in question if the policy is 
not implemented, and p1 denotes the price of the good if the policy is not implemented. 
Therefore, the value of c is the willingness to pay for the increased quantity or quality 
through the policy. 
Once the good in question is determined and the population of interest is attained, 
a questionnaire is created that captures the necessary elements to measure Hicksian 
surplus. First the good is thoroughly described, giving the current level of the good and 
the potential increased level and any effects or concerns at these levels (e.g. health 
problems, limited fishing access). An extensive, detailed description of the good, along 
with information is outlined so that respondents are informed and can make rational 
responses. Respondents are also asked for income levels along with other demographic 
information. Next, respondents are told the current price of the good and the associate 
proposed price on the increased level, and asked their individual willingness to pay for 
the proposed increase.  
To elicit an accurate measure of willingness to pay, the questionnaire must state 
the nature of payment; either hypothetical or real. In a hypothetical payment, respondents 
are asked how much they would pay, in a hypothetical market situation, but are informed 
that there will be no actual transfer of money for the stated change. On the other hand, 
with a real payment, respondents actually face a market-like decision, where payment is 
exchanged for the stated change. If the payment is real, the payment vehicle must be 
explicitly noted in order to capture respondent’s real trade-offs and valuation. Also to 
meet the guidelines of the NOAA panel, a decision rule must be given along with an 
explanation of the method of provisioning, and a timetable for the change in the good to 
occur. 
Along with the informational component of the survey instrument, the actual 
contingent valuation question needs to be completed with certain specifications. A 
response format is used that allows for responses of $0 and varies depending on the 
sample size and the specific purposes of the study.  Because of the potential bias from the 
hypothetical nature of the valuation question, other questions must be asked to screen for 
protest and other misleading responses. Also included in the survey are other questions 
that provide for covariates for statistical analysis and to address specifics of the study. 
Additional questions are included that assess the validity of the responses. These 
necessities combine into a very detailed questionnaire of which the specifics depend on 
the ultimate goal of the study (Champ, 2003). 
Once the questionnaire is drafted, pretests and focus groups are usually completed 
to test the soundness of the questions and to determine if respondents have full 
understanding of the good in order to give relevant responses. The questionnaire is then 
implemented to a sample of the select population. The mode of elicitation varies, but is 
most commonly through mail or personal interviews. Once the questionnaires are 
completed and the data is entered, data analysis is completed and the appropriate 
willingness to pay values are determined. The type of econometric modeling and data 
analysis depends on the intent of the study, responses format, and the payment vehicle. 
For example, logit and probit models are commonly used with dichotomous choice 
formats and the Hanemann technique is frequently used to estimate the mean willingness 
to pay.  The final steps include reporting study results and checking the validity and 
reliability of those results (Champ, 2003).  
2.2 Race, Gender, and Contingent Valuation 
 Many demographic and socioeconomic variables are attained in CVM 
questionnaires, such as income, age, gender, race, and schooling levels. Many of these 
are used primarily as control variables in estimating willingness to pay and are not the 
subject of specific comparisons. Recently, these demographic variables have been 
analyzed beyond controls and have been used to measure different valuation amongst 
different groups (e.g. Ladenburg and Olsen, 2008).  
 Historically, very few CVM studies were been done that focused on, or had any 
substantial conclusions about different willingness to pay amongst different classes, races, 
and gender groups. Of the more recent studies that include these variables, few focus on 
environmental services or public goods. The limited number of studies cannot give a 
complete analysis of any specific group’s systematic willingness to pay for 
environmental of health improvements. Since CVM is used to measure benefits in many 
cost benefit analyses designed to determine the future of environmental policy, this gap in 
the literature needs to be of concern to economists interested in the overall conclusions of 
CVM and its use in policy-making.  
When focusing only on public good studies, CVM has found no specific trends in 
gender differences. Brown and Taylor (2000), Berrens et al. (2002), and Kealy et al. 
(1990) find that men have a statistically larger stated value of willingness to pay than 
women for the provisioning of public goods. On the other hand, Swallow et al. (1994) 
find that women have higher valuations, while many such as Teal and Loomis (2000) 
find no differences. 
Limiting the scope to environmental public goods, studies find either no gender 
differences, or that men are willing to pay a larger amount for environmental amenities. 
Dupont (2004) suggests that “women [should be] more willing to pay for environmental 
public goods improvements to reduce risks, [but] economic theory on the role played by 
time in valuation suggests that the presence of differential time constraints will lower the 
WTP values of individuals with the least amount of leisure, typically women with 
children” (p. 274). His observation may give an explanation for the inconsistent results 
from CVM studies.   
Dupont (2004) uses data from a survey conducted in 1995 intended to obtain the 
value of benefits from a clean-up of the Hamilton Harbour in Ontario, Canada in order to 
encourage water-based recreational activities. The payment vehicle used was an increase 
in households’ water bills, or rent for tenants. The data suggests that gender is irrelevant 
to one’s determination of WTP for the clean-up. When the focus is limited to WTP for 
swimming, men have a higher WTP than women, and with issues of fishing, men are 
willing to pay over twice that of women. Furthermore, Dupont suggests that the time 
constraint that women face outweighs their desire to reduce risks when asked for their 
WTP for recreational environmental public goods.   
Dupont (2004) makes a very clear explanation for inconsistent gender findings 
amongst CVM studies. Future studies could distinguish motives and constraints by 
including questions in the survey that capture time constraints suggested by Dupont to be 
the main cause of women’s lower stated valuation. Controlling for this additional 
constraint may lead to better estimates of valuation and more consistent gender effects 
found among CVM studies.   
Since most policy makers are males, if females rank environmental quality higher 
than males, the interests of the general population may not be represented by 
governmental environmental policy. This potential inconsistency gives motivation for 
Teal and Loomis’s (2000) CVM study to determine gender differences for environmental 
resources in the San Joaquin Valley. The dataset included 803 individual household 
members, not specifically the ‘head of household’. The findings suggest that women are 
significantly less likely than men to hold beliefs about consequences resulting from 
environmental conditions affecting salmon fishing and waterfowl hunting. Gender was 
not found to be a significant predictor in a respondent’s WTP for habitat improvement, 
wildlife contamination control improvement, or river and salmon improvement. Finding 
no gender differences led Teal and Loomis to conclude that female and male 
policymakers will likely vote the same way in regard to environmental issues.  
Brown and Taylor (2000) used surveys that ask respondents their willingness to 
contribute to the Nature Conservancy, a national nonprofit organization that developed 
and sponsors the Adopt an Acre program which allows individuals to contribute directly 
to the protection of rainforest land. The authors found that when faced with a 
hypothetical contribution, women were willing to pay a significantly lower amount 
towards rainforest land than men, only willing to contribute on average $28, as compared 
to over $72 for men. When asked to actually donate money, women were still willing to 
donate less, but the magnitude of the difference decreased, with women, on average 
willing to donate $3.23 and men $6.14, and the contribution behavior between the sexes 
was not significantly different. The authors conclude that the hypothetical biased is 
stronger for males and that women are less likely to free-ride. These results suggest that 
women reveal WTP that corresponds more closely to the ‘real market’. This result may 
indicate a problem for CVM in trying to measure true valuation. In many cases the 
environmental good in question is a public good and when sold in any market, consumers 
would be willing to pay significantly less than the socially optimal price or their true 
valuation due to free rider issues. Therefore if women express a willingness to pay of 
environmental public goods in CVM that is very close to what they would pay in the 
market, then the methodology may be eliciting the ‘price’ they would pay in the market 
and not their true valuation, which theoretically should be much higher.  
One of the few nonmarket valuation studies that find women having a higher 
willingness to pay is Swallow et al.‘s (1994) siting of landfills. Results from the basic 
models with no interactions, found that women were more willing to pay for siting that 
does not take away as many environmental services. In the more specific models the 
authors run, women have a significantly higher marginal WTP to avoid impacts of 
farmland stock, habitat quality, groundwater quality, homes, farms, and parks from a 
landfill site. The authors note that:  
A gender wage gap may challenge valuation methods that use a household utility 
model, since genders may represent household values differently. [Since] 
inequalities may exist across genders, political economists might be keenly 
interested in the gender gap, (or that) nonmarket values may question methods, 
that assume constant preferences across residential groups or household 
members. (p.441) 
 
An interesting note is that the conclusions about gender differences in WTP may 
be due to the good or amenity in question. Those studies either finding no gender 
differences, or that males are willing to pay more, usually ask about environmental 
amenities that are more recreational in nature. Studies finding that women are willing to 
pay more have an environmental amenity that is more necessary and often has health 
implications. The distinction between these two types of environmental goods may have 
many implications for the format of survey used to determine value.   
Contingent valuation methodology suggests that demographic information needs 
to be asked, but the specific demographics to ask are usually not specified (Carson, 2000). 
Gender therefore may be seen by some as an unnecessary demographic variable to use in 
economic theory, since usually only income is assumed critical. Race and ethnicity are 
included even less than gender in CVM, and when included, usually coded only as a 
dummy variable with race divided into white and non-white categories. Not surprising, 
when race is measured through a dummy variable, it hardly ever has explanatory power 
in WTP differences. When race or ethnicity is a focal point for a WTP study the focus is 
typically on issues such as language bias (Loomis et al. 2002), violence (Ludwig and 
Cook 2001, Cohen et al. 2004), job safety (Gerking et al. 1988), food safety (Misra et al. 
199) or health risk reduction (Byrne et al. 2004, Wagner et al. 2001) and not specifically 
on environmental amenities. Results from these limited studies suggest that minorities are 
willing to pay less than whites in most cases.  
Wagner et al. (2001) captured WTP by race for mammography among low-
income women. This study is unique in that incorporates race with gender and income. 
Also, contrary to most mainstream WTP studies, the authors did not simply use a dummy 
variable for white and non-white. Ethnicity or race was divided into African American, 
Chinese, Filipino, Latina, and Non-Hispanic white. Consistent with standard theory, 
women with more money had a higher WTP for a mammogram than others. Results 
showed that WTP for mammography differed significantly by race. Chinese and Filipino 
women had a WTP that was significantly less than the other racial groups. Also when 
compared to the control group–white women–African American women had a WTP that 
was slightly more and Latinas slightly less. These results show that when the minority 
group is predominantly Latina and African American, a WTP study may not show any 
significant racial difference when using a simple dummy variable, even in the presence of 
differences when race is further disaggregated. 
When focusing on environmental CVM studies, little has been done that includes 
race as a determinant of WTP. Loomis et al. (2004a) and Loomis et al. (2004b) try to 
determine WTP for fire prevention and fuel reduction by race by focusing on differences 
amongst whites, African Americans, and Hispanics. Although, consistent with other 
studies, differences amongst race was not found to be significant, these papers found that 
African Americans had a mean WTP for prevention that was $100 ($505) more than 
whites ($400). As stressed by the authors, Hispanics were found to be willing to pay 
almost twice that of whites ($863 v $437) for fuel reduction, but again, the difference was 
not found to be statistically significant. With no significant differences found between 
Whites and minorities, theses studies show that the common conclusion that minorities 
are WTP less for goods and services may not be the same for environmental amenities. 
This gap in the literature is surprising given the rise in the environmental justice literature 
and, like gender, should be of importance to political economics. 
Table 2.1 presents a quick summary of important CVM studies and their 
associated conclusions.  
Table 2.1 Summary of CVM studies 
Study Good and/or Service Focus Finding 
Dupont 2004 
Benefits from a cleanup of the Hamilton 
Harbor in Ontario Gender differences  
  General clean up  No difference 
  Swimming   Men higher WTP 
  Fishing  Men higher WTP 
Teal and Loomis 
2000 
Environmental services in the San Joaquin 
Valley Gender differences  
  Salmon fishing  Men higher WTP 
  Waterfowl hunting  Men higher WTP 
  Habitat control  No difference 
  Wildlife contamination control  No difference 
Brown and Taylor 
2000 
Contributions to the Nature Conservancy for 
Rainforest Protection Gender differences  
  Hypothetical Payment  Men higher WTP 
  Real Payments  Men higher WTP 
Swallow et al 1994 Siting of Landfills Gender differences  
  
Siting that will not impact farm land, habitat 
quality, groundwater, homes, and farms  
Women higher 
WTP 
Loomis et al 2004 Fire Prevention Racial differences No differences 
  
2.3 Limitations of CVM 
 Contingent valuation uses neoclassical models and assumptions making it subject to 
the limitations within neoclassical theory. CVM uses the neoclassical assumptions that 
preferences of individuals over alternative states are the basis for valuation. Individuals 
are assumed to act purely out of self-interest and have exogenous preferences that follow 
the neoclassical assumptions of utility functions which are maximized, subject to total 
expenditure on market goods that cannot exceed income. The stated willingness to pay 
for the nonmarket good from that income is therefore assumed to represent the value that 
the self-interested individual places on the nonmarket good in question (Champ, 2003).  
Many shortcomings have been identified in the traditional methodology adopted 
by CVM. First, full information is needed for individuals to state true valuation in CVM 
surveys. Since there are no markets for public goods, it has been suggested that in many 
cases the survey does not include enough information to elicit valuation and that 
individuals do not have enough prior market experience with the good to obtain valuation 
(McFadden, 1994; Arrow, 1982; Boxall et al., 1996). This may be of particular concern 
with environmental public goods since individuals have no experience with the market 
providing these goods. Making valuation decisions in a public context would be much 
more familiar and realistic to respondents.  
Also CVM may not elicit true valuation for public goods. CVM studies elicit 
value by mimicking a market. From public good theory, markets will not give the socially 
optimal level, or value of any public good. In theory, any public good left to the market 
will give a value that underestimates the value society places on the good because of the 
‘free rider’ incentive. The problem with CVM studies for public goods is the assumption 
that respondents will give their true valuation, not just what they would pay in a market 
(Sen, 2000; Sen, 1977). It therefore becomes reasonable to assume that the value given 
from a CVM study will understate the true value that society places on the benefits from 
public goods. Evidence from CVM studies may exist to support the undervaluation of 
environmental public goods. Many studies find a hypothetical bias when respondents are 
not actually paying for the good (Popp, 2001). The stated willingness to pay for public 
goods when the payment is hypothetical is up to ten-fold the stated willingness to pay 
when the respondents are to pay directly. This large gap may in fact be measuring the 
undervaluation of public goods when placed in a market setting and not capturing any 
bias at all. 
The use of an individual income constraint becomes problematic when it is not 
implemented in reality. Its use may lead to irrelevant alternatives to enter into the social 
choice (Sen, 2000). Since most of the nonmarket goods assessed in CVM studies are 
usually provided by public institutions, not individuals, asking individuals their 
willingness to pay may give inaccurate results because of a lack of references. Due to the 
influence of commitment on social choice, CVM “has ambiguities especially when it 
comes to interpreting what people say they are ready to pay for public goods… [since] 
the philosophy behind contingent valuation seems to lie in the idea that an environmental 
good can be seen in essentially the same way as a normal private commodity that we 
purchase and consume” (Sen, 2000, p. 948). 
CVM’s reliance on willingness to pay places the same weight on everyone’s 
dollars irrespective of the poverty or prosperity of the individual respondents (Sen, 2000). 
This valuation technique gives less voice to those with fewer dollars. Therefore the poor 
will have less say in the valuation of public goods and other nonmarket goods.  CVM, 
being individually based has the additional problem of possibility. Sen (2000) notes that: 
For example, a case in which it is inquired how much I would pay to save all the 
living creatures that perished as a result of the Exxon Valdez disaster, and I say 
$20. As interpreted by CV, it is now presumed that if $20 paid by me would wipe 
out altogether all these losses, then I am ready to make the payment. It is hard to 
imagine that this question and answer can be taken seriously... The very idea that 
I treat the prevention of an environmental damage just like buying a private good 
is itself quite absurd. The amount I am ready to pay for my toothpaste is typically 
not affected by the amount you pay for yours. But it would be amazing if the 
payment I am ready to make to save nature is totally independent of what others 
are ready to pay for it, since it is specifically a social concern. The ‘lone ranger’ 
model of environmental evaluation – central to the interpretation of CV 
valuations – confounds the nature of the problem at hand (948-949).  
 
These critiques revolve around the traditional methodology utilized by CVM, but 
the science has made changes to address many of these criticisms. The use of a tax 
referendum payment vehicle instead of a market-like transaction vehicle can minimize 
may of the shortcomings addressed. Respondents are asked if they would support a tax 
referendum, in which the respondent would have to pay a given increase in taxes, in order 
to have the stated change in the nonmarket good. This alleviates the issue of possibility 
since, although each individual is paying a relatively small amount, it is clear that a 
‘communal’ larger amount is needed to pay for the change. The critique of irrelevant 
alternatives, where individual choices in CVM are not representative of real life 
situations can also be minimized by a tax referendum format. Since many of these goods 
are funded by tax dollars, a referendum is a realistic format in which most respondents 
will have experience and understand trade-offs in order to state accurate values.   
Although CVM has changed to address many critiques, there are still others that 
have not been adequately tackled. The limitations of the neoclassical methodology give 
rise to critiques from the race and gender literatures. CVM’s reliance on neoclassical 
assumptions of self-interest and utility maximization lead the methodology to rely on 
assumptions of neoclassical rationality. This form of rationality assumes that all 
individuals act in the same way and therefore only one model of behavior is needed. The 
unit of analysis is economic or ‘mushroom’ man who springs up fully formed, has 
exogenously set individual preferences, is purely self-interested, is autonomous, has no 
age or dependencies, and his only form of communication is through prices and the 
market (Nelson, 1995). From this perspective, stated willingness to pay for a good should 
dictate value for all individuals regardless of their race, gender, or class since all agents 
are assumed to behave like economic man. But the feminist literature explains the need 
for a richer theory of human economic behavior that allows for pluralistic modeling in 
order to best understand and describe human behavior. By exploring the limitations of 
neoclassical assumptions of economic man, the feminist critique allows for the discovery 
of more realistic descriptions of the different constraints that are placed on different 
social groups within society and how these influence choice beyond the simplicity of 
economic man. CVM’s current use of neoclassical rationality seems to be a poor choice 
in understanding the decisions and values of women and many minorities, and gives 
credence for an alternative methodology to accurately capture value.  
 The neoclassical modeling of human behavior leads to assumptions of rationality 
and utility maximization that are gender biased. These assumptions rely on masculine-
associated traits such as individualism and self-interest and ignore feminine-associated 
traits about cooperation or altruism. Therefore the feminine is considered non-economic 
and assumed not to enter into decision-making. But this reliance on solely masculine 
traits cannot explain feminine behavior and choices made by many women (Nelson, 
1995). This neoclassical model does not incorporate what women do since it is an 
outdated theory, culturally based at a time of patriarchy in which these foundations hurt 
women’s positions. Feminist economics challenges this modeling to not only help 
women’s economic and social status, but also in the attempt to truly understand economic 
decision-making and suggest a discipline that is based on sociology, history, and is 
normative in its place (Strober, 1994; MacDonald, 1995; May, 2002).  
 Concepts of self-interest and rationality when extended to women and the family 
come in to question. Self-interest is assumed to the extent that individuals always act 
selfishly and only interact with other adults in an impersonal environment rather than 
more realistic personal relations. Feminist theory criticizes this formation of rationality 
and individualism since “these models assume an individual without connection to others 
and whose behavior has no room for empathy, altruism and relation decisions” (Beneria, 
1995 p. 1846). Any relations involving affection and love are ignored which leaves many 
family relations out of the realm of economic analysis.  Decisions that have a caring 
component are ill suited for neoclassical theory, since such behavior by agents is not 
accepted. The feminist analysis questions the assumptions of independence and 
autonomy and presses issues of altruism, connection and reliance on others, giving rise to 
altering behavior amongst individuals with varying levels of these qualities. (Folbre, 
1994; Nelson, 1995; Strober, 1994).  
 Although women have more labor market freedom than ever before, social norms 
still affect preferences and act as constraints leading to socially imposed altruism. Many 
women are still housewives, the largest single occupation, because social norms make 
other options seem worse (Bergman, 1981). Those women who do break out of the mold 
and move into the labor market are highly segregated into occupations with a care 
component. As seen by women’s career choices, a feeling of love and commitment is 
socially imposed on women, therefore creating a situation where women have love and 
commitment enter into decision-making. This sense of love and commitment may not 
initially play a role in women’s decision making, but after taking on such caring roles, 
may begin to influence behavior (Folbre and Nelson, 2000). Humans do not simply exist 
without dependencies, have no age and have exogenous preferences that are fully formed. 
Individuals have altruistic motivations that are shaped and constrained by the surrounding 
social structure. These characteristics are very important in preference formation, 
specifically in women. Simply, humans do not behave the way described by economic 
man, especially women. 
 Ideas of socially imposed altruism give rise to another important difference 
between feminist and neoclassical economic theories; the way in which preferences are 
determined. In neoclassical theory, individuals are assumed to have exogenously 
determined preferences where social relations, influences, and cultural constraints play no 
role in preference formation. Individuals’ only form of communication is through pricing 
in markets leaving the ways in which society and cultural norms influence behavior 
disregarded. Feminist theory suggests how gender and racially biased value, social 
inequality and norms influence individual preferences and acknowledge the reflection of 
group and society in patterns of preferences. Since one cannot freely choose the group 
that society places one in, social norms can act as an additional constraint to human 
behavior that goes beyond the simple expenditure constraint in neoclassical modeling. 
Therefore, feminist theory addresses the importance of group identity, social norms, and 
their impact on group differences in describing and predicting systematic differences in 
group behavior (Folbre and Weisskopf, 1998; Folbre, 1993).              
 From the feminist critique of neoclassical theory, the gendered nature of the 
economy and social norms suggest that differences in behavior and outcomes of decisions 
between men and women are expected. These differences go beyond altering neoclassical 
theory by introducing a gender dummy variable into the analysis. Gender interacts with 
many socioeconomic and demographic categories, such that true gender differences can 
only be understood with full interaction models as shown by the labor market and wage 
discrimination studies (Figart, 1997). The same arguments have been made for race or 
ethnic differences. 
 Gender and racial identity formation is associated with economic outcomes and 
choices. But mainstream neoclassical theory continues to treat gender and race as a fixed 
parameter associated with an individual. A group is treated simply as the aggregate of all 
individuals assigned to that group and this framework can therefore not explain the 
formation and persistence of social norms related to group identity. “There is … a choice 
involved within … identification. However, macro-level social processes define the 
choice set and constrain the social and economic implications of individual identity 
choices” (Darity et al., 2006, p. 289). Because of gender and racial norms and economic 
outcomes, gender and racial identities are ingrained in individuals. One outcome of racial 
identity is a lower economic status for many minorities which may lead to an 
oppositional identity associated with certain economic behavior that is opposite to those 
groups with more economic opportunities (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Those minorities 
with a higher economic status who identify with the same racial group may feel a 
commitment to the group and will make decisions that are best for others in the group 
(Sen, 1985). Therefore it would be expected that those who identify with a racial group 
that is economically disadvantaged would have similar behavior and decision-making as 
others in the group regardless of economic status. Gender and racial identity influences 
on decision-making can be extended to include environmental or health valuation.  
 Racial differences in environmental attitudes have been categorized into three 
explanations: hierarchy of needs, cultural differences, and environmental deprivation. At 
first glance, the first two explanations would predict that many racial minorities, 
particularly Blacks and Hispanics would be less concerned about environmental quality 
because of wealth disparities and cultural norms. On the other hand, the third explanation 
of environmental concern would hypothesize that racial minorities would be more 
concerned with environmental quality because of a higher burden of poor environmental 
conditions (Mohai and Bryant, 1998). 
 The environmental justice literature suggests that minorities, specifically Blacks 
and Hispanics are disproportionately exposed to environmental harm (Mohai and Bryant, 
1998; Bullard, 1983; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1983; Downy, 2007; Mohai and 
Saha, 2007). This unequal impact from environmental risk is due particularly to the siting 
of hazardous waste sites in predominantly Black and Hispanic neighborhoods and has 
been suggested as the cause of increased concern for neighborhood and community 
environmental concern. This concern can be expanded beyond those living in these 
neighborhoods. If reducing environmental harm becomes associated with racial identity, 
then those Blacks and Hispanics living outside of these polluted neighborhoods may still 
have high levels of concern if they associate with the racial identity.  
 The ecofeminist literature suggests that social norms, power relations and identity 
may predict that women will also have more concern over environmental harm than men. 
Historically, women have been responsible for water collection, fire wood collection, and 
food preparation. Therefore any destruction to the environment will have a 
disproportional impact on women’s roles. Women also make up the majority of the 
world’s poor, the group that is disproportionately impacted by environmental damage. 
The characteristic of superiority over nature is considered masculine, while connection 
with nature is considered feminine. These issues all suggest that there is a connection 
between environmental destruction and the treatment of women and the environment. 
Therefore, it would be expected that women would have more incentive to support 
environmental protection (Nelson, 1997; McMahon, 1997; Mellor, 2002; Zein-Eladbin, 
1996).   
 The neoclassical assumptions of self-interest and exogenously determined 
preferences lead CVM to disregard any preferences that are endogenously determined 
through social constraints and formation of identities. The limited use of neoclassical 
theory prohibits any systematic gender or racial differences to be included in the 
modeling of CVM measures of valuation. The following chapters will explore alternative 
explanations of preference formation that are socially determined to allow a richer 
measure of valuation of nonmarket goods.   





Table 2.2. Summary of CVM critiques from non-traditional perspectives 
Critique Author Reason 
Individual Constraint Sen 2000 Leads to potential of irrelevant alternatives and problems of possibility 
Assumptions of 
Rationality, Self-
Interest, and Utility 
Maximization 
Nelson 1995 Use of masculine traits, ignorance of feminine traits leads to use of Economic Man which is gender biased 
  
Folbre 1995 
and Folbre and 
Weisskopf 
1998 
Socially imposed altruism, social norms, and groups 
identity create situation where humans, especially women 
do not act in accordance to these assumptions 
Identity formation Darity et al 2006 
Society decides the choice sets of individual identity 
choices 
  Akerlof and Kronton 2000 
Lower economic status of many minorities leads to an 
oppositional identity to whites 
Findings from other 
literatures Ecofeminism  
Women are disproportionality hurt by environmental 
destruction and have different motivations to decrease 
degradation 
  Environmental Racism/Justice 
Minorities (specifically Blacks and Hispanics) are 
disproportionately hurt by and show concern for 
environmental harm  
Econometric Modeling Figart 1997 Gender and race more than a dummy variable 
  
2.4 Risk Aversion 
Measures of risk aversion describe how individuals act in the presence of 
uncertain outcomes. The same assumptions that apply to the individual utility function 
used by CVM also apply to risk aversion, namely that preferences are assumed to be 
exogenously given and stable over time. Using a twice continuously differentiable von 
Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) utility function, as introduced by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944), individual i’s level of absolute risk aversion, introduced by Pratt 





The level of absolute risk aversion, measured by r, quantifies the extent to which an 
individual will avoid risk though the purchase of insurance. The level of absolute risk 
aversion depends on the concavity of the VNM utility function. The amount that an 
individual is willing to pay for insurance to avoid the risk should, theoretically, be 
proportional to their level of risk aversion to the specific risk (Nicholson, 2005, p. 542). 
Subsequently, the individual level of r should be consistent with the probability of 
willingness to pay to reduce risks, implying a predicted consistency between CVM and 
risk aversion findings among similar sources of risk; those found to have higher 
probabilities of WTP from CVM studies are predicated to also be found to have higher 
degrees of risk aversion.  
Contrary to the results from the CVM literature, systematic gender and race 
differences across risk aversion studies are found. Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) find that 
for those with insurance, men are significantly less likely to be risk averse and that 
Blacks and Hispanics are consistently less risk averse than whites. Rosen et al. (2009) 
supports the conclusions reached by Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) and find that the 
factors that best explain higher levels of risk aversion are being white, having no college 
education, and being female. 
 With regard to gender and financial risk, Jianakopolos and Bernasek (1998) find 
“systematic differences in risk aversion by gender [which] may provide an explanation 
for women’s systematically lower levels of income and wealth compared with men’s” (p. 
621). Taking into account race, single Black women were found to hold significantly 
more risky assets than single white women, but the reverse was not true when compared 
with single men and married couples. This study shows the need for interaction between 
gender and race to give consistent results.  Bernasek and Shwiff (2001) also find that 
gender is a significant predictor of risk aversion, with women being more risk averse than 
men. Interesting, the authors find that amongst married women, when a spouse becomes 
more risk loving, women become more risk averse. This finding suggests that studies 
should move away from the household being the main unit of analysis since it does not 
take into account relationships affecting data within the household. A summary of the 
risk aversion findings are given in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 Summary of risk aversion finding 
Study Focus  Finding 
Halek and 
Risenhauer 2001 
Gender and Racial 
Difference 
Those with insurance, men are less likely to be risk averse 
than women and Blacks and Hispanics less risk averse than 
whites 
Rosen et al 
Gender and Racial 
Difference 
Men and minorities are found to be less risk averse. Factors 
found to indicate higher levels of risk aversion: being 
whites, no college education, and being female 
Jianakopolos and 
Bernasek 1998 
Gender and Racial 
Difference 
Females more risk averse than males. Single Black females 
hold riskier assets than single white women. 
Bernasek and 
Shwiff 2001 
Gender and Racial 
Difference 
Women are more risk averse than men. Amongst married 
women, if a spouse becomes more risk loving, then the 
female becomes more risk averse 
 
Chapter 3: Perceptions of Risk 
Within the CVM literature, studies rarely address the reason why valuations of 
nonmarket goods are at the reported level. Many authors make inferences, but this is a 
secondary view without the original intention of the respondents. The risk perception 
literature–a branch of sociology and phycology–offers a reason and understanding for the 
valuation of these goods. In essence, the two bodies of literature measure the valuation of 
the same good, just from different perspectives. This similarity is strongest when dealing 
with public goods that are health related. “A prevailing assumption in this literature is 
that people who perceive a relatively high likelihood of an adverse event are more likely 
to take personal meliorative steps and support government initiatives to do otherwise, 
even in the face of required sacrifice” (O’Conner et al, 1999, p. 461). It should then be 
assumed that those who have higher perceptions of environmental risk should also have a 
higher WTP for protecting the amenities the environment produces (O’Connor et al. 
1999). 
The risk perception methodology is similar to that of CVM in that primary data is 
collected through surveys. Unlike CVM, the risk perception literature is more direct in 
connecting the reasoning of individual choice with the choice itself. Risk perception 
studies ask questions about sources of risk and directly ask how these respondents view 
the reasoning behind these perceptions. Respondents are also asked demographic
information to be used as controls in regression analyses and to measure group 
differences in perceptions.  
3.1 Risk Perception and Gender and Race 
 The risk perception literature gives a more interdisciplinary approach to risk. This 
literature has consistent and significant results with regard to race and gender effects to 
environmental risk. Risk perception goes beyond the grasp of mainstream economic 
theory and can give insights in explaining reasons why risk perception is different 
amongst different groups within society. 
 Although not considered in mainstream economic theory, “neither social reality 
nor scientific knowledge about reality is gender neutral” (Gustafson, 1998, p. 805). 
Therefore to make an assumption about the gender neutrality in any social science, 
including economics is likely false and will lead to invalid conclusions. The risk 
perception literature gives reasons for the nature of gender differences, along with race 
and class differences.  From this literature, reviewed below, systematic differences in 
perceptions of risk are found between different groups. “A conventional wisdom had 
been that African Americans are not as concerned as are whites about environmental 
quality issues” (Mohai and Bryant, 1998, p. 475). But along with women, the prevailing 
conclusions from the literature suggest that minorities perceive more risk than Whites 
from the same sources, specifically Blacks and Hispanics. This is in sharp contrast to the 
racial conclusions, or lack there of, found in the CVM literature.  
Numerous studies have been conducted to determine perceptions of risks 
associated with environmental degradation and related health risks. Finucane et al. (2000) 
best explain differences in perception to environmental hazards as the ‘white male 
effect’; a subgroup of white males that have significantly lower perceptions of risk than 
non-whites and women that influence aggregate risk measures.  Flynn et al. (1994) find 
that women perceive significantly more risk, along with nonwhite males when compared 
to white males on numerous environmental hazards. The race and gender differences 
found were mainly due to 30% of the white male population that judged risks to be 
extremely low. The effect that this subgroup has on the general perceptions of risk on 
society was coined as the ‘white male effect’ by Finucant et al (2000). The ‘white male 
effect’ has been supported by over 95% of the risk perception literature.  
 Along with discovering the ‘white male effect’, Flynn et al. (1994) also revealed 
attitudes that these low risk perception males hold; agree that future generation can take 
care of themselves, that government and industry can be trusted with making proper 
decisions for managing risks from technologies, that society has gone to far to push for 
equal rights, and disagree that technology is destroying the environment, that they have 
little control over their health risks, and the need to have a redistribution of wealth. 
 The ‘white male effect’ was supported by Johnson (2002) but with a smaller 
percentage of white males having significantly lower risk perceptions than minorities and 
women. White males with lower risks had hierarchical and individualist views, high trust 
of technology, and distrust of government. Particular to air quality, white men differed 
from all other groups with women and minorities being around 25% more likely to rate 
outdoor air quality as a high health risk and were less likely to see themselves as sensitive 
to air pollution and suffering from respiratory problems. Johnson also notes that non-
whites work outside more regularly than whites, increasing their exposure to many 
environmental issues, and may explain some of their increased risk perceptions. 
Satterfield et al. (2004) study risk perceptions to determine if any racial or gender 
differences can be determined. They find that white males have significantly lower risk 
ratings than white females, nonwhite females, and nonwhite males, with nonwhite 
females having significantly higher risk ratings than other groups. The results supports 
the ‘white male effect’, with a subgroup of 48% of white males having significantly 
lower risks. These white males are also likely to perceive more benefits from science, 
technology, and industry, and feel that those benefits outweighed their risks. Whites and 
males are also found to see less discrimination and vulnerability with environmental 
issues than nonwhites and women. Those who feel that they were often discriminated 
against rate risk higher than those that do not feel discriminated against. “That is, many 
risk problems are framed by minorities as questions of justice and fairness and not as 
technical, scientific, or economic problems per se.” (Satterfield, et al., 2004, p) 
  The ‘white male effect’ is supported by Finucane et al. (2000) but found to be 
more complicated than originally discussed by Flynn et al. (1994). Women are found to 
have higher risk perceptions than men, and minorities, other than Asians, have 
significantly higher risk perceptions. These white males are found to be better educated, 
have higher levels of household income, more politically conservative and “may perceive 
less risk than others because they are involved in creating, managing, controlling, and 
benefiting from technology” (p. 161). But, perceptions are found to go beyond just 
ethnicity and gender and are dependent on social characteristics and individual ideology. 
Although lower in white males, a large amount of heterogeneity was found between 
males and females of different races indicating that how individuals define their identity 
has effects on perceptions beyond just race.   
Specific to race, Mohai and Bryant (1998) find that most African Americans and 
whites rank similar environmental issues as important–particularly pollution–but African 
Americans are statistically significantly more likely to mention a neighborhood 
environmental problem as a concern and rate the quality as poor. Larger proportions of 
African Americans rate pollution problems, drinking water quality, and air pollution at 
higher levels of importance than whites. Contrary to theory, income is found to be 
negatively associated with nearly every dimension of environmental concern and it is 
clear that differences in income do not account for racial differences in concern. The 
conclusion reached by Mohai and Bryant indicate that there may be no ‘race effect’, but 
rather the differences in environmental concern can be attributed to cultural conditioning 
and related to the greater likelihood of African Americans to be living in poorer 
environmental conditions than whites.  
 Numerous studies have been completed to see if gender differences exist in risk 
perception. Riechard and Peterson (1998) find that females between the ages of 10-17 
have significantly higher risk perceptions than their male peers and that environmental 
hazards were perceived to have the highest level of potential risks. Davidson and 
Freudenburg (1996) also find that women show higher concern for risks associated with 
health and safety of the family and site-specific environmental issues. Women were 
found to be less trusting of institutions and technology that surround the origins of 
potential risk. Mohai’s (1992) results support Davidson and Freudenburg’s conclusions. 
Women were found to report that water pollution and other immediate environmental 
issues were of higher concern, whereas men feel that recreational environmental issues 
were of higher concern. Barke et al. (1997) find that gender differences in perceived risks 
are evident in males and females having similar occupations, specifically scientists, those 
with the most knowledge about environmental dangers.  
 Similar to findings that women self-report higher perceptions of risk than males, 
women have also been found to be more willing to take voluntary action to protect 
themselves and their families from environmental risks. O’Connor et al. (1999) find that 
woman–especially environmentalists–are more likely to take voluntary action than their 
male counterpart, regardless of the other variables included in their model. Schahn and 
Holzer (1990) also find that women are more likely to self-report voluntary protectionist 
behavior than males. Bord and O’Connor (1997) also find that women are more likely to 
take voluntary action with environmental risks. It therefore becomes conceivable that 
women perceive more environmental risks, and in order to reduce their family’s risk to 
exposure, they are more willing to take voluntary steps than men to reduce exposure to 
these environmental hazards.  
 There are many explanations for why women and minorities perceive more risk 
from environmental hazards when compared to white men. Of the many possible 
explanations, the most prevalent within the literature are differences in identity formation, 
cultural norms, and socialization, constraints, different levels of experience and exposure, 
differences in knowledge, biology, benefits from technology, trust, feelings of control, 
and power.  
 Biological differences were originally used as a possible explanation for gender 
differences in risk perceptions, but when only based on sex related differences, adding in 
the factor of racial differences, the biological explanation became negated. For the 
biological explanation to hold, white males and minority males should have the same risk 
perceptions, but–as the literature shows–there are consistent differences (Finucane et al., 
2000). 
 Another popular explanation for documented differences is disparity in scientific 
and environmental knowledge. The thought is that the more knowledge an individual has 
about technology leading to environmental hazards, the closer their risk perceptions will 
be to the ‘true’ level of risk, that which is observed. Observers may attribute women’s 
and minorities’ greater perception of risk to reflect a poorer understanding of technology 
relative to white males. Although some studies find that women do report being less 
knowledgeable about environmental concerns (Bord and O’Connor, 1997), others find 
that this is not the case, with either women or minorities having more knowledge (Savage 
1993). Davidson and Freudenburg (1996) report that more studies find statistical 
significance in the unexpected direction: that higher levels of knowledge are associated 
with increased levels of concern. Women and minorities therefore, may be more 
knowledgeable about environmental concerns. Other studies find no conclusive evidence 
to support knowledge as having any bearing, (O’Connor et al., 1999) or find that the 
effect is very indirect (Schahn and Holzer, 1990). 
 Barke et al. (1997) construct a very conclusive study to test the hypothesis that 
higher levels of knowledge will result in lower levels of risk perceptions since knowledge 
is adequately controlled for by studying male and female scientists in the same fields. 
Male scientists were found to consistently have lower risk perceptions than their female 
colleagues, although knowledge levels were the same. “Differences in risk perception 
between men and women is not simply a manifestation of different levels of scientific 
training” (p. 174). Although “(w)omen are discouraged from studying science and there 
are relatively few women scientists and engineers,” those female scientists judge risks to 
be greater than their male colleagues (Slovic, 1999, p.692). 
 From the studies focused on risk perception and knowledge, no clear gender 
association can be detected. Unfortunately, no study has focused on race and knowledge. 
But as the gender studies suggest, it seems unlikely that knowledge could adequately 
explain racial differences in risk perception. “Women do indeed express higher levels of 
concern than do males, not because they know less but because they care more” 
(Davidson and Freudenburg, 1996, p. 328).  
 Another potential explanation that has been given attention within the literature is 
the role of technology and individuals’ relation to it. Slovic (1999) suggests that:  
perhaps white males see less risk in the world because they create, manage, 
control, and benefit from so much of it. Perhaps women and nonwhite males see 
the world as more dangerous because in many ways they are more vulnerable, 
because they benefit less from many of its technologies and institutions, and 
because they have less power and control (p.693).  
 
Finucane et al. (2000) explain that differences in worldwide views, trust, and control are 
key factors that reflect values about technology and its impact on society. “White males 
may perceive less risk than others because they are involved in creating, managing, 
controlling, and benefiting from technology” (Finucane et al,, 2000, p. 161). White males 
were found to be more trusting of technology and less trusting of government than 
women and nonwhites. To white males “the world seems safer and hazardous activities 
seem more beneficial” (Finucane et al,, 2000, p. 167). Davidson and Freudenburg (1996) 
find that women are less likely to trust institutions of technology than men, and “no other 
known study reports significant findings in the opposite direction” (p. 319). The 
conclusion that white males express higher trust and benefits from technology was 
support by Satterfield et al. (2004), Johnson (2002), and Flynn et al. (1994).  
 Trust of government has been another potential determinant of risk perception. 
But, unlike the role of technology, trust of government has had mixed conclusions. Flynn 
et al. (1994) find that white males with the lowest risk perceptions tend to agree that 
government can be trusted. On the other hand, Finucane et al. (2000) find the opposite 
relationship, that white males are less trusting of the government. Satterfield et al. (2004) 
seem to agree, finding that the white males with the lowest risk perception are more 
conservative than women and nonwhites. Due to the inconclusive influence that trust of 
government has on risk perception, this measure alone cannot be used to determine 
perceptions of risk.  
 Power and the opposing sense of impotence, are also thought to be related to 
perceptions of risk. A feeling of control over hazards decreases perceived risks associated 
with the specific hazard (Sjoberg, 2000). Satterfield et al. (2004) find that race and 
gender differences in perceived risk is “attributed to the reduced social and formal 
decision-making power held by women and minorities as compared with white males” (p. 
116). Flynn et al. (1994) also find that low risk perceiving white males feel that they have 
more control over risks than others. A sense of power seems to influence a lower level of 
perceived risk, usually held by white males, and a sense of having a lack of control, 
usually held by women and minorities, is likely to increase the level of perceived risk. 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the overall race and gender findings from the risk 
perception literature.  
 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of risk perception findings 
Study Finding Specifics 
Finucane et al 2006 White male effect 
These white males are more conservative and have higher 
income 
Flynn et al. 1994  White male effect 
These white males agree that future generations can take 
care of themselves, industry can be trusted, society has 
gone too far to push for equal rights, and disagree that 
technology is destroying the environment 
Johnson 2002 White male effect 
These white males hold more individualistic views and 
have high trust in technology 
Satterfield et al 
2004 White male effect 
These white males benefit more from technology, science, 
and industry, see less discrimination, and feel more control 
impacts 




Blacks more likely to state higher perceived risks from 





Women trust technology less than men and socialization of 
female identity 
Barke et al 1997 
Women perceive 
more risks 
Female scientists perceive more risk than male scientists 
with similar knowledge of environmental damage 




Female environmentalists willing to take more voluntary 
actions to protect themselves 




Women more willing to take voluntary actions to protect 





Those that create and benefit from technology perceive 
less risk associated environmental damage 
Sjoberg 2000 General 
Those who feel a lack of control over decisions perceive 
more risks 
  
The environmental justice theory focuses on questions of minority populations 
being disproportionately burdened by environmental hazards. Many environmental 
justice studies have found that women and minorities are disproportionately exposed to 
environmental hazards (Bullard, 1983: U. S. General Accounting Office, 1983: the 
United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, 1987: Downey, 2007: Mohai and 
Saha, 2007: O’Neil, 2007). The risk perception literature uses this claim as an 
explanation for higher risk perceptions among non-whites and women. Savage (1993) 
found that Blacks and women felt more exposed to environmental risks than men. 
Gustafson (1998) agrees with regard to gender, and states that “the interplay between 
ideology and practice gives rise to gender differences in risk exposure” (p. 810). 
 Ecofeminism literature focuses on the increased exposure women have to 
environmental harm as opposed to men. The focus is on socialization and cultural gender 
roles that place women in charge of environmental tasks. Thus when the environment is 
destroyed, women disproportionately are burdened due to the socialized roles that create 
their dependence on the environment (McMahon 1997; M. Mellor, 2002; Julie Nelson, 
1997). Similar findings across disciplines give credence to the risk perception literature’s 
association of risk perception and exposure to environmental exposure.  
 Socialization, cultural roles, and identity formation are key in understanding 
differences in risk perception. Within this literature, women have more concern for 
environmental issues because: 
from childhood on women are socialized to be family nurturers and caregivers, 
that is, to develop a ‘motherhood mentality’…In contrast, men are socialized to 
be family breadwinners and economic providers. The socialization of men results 
in a ‘market mentality’ that gives priority to economic growth and development 
and that may portray environmental pollution as a necessary tradeoff for growth. 
(Mohai, 1992, p.2).  
 
Davidson and Freudenburg (1996) agree that the literature points to socialization as an 
important determinant in perceived risks, stating that: 
because female children do not identify with an alternative role model in the 
process of defining themselves, they continue to identify with their mother, and 
consequently they are not as likely to develop a distinction between themselves as 
individuals and the world around them…The male is able to objectify and control 
his environment, and to define himself as separate from the world around him. (p. 
304)  
 
These cultural norms that are learned by men and women through socialization help 
explain why women are more likely to see environmental risk since “women are still seen 
as outsiders to the public sphere dominated by men” and are not benefited by the 
economic process leading to the degradation of the environment and therefore do not see 
benefits that could outweigh the risks (p. 306). In describing the gender duality in 
economic theory, Julie Nelson (1995; 1997) supports this idea of the gendered nature of 
risk as it is tied to the gender norms and women’s connection with the environment. 
There is therefore a connection between the risk perception literature and feminist 
economic theory.   
3.2 Differences between CVM, risk aversion, and risk perception literatures   
The theories behind CVM and risk aversion methodology are both based on 
neoclassical economics, leaving very little differences in underlying assumptions. 
Because the risk aversion literature has not expanded to include environmental and health 
aversion, the only relevant assessment option is to compare CVM methodology and 
results to the methodology and results of risk perception. Although both CVM and risk 
perception studies use survey data, the methodology adopted varies significantly. 
Findings on race and gender in the risk perception literature are reported in the form of 
simple descriptive statistics, particularly means and difference in means (Mohai, 1992; 
Flynn et al., 1994; Bord and O’Connor, 1997; Slovic, 1999; Mohai and Bryant, 1998; 
Finucane et al., 2000). For describing racial or gender-based differences, difference of 
means tests can be very informative but are ignored within the CVM studies. In many 
studies when regressions are reported, the risk perception methodology goes beyond that 
of CVM, in that regressions are completed for males and females independently and 
minorities and whites independently (Johnson, 2002). The methodology behind running 
separate regressions is an improvement over adding gender and race as a dummy variable 
since these factors interact with other independent variables (Figart, 1997). Since gender 
and race interact with many other socioeconomic and demographic variables, CVM 
studies use possibly underspecified modeling giving possibly incorrect conclusions. 
Some risk perception literature uses multivariate regression with gender and race simply 
as a dummy variable (Bord and O’Connor, 1997; Barke et al., 1997; O’Connor et al., 
1999). Although the results given are less descriptive than running separate regressions, 
these risk perception studies include other statistical models to support the conclusions 
reached by the regressions. The methodology used in the risk perception literature has 
been supported by other social sciences, in particular the feminist economics and 
environmental justice literatures (Miller and Rodgers, 2008; Mohai and Saha, 2007). 
The use of dummy variables becomes very problematic with respect to race 
effects. Although race is asked as a categorical variable in many CVM studies, a dummy 
variable is used to indicate a respondent as either white or non-white. This dummy 
variable can be very problematic in that different ethnic minorities may respond 
systematically different from one another, but when included as one group, the 
differences may be washed out. It has been noted in the risk perception literature that 
Asians have a very low level of perceived environmental health risk, whereas Blacks and 
Hispanics have much higher perceived risks. When Asians are aggregated with Blacks 
and Hispanics, a trend that truly exists may be ignored (Finucane et al., 2000).  
Unlike CVM, the methodology used in the risk perception literature offers 
theoretical explanations of why certain groups within society would perceive different 
levels of risk. The survey technique used in risk perception studies ascertains beliefs, 
values, socioeconomic, and cultural factors that explain the found differences and support 
the findings with other interdisciplinary social science work (Slovic, 1993; Mohai and 
Bryant, 1998; Gustafson, 1998; O’Connor et al. 1999; Sjoberg, 2000). CVM surveys also 
establish values, beliefs, and socioeconomic characteristics but use this information as a 
control, rarely giving the variables any explanatory power. Studies specific to race and 
gender have very limited background theory to support the conclusions, relying on 
previous CVM studies with only limited mention to interdisciplinary work (Teal and 
Loomis 2000; Brown and Taylor, 2000; Dupont, 2004). This gap of interdisciplinary 
theory leaves CVM only able to report results, instead of incorporating the results into a 
larger body of scientific knowledge. In general, CVM studies have a very shallow means 
of interpreting and modeling the data and do not include the richness offered by the risk 
perception literature. 
A group of studies apply nonmarket valuation techniques to measure the value of 
reducing risks. This literature uses insights from risk perception studies as a basis for 
interpreting the results from nonmarket valuation techniques. In particular, Viscusi and 
coauthors use contingent valuation (Magot, Viscusi and Huber, 1988) and the hedonic 
method Viscusi, 1993) to estimate the monetary value of reduced health risks, such as 
the value of cleanup at Superfund sites (Gayer, Hamilton and Viscusi, 2000). Although 
this work is a step forward in connecting these relevant literatures, it does not address 
gender or race effects present in perceptions of risks.      
3.3 Case study 
 To test if the results from CVM and risk perception literatures are consistent, a 
case of valuation of water quality is conducted in this section. The data used were 
collected for a study conducted by Loomis et al. (2009). In the study, individuals were 
asked if they would pay a stated amount for bottled water given the associated 
probabilities of good and bad health outcomes. This section will use this data, however a 
different economic model is constructed to determine the gender and racial difference in 
willingness to pay for the private good of bottled water as a proxy for an increase in the 
public good of water quality. The current study will also try to determine the suitability of 
CVM methodology as a tool for valuation of environmental health goods. 
The theoretical foundation of CVM for health decision lies in the assumed form 
of the individual utility function. The typical utility function assumes that individual i 
receives utility through his or her own consumption of market goods X1,…,Xn, on the 
level of individual health, Hi, and possibly the health of others Hj: 
  
Where H  {B,G}, B represents a bad health outcome, and G a good health outcome. 
The impact of market goods and health outcomes for individual j on utility are assumed 
to act independently of one another. That is, changes in individual i’s consumption of 
market goods will not affect the level of health outcomes for individual j, and vice versa.  
If someone is purely self-interested then there is no incentive to pay to increase Hj, 
and therefore Ui H j
= 0 . 
 Assuming that the change of the good in question will reduce health risks, 
decisions of willingness to pay will be based on expected utility: 
EUi = PB Ui (B)+ (1 PB ) Ui (G)
Ui(B) is the associated utility of bad health, Ui(G) is utility of good health, and PB is the 
probability of bad health. 
 
Ui =Ui(X1i ,...,Xni,Hi,H j )
 
 The utility function presented in equation 3.2 determines individual i’s action of 
‘Pay’ (the act of that individual stating the desire to pay the stated amount to have the 
decrease in risk). But the form of the function itself is not apparent to the outside 
observer. To estimate the impact of the utility function on the ‘Pay’ choice, in a 
dichotomous choice framework, a logit regression analysis is preformed. The responses 
from the questionnaire are combined with the associated cost of ‘Pay’ and risk factors 
into a regression that estimates the impact of factors (such as gender, age, perceived risks, 
and race) on the ‘Pay’ decision. 
The probability that individual i will select the action ‘Pay’ suggests that 
individual i’s WTP for the increased probability of good health is greater then the cost of 
the program. Therefore, the probability that individual i is willing to pay the stated 
amount to reduce the risk of the bad health is: 
Prob (WTP > cost) =1 1
1+ eB0+B1(cos t )+B2 (risk )
Where ‘cost’ is the stated cost in the survey associated with reduce risks and ‘risk’ is the 
reduction in health risks of the improved level of the good, i.e. a reduction in the 
probability of B and an increase in the probability of G. Socioeconomic variables are 
typically included as explanatory variables in the empirical model. The s shown in 3.3 
represent the coefficients of the associate variables found from the logit regression.  
3.3.1 A Model of Risk Perception and Risk Aversion 
To test the comparability of the theories, a tractable uniformity between the 
theories needs to be established. CVM and risk aversion methodology rely on expected 
utility theory. Risk perception theory, although thoroughly developed, has not been 
empirically modeled in this context. In order to make the three theories connectable, a 
simple model of risk perception by extending the standard expected utility model is 
developed below. The main idea is that subjective perception of risk can alter both the 
perception of the probability associated with an outcome and the valuation of such 
outcome, as expressed by the individual utility function.   
 Let Pbi be the true underlying probability that individual i will experience bad 
health. The probability is indexed by individual to allow for different individuals to have 
different probabilities of bad health outcomes, since it is documented that certain 
individuals are burdened more by sources of health risks than others (e.g. Bullard, 1983). 




suggest that individuals with very low perceptions of risk actually view risky outcomes as 
less likely to happen than the true probability, while those with high perceptions of risk 
believe that these outcomes are more likely to happen (Viscusi, 1993). Therefore, when 
 
i =1, the individual perception of risk is equal to the objective risk associated with an 
outcome. Allowing 
 
i  to be different than one, and possibly to be different across 
individuals, highlights the role of individual perception of risk in shaping subjective 
evaluations of risky outcomes. First, insights from the risk perception literature suggest 
that perceptions of risk affect the perceived probability of outcomes. This consideration 
points toward using perceived probabilities instead of true probabilities as weights in the 
expected utility function. We have: 
 EUi = PBi i Ui (B)+ (1 PBi i ) Ui (G)     (3.4) 
Ui(B) and Ui(G) have the same meaning as defined in equation 3.2. 
 Further, the risk perception literature suggests that perceptions of risk influence 
not only perceived probabilities of outcomes, but also how individuals value outcomes. In 
other words, the perception of risk by individual i should not only influence the 
subjective probabilities that i associates to risky outcomes, but also enter as an argument 
of individual i’s utility function. The Pratt-Arrow measure of relative risk aversion is 
another measure of aversion to risk, but is specific to risks associated with particular 
options, not an overall measure of risk. In order to simply capture this idea, assume that 
individuals have constant relative risk aversion utility functions, which assumes a 




       (3.5) 
Where Hi {B,G}. Also,  represents the relative risk aversion coefficient with 0 1. 
We assume that the level of relative risk aversion, , is the same across all individuals. 
This formulation of the utility function allows for the degree of risk perception to 
influence individual utility. In fact, using equation 3.4, the expected utility of individual i 
is: 
 EUi = PBi i
B
i
+ (1 PBi i )
G
i
     (3.6) 




= (1 ) i
Hi
     (3.7) 
We are interested in comparing risk aversion across individuals relative to the same type 
of outcome (B, G respectively). Therefore, we can normalize the outcome of B=1 and 
G= , where >1, in order to simplify equation (3.7) to: 
 rBi = (1 ) i  and      (3.8) 
 rGi = (1 ) i  (3.9) 
for each outcome (B, G). Individual perception of risk, i, directly determines the level of 
absolute risk aversion for individual i, because it influences the concavity of the 
individual utility function. As it is clear from equation (3.8 and 3.9), an increase in 
perception of risk increases the level of absolute risk aversion. Since ri influences the 
probability that individual i will be WTP to insure against risk, then this simple model 
provides an immediate empirical link from perceptions of risk to absolute risk aversion 
and the probability of WTP. 
 The model shown here assumes a dichotomous health outcome: good or bad 
health. In this study, respondents were given the probabilities of bad health outcomes, 
and thus also given the probabilities of good health outcomes. Because of the treatment 
of health outcomes as being dichotomous, the modeling of health outcomes as 
dichotomous is appropriate. But for other risks, the health outcome may not be as simple. 
In these cases health may be more accurately represented by a continuous health outcome. 
In these cases, the expected utility would be based on the underlying distribution of the 
probabilities of health outcomes. Perceptions of risk would still have an influence on the 
expected utility since the measure would still be based on the utility of health outcomes 
outlined in equation 3.5 and the perceived probabilities of outcomes. Overall, the 
influence of  on expected utility, and thus behavior with continuous health outcomes 
will be uniform.    
 The data from the previous section will be used to test not only the consistency of 
this link between the three literatures, but also to determine if different groups exhibit 
systematic differences within the results.  
3.3.2 Loomis et al Findings 
The study conducted by Loomis et al (2009) used the traditional model of 
willingness to pay without incorporating perceptions of risk. The original methodology 
adopted by Loomis et al. used a conjoint approach based on the theoretical foundation of 
the random utility stated preference model. Using an expected utility framework, adults 
were given a dichotomous choice stated preference survey following Hanemann’s (1984) 
exposition of the utility difference foundation. In their model, the first choice was a ‘no 
action’ choice associated with no cost. The alternative choice given would reduced 
infant’s risk of brain damage, shock, and death and was associated with a one-time cost 
of  $Z, which varied across the sample. The overall water quality and associated risks 
were determined though numerous discussions with water quality specialists.  
The experiment included one cost factor and three risk factors; brain damage, shock, and 
death. For the ‘no action’ option, the cost was zero and the risk of shock, brain damage, 
and death were set at the baseline levels of 100/1000, 40/1000, and 9/1000 respectively. 
For the alternative of ‘buy bottled water’ there were five varying levels of each risk, of 
which, one was chosen randomly for each survey for each risk category. Two treatments 
were included in the study. For the consequential treatment, respondents were asked to 
pay real money for the bottled water from a sufficient amount of money given to the 
respondents to create a real opportunity cost of purchasing bottled water. The second 
treatment was non-consequential and included a hypothetical payment. For both 
treatments, the survey packets included an explanation of the risks associated with the 
current level of water quality, and how purchasing bottled water would decrease these 
risks. Respondents were also informed of the layout of the questionnaire to increase 
understanding and decrease non-meaningful responses.  
The data consisted of 188 completed surveys from Colorado households. Each 
packet included four willingness to pay questions. Once protest votes were eliminated, an 
effective sample size of 689 remained with 570 female responses, 103 male responses, 
314 white responses and 168 Hispanic responses. Both gender and ethnicity were coded 
as a dummy variable, yet only gender was included in the econometric model. The gender 
dummy variable was coded as one for male respondents and zero for female.  
The authors believed that the amount a respondents would be willing to pay 
depended on the cost or price of bottled water, the associated risk of infant health 
problem, how much they believed bottled water reduced these risks, whether the payment 
was real or hypothetical, the smell of their existing water, their gender, and perceived 
levels of control and norms around health issues. The econometric model therefore used 
is as follows: 
 
Prob (WTP > cost) =f(cost, risks, mode, smell, bottled, gender, perceived control, water 
norms)1 
The results reached by Loomis et al. are shown in Table 3.2 
 
 
Table 3.2 Loomis et al. Results 
Variable Coefficient  Probability 
Cost -0.001269 0.0629 
Real Cost Dummy -0.009515 0.0000 
Shock  0.022628 0.0029 
Brain Damage  0.041088 0.0211 
Death  0.104565 0.0866 
Survey Mode -1.059893 0.0000 
Water Smell -0.338202 0.0060 
Bottled  0.91329 0.0000 
Gender -1.151328 0.0000 
Perceived Water Control  0.528444 0.0084 
Water Norms  0.418877 0.0005 
Constant -1.887061 0.0331 
Log Likelihood -425.2796   
 
The variable Cost is the one time cost to the respondent. The Real Cost Dummy 
represents whether the survey was hypothetical or consequential (hypothetical = 1, 
consequential=0). Survey mode represents if the survey was conducted in-person (1) or 
through mail (0). Water smell is a four-point scale with 1 indicating a strong unpleasant 
smell up to a 4, indicating no smell. Bottled indicates whether the respondent thought that 
bottled water reduces the risk of nitrates (yes = 1, no = 0). Perceived Water Control is the 
control the respondent perceived over their drinking water and Water Norms are 
subjective norms for being concerned about drinking water quality.  
The results reached by Loomis et al. support standard economic theory. The 
statistically significant negative coefficient on cost indicates a downward sloping demand 
curve for bottled water. Also, the effect on willingness to pay for bottled water from 
reductions in the risk of infant death, brain damage, and shock are positive, suggesting 
that when bottled water reduces these risks, respondents are willing to pay more for 
bottled water. The statically significant negative coefficient on the Real Cost Dummy 
also supports theory since those who received a hypothetical payment are willing to pay 
more than those who received a consequential payment. Also–and not surprisingly–the 
results show that those who believe that bottled water reduces the risk of nitrates are 
more likely to pay for bottled water.  
Of further interest is the coefficient on gender which shows that women are more 
likely to pay for bottled water, a conclusion that seems to support the risk perception and 
risk aversion literatures. The model also suggests those who perceive more control over 
water quality will be more likely to pay for bottled water along with those who seem to 
be more concerned with water quality. 
The results reached by Loomis et al. seem to support the theoretical link between 
the literatures. However, the use of a dummy variable for gender without including 
interaction effects, not including ethnicity, and ignoring other important right hand side 
variables, raises many questions about the robustness of the results. The econometric 
model that is developed in this chapter addresses such questions. 
3.3.3 Study Incorporating Perceptions of risk in Stated Valuation 
 The current study uses the data collected by Loomis et al (2009), but uses an 
alternative methodology and estimates the model introduced in section 3.3.1 
 
3.3.3.1 Methodology 
The method adopted in the present study uses a random effects logit model for 
estimations in order to control for the fact that each individual was asked four WTP 
questions. Instead of including dummy variables for race and gender, separate random 
effects logit regression models are completed for gender and race groups2. Running 
separate regressions is an improvement over adding gender and race as dummy variables 
since these factors have been shown to interact with other independent variables in 
significant ways (Figart, 1997). Since gender and race interact with many other 
socioeconomic and demographic variables, not adequately controlling for these 
interactions runs the risk of using underspecified modeling. 
 Due to the economic structure of Colorado and its dependence on agricultural labor, 
the only ethnic groups with a large enough sample to get robust results are White and 
Hispanic. To be comparable to the risk perception literature, variables are included to 
measure perceptions of risk and social norms. Also socioeconomic variables are 
incorporated in the econometric model, such as income and years of schooling. 
3.3.3.2 Results 
Several differences between men and women and between whites and Hispanics are 
found within the sample. Women answering the survey were over twice as likely to have 
a live-in family member that had been pregnant within the last three years and have 
children under the age of 18 than men. Those women sampled were younger, had more 
years of schooling, and had lower stated household incomes than men. When comparing 
those who identified themselves as white to Hispanic, whites were less likely to have had 
a pregnancy within the household in the last three years and have children under the age 
of 18 than Hispanics. Whites were also found to be younger, have fewer years of 
schooling, and have a significantly lower income than sampled Hispanics. These 
differences in the sample show that there is heterogeneity amongst the different sub-
groups of the population and, unlike Loomis et al. (2009), need to be included in the 
econometric models in order to accurately control for the heterogeneity.  
The risk perception literature finds that women are more likely to take voluntary 
actions to protect themselves against risk. This finding is substantiated by this study with 
women being more likely to use a water filter (Table 3.3). On the other hand, Hispanics 
are found to be less likely to use a filter and spend less money on bottled water. But, 
Hispanics are found to be more likely to use bottled water while nursing, indicating that 
Hispanics are also are more likely to take voluntary action when the risks are perceived to 
be higher, further substantiating the risk perception findings.  
The results from Table 3.3 suggest that women perceive more risk associated with 
nitrates in drinking water. Women are more likely than men to think their drinking water 
is unsafe, believe that it is more important to test the quality of drinking water, and 
believe that it is not normal for infants to be ill more often than adults. These findings 
support not only the risk perception literature, but also the risk aversion literature. On the 
other hand, Hispanics are also found to perceive more risk by believing that their 
drinking water is less safe than whites and also believing that it is more important to test 
the quality of the water. This finding corroborates the risk perception literature, but is 
seemingly in contradiction to the risk aversion literature.  
Table 3.3: Sample Differences 3 
Variable Men Women White Hispanic 
Pregnancy (% yes)4 0.35 0.75483871 0.636363636 0.803921569 
    chi2=57.0339***5 chi2=22.4116*** 
Kids under 18 (% yes) 0.307692308 0.801282051 0.679012346 0.921568627 
  chi2=110.3860*** chi2=41.9366*** 
Use a filter (% yes) 0.346153846 0.446540881 0.543209877 0.288461538 
  chi2=3.6701* chi2=33.3073*** 
Use bottled water while nursing 1 (only 8) 0.825 0.777777778 0.923076923 
     (% yes) chi2=1.6800 chi2=4.7122** 
Age (mean) 38.48 31.27097 33.625 31.07843 
    z = -5.478*** z =  -3.167*** 
Schooling (mean) 13.30769 13.59211 15.0679 11.04167 
  z =   1.927* z = -11.545*** 
 
Table 3.3 also suggests that women and Hispanics not only perceive more risk 
from the high nitrate levels, but also are more likely to support further public action to 
reduce the risks than men and whites. Both groups believe that more public funds should 
be used to promote infant health and that infant health should be more of a public issue, 
where not all of the responsibility for maintaining infant health lies on parents. Assuming 
that individuals believe that devoting more public funds to infant health would mean 
either an increase in tax revenue or a decrease in other public projects, individuals 
understand that supporting more funds will be costly. These findings suggest that women 
and Hispanics would be more likely to pay for insurance to reduce infant health risks. 
Since Hispanics are more likely to take costly action, they are predicted to have higher 
levels of risk perceptions.  
Pregnancy, Kids under 18, Use a filter, and Use bottled water while nursing are coded: Yes=1, No=0. 
Age and Schooling are coded in years and refer to the respondent. Income refers to stated household 
income. The rank variables are based on a 5-point scale with a 5= ‘Strongly Agree’ with the statement, 
4=’Agree’, 3=’Don’t Know’, 2=’Disagree’, and 1=’Strongly Disagree’ with the statement.  
 
4 Chi2 and Z-statistics measure differences between the stated groups. The sample difference statistics were 
determined using Chi2 tests for dichotomous variables and Wilcox-Mann-Whitney tests for categorical 
variables. 
 
5 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Looking at the interaction between gender and race, the results (Table 3.4) show 
greater differences. The strongest demographic differences are between white women and 
Hispanic women, with Hispanic women being more likely to have infants and children, 
be younger, have less years of schooling, and have significantly lower family incomes. 
Due to the relatively small sample size of men–specifically Hispanic men–the results do 
not indicate the same level of differences with regard to men, but do show differences 
between white women and white men. The Hispanic women sampled reported a higher 
level of pregnancy and children, a lower age, and a lower household income.  
Table 3.4 also indicates that Hispanic women perceive more risks from drinking 
water and–although they spend less money on bottled water overall–will be more likely 
to use bottled water when nursing than white women. Hispanic women are also more 
supportive of public programs for improving infant health. Interacting gender and race 
reveals the extent of differences between groups. These results highlight the need to 
account for both gender and race differences in any similar study. In particular, they 
support the inclusion of a wide range of explanatory variables that should be included 
into econometric modeling, especially people’s perceptions of health risks. 
The results from Tables 3.3 and 3.4 suggest heterogeneity in the perceptions and 
beliefs amongst the respondents in the sample. Therefore, pooling all the data without 
proper interaction terms may lead to inaccurate results. We believe, like Loomis et al. 
(2009), that individual valuation should depend on the cost of bottled water and the 
associated risks. But unlike the previous authors, we include socioeconomic and 










































































































































































































































































































   





























































































































































































































   





















































































































































































































































































































































that indicate the level of perceived risks associated with water quality, and other specific 
perceptions. The dependent variable is based on the choice of ‘no action’ (choice = 0) or 
to pay the stated amount for bottled water (choice = 1). The econometric model is: 
Prob (WTP >cost) =f(cost, infant risks, perceived risk, norms, demographics, 
socioeconomics)6 
From Table 3.5, the sign on the coefficient for cost, although not always significant, 
is in the expected direction, indicating that when the cost of bottled water increases, 
people are less willing to pay the stated amount. Also the results for risk of shock, brain 
damage, and death, when significant, are in the hypothesized direction; when risks 
associated with bottled water decrease, respondents are more likely to be willing to pay 
for the good. The impact of schooling is not significant for any group, and income is only 
significant for Hispanics. Age2 is highly significant for Hispanics and Hispanic women, 
but is insignificant for all other group. 
Chow likelihood ratio tests were performed to determine the differences between 
the groups within the survey. A Chow test is a form of a likelihood ratio test that is used 
to determine the significance of differences between coefficients of disjoint subgroups 
within a sample when estimated using the same model. In this case, each of the 
subgroups are disjoint subgroups of the overall sample and the same model is used to 
estimate the behavior of each group. The results of the chow test are reported in Table 3.6.  
Wald tests have been conducted that determine the ‘mode’ and ‘hypothetical’ variables are not necessary 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.6: Chow Likelihood Ratio Tests on Differences between Groups   
Women v Men Whites v Hispanics White Women, Hispanic Women, White Men 
LR chi2  =  14.29 LR chi2  =  255.26*** LR chi2  =   227.38*** 
Prob > chi2 =  0.3539 Prob > chi2 =  0.0000 Prob > chi2 =  0.0000 
    
 There is no significant difference between the coefficients of men and women, 
and therefore in theory these two groups of data could be pooled. On the other hand, 
Whites and Hispanics have significantly different estimates on coefficients and therefore 
the data should not be pooled. The same result is found between White Women, Hispanic 
Women, and White Men. These results suggest that influences on choice of paying for 
bottled water are significantly different among these groups and pooling the data is 
inappropriate. Since many of the subsequent results and tables rely on the estimates from 
the logit regressions, the likelihood ratio tests suggest that significant differences exist 
amongst the groups.   
The mean willingness to pay for bottled water can be calculated for each group 
based on the logit regression, as long as the group exhibits a downward sloping demand 
curve for bottled water. Unfortunately, only the groups White, Women, and White 
Women have a significantly downward sloping demand curve, and thus the mean values 
of willingness to pay are limited to these groups. Using the Hanneman technique, a 
common tool used in the CVM literature, Table 3.7 gives the mean willingness to pay 
amongst these groups. 
Table 3.7: Mean Willingness to Pay for Bottled Water by Group   
  Women White White Women 
Mean WTP $631.33 $1610.40 $759.06 
 
 Due to the lack of a significantly downward sloping demand curve for some 
groups, the mean willingness to pay for bottled water cannot be calculated for each group, 
limiting the usefulness of this measure in comparing behavior among the groups. The 
mean probability of being willing to pay the stated amount can be calculated for each 
group and be used for appropriate comparisons. Using the technique introduced in 
equation 3.3, the probabilities of groups’ willingness to pay for bottled water is: 
Prob (WTP>cost) =1 1
1+ e 0+ 1(cos t )+ 3 (risk )+ 4 ( perceptions)+ 5 (norms)+ 6 (demographics)+ 7socioeconomics
 (3.10)
 
Probabilities of WTP are given in Table 3.8. The results indicate that women are more 
likely to pay for bottled water than men, whites more likely than Hispanics, and white 
women more likely than both Hispanic women and white men. Each group’s mean 
probability of paying is based on the coefficient estimates from the group’s logit 
regression reported in Table 3.5 and the mean value of each of the variables. Therefore 
the mean probabilities reflect group differences in each of the included variables such as 
income, schooling, and perceptions of risk.   
Table 3.8: Probabilities of Mean WTP by Group8,9 
  All All All All White Hispanic White 
Group Women Men Hispanics Whites Women Women Men 
Prob. of 
WTP 0.967 0.925 0.812 0.9996 0.9975 0.966 0.888 
 
8 These results are only an estimation. The insignificant coefficient on cost prohibits precise probability 
calculations. Probability for Hispanic men is unavailable due to the lack of associated logit results. 
 
9 The values of the mean probability of WTP and the mean WTP by group presented in Table 3.7 seem to 
be very high. Based on the logit regression, the results are estimated based on a very small cost for bottled 
water. When the cost of bottled water was low, a high percent of respondents were willing to pay for its 
availability. Thus the seemingly high values are based on the logit results of a low cost on bottled water.
Contrary to the apparent robustness of the finding on willingness to pay from Table 
3.8, results from the logit model suggest a possible problem with these findings. 
Potentially, the most interesting result from Table 3.5 relates to ‘My Community has Safe 
Drinking Water’. Although many questions were asked that assessed the safety of the 
available drinking water, the authors believe that ‘My Community has Safe Drinking 
Water’ was best proxy for infant health risks associated with drinking water since it is not 
specific to the respondents’ own water source, and measures the overall level of risk 
throughout the community. Other questions were asked about respondent’s own water 
quality, but these were felt not to capture a communal water quality since there are 
multiple sources of water for those included in the survey. Therefore, those respondents 
without infants can assess the quality of drinking water available to infants in other 
households. For men, whites, and white females, the significant negative coefficient on 
‘My Community has Safe Drinking Water’ indicates that those who perceive the quality 
of their drinking water as better have a lower probability of being willing to pay for 
bottled water. This is the relationship that is expected between these two variables. On 
the other hand, Hispanics and Hispanic women have a significantly positive coefficient 
on ‘My Community has Safe Drinking Water,’ indicating that those who have a higher 
probability of willingness to pay for bottled water perceive their drinking water to be 
safer than those with a lower probability, even when controlling for income. For 
Hispanics, especially Hispanic women, those with higher perceptions of risk are less 
likely to take steps to reduce those risks. Within the content of a CVM study, in terms of 
the consistency between risk perceptions and WTP, we find consistencies for some 
groups – men, whites, and white women – but inconsistencies for Hispanics and Hispanic 
Women. This finding signifies a need to further study the theories to find the source of 
the discrepancy.    
3.3.3.3 Empirical Example 
 The survey used by Loomis et al. includes the probabilities associated with infant 
shock, brain damage, and death due to high nitrate levels in drinking water. Specific to 
the risk of infant death, the associated probability is given as 9/1,000 deaths for all infants. 
In terms of the empirical model, Pb=9/1,000. The level of individual risk perception, i 
can take on values based on 0 < i
1
Pbi




0 i 111.11. The variable ‘My community has safe drinking water’ was the best variable 
for capturing perceptions of risk associated with infant health and drinking water. As 
stated above, this variable was chosen because of its appropriateness for all respondents 
in the sample, not just those with infants in the household. ‘My community has safe 
drinking water’ is a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 5. To ensure that i has the 
proper range and maintains the perceptions of respondents, the transformation i=5/rank 
was chosen. Although the upper bound for i is 111.1, and lower bound of 0, the current 
transformation was chosen to prevent overestimating, or underestimating perceptions of 
risk. For an individual i, who stated that their water quality was safe by giving a rank of 5, 
their associated perception of risk would be 1. The perception of risk measures ranged as 
higher as 5 for those individuals indicating that their water quality was unsafe by giving a 
rank of 1. These transformed measures are presented in table 3.9. 
 
 
Table 3.9: Transformation of Risk Perceptions Variables  
My community has safe drinking water (rank) 1 2 3 4 5 
 Transformation 5 2.5 1.67 1.25 1 
 
 Using the data based on the responses to ‘My Community has Safe Drinking 
Water”, mean values for risk perceptions are calculated for gender and race groups. The 
transformed values are given in Table 3.10.  
Table 3.10: Mean Risk Perception by Group 
  All All All All Hispanic White White Hispanic 
Group Women Men White Hispanic Women Women Men Men 
Original mean 
of rank  3.25 3.92 3.56 2.77 2.76 3.46 4 3 
 Transformed   1.5385 1.2755 1.4045 1.8051 1.8116 1.4451 1.25 1.6667 
 
As seen from Table 3.4, the levels of risk perceptions vary for each group, with Hispanic 
women perceiving the most risk and white men perceiving the least risk. Since, the mean 
level of  is a transformation of the original mean rank, the tests from Table 3.4 indicate 
that these values do vary between groups. 
 From equation 3.8, the mean level of absolute risk aversion can be calculated and 
perceived probabilities of bad health outcomes can be calculated from equation 3.6 for 
each group. Since the value of  in not specific to the individual, any value can be chosen 
for explanatory purposes. A survey of the risk aversion literature finds that the actual 
level of relative risk aversion ranges between =.44 (Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey, 2000) to 
=.67 (James Cox and Ronald Oaxaca, 1996)10. Based on this range, the initial value 
=.5 is chosen. The results are shown in Table 3.11.  
10 Empirical evidence suggests that the level of relative risk aversion is within a range including .5. For the 
present purposes the choice of  does not impact the results since altering the value leads to a monotonic 
Table 3.11. Mean Risk Perception, Risk Aversion, Perceived Probabilities of Bad Outcome, and ‘Pay’ 
Group  Mean  Mean r Mean Pb  Probability of ‘Pay’ 
All Women 1.5385 0.7693 0.01385 0.967 
All Men 1.2755 0.6378 0.01148 0.925 
All Whites 1.4045 0.7023 0.01264 0.9996 
All Hispanics 1.8051 0.9026 0.01625 0.812 
Hispanic Women 1.8116 0.9058 0.01630 0.966 
White Women  1.4451 0.7226 0.01301 0.9975 
White Men 1.2500 0.6250 0.01125 0.888 
Hispanic Men 1.6667 0.8334 0.01500 * 
 
The results from Table 3.11 show that, not only are there seemingly differences 
between perceptions of risk amongst the groups, but there are also possible differences in 
levels of absolute risk aversion, perceived probabilities of bad health, and probability of 
‘Pay’. The results from the group perceptions of risk support findings from the risk 
perception literature, and show a direct link between perceptions of risk and group levels 
of absolute risk aversion. Women are found to have a higher degree of absolute risk 
aversion when compared to men. This finding is also consistent with the risk aversion 
literature. On the other hand, whites are found to, on average, have a lower degree of 
absolute risk aversion than Hispanics, which contradicts the results from the risk aversion 
literature. When gender and race are integrated, Hispanic women are found to perceive 
the most risk, resulting in the highest level of risk aversion, while white men having the 
lowest level of risk aversion. Again, these results are consistent with the risk aversion 
literature with respect to gender, but not for race. 
 From Table 3.11, the level of perceived probability of infant death (bad health 
outcome) with current water is relatively high. Including perceptions of risk increases the 
perceived probability from 9/1,000 or .009 to .0163 for Hispanic women. This shows not 
transformation of the mean absolute risk aversion levels and therefore will not impact the interpretation of 
the results based on gender and race differences.   
only that the inclusion of risk perceptions greatly influence perceived probabilities, but 
also that it has the potential to significantly increase the concavity of the utility function. 
Again, the results show that Hispanic women have the highest perceived probability of 
infant death, while white men have the lowest.   
 From the survey, the probability of ‘Pay’ differs among the groups, although each 
is very high. The results noted in Table 3.11 suggest a possible inconsistency between the 
three variables: risk perception, risk aversion, and probability of ‘Pay” for certain groups. 
The findings for women and men are coherent with the empirical model. Women are 
found to perceive more risk, have a higher level of risk aversion, and also have a higher 
probability of ‘Pay’ than men. The data conflicts with the empirical model comparing 
whites to Hispanics. Whereas Hispanics perceive more risk and have a higher degree of 
absolute risk aversion, they have a lower probability of being willing to pay for bottled 
water than whites. The results and empirical model are also consistent with respect to 
white men, but are again inconsistent with respect to Hispanic women. 
 The apparent inconsistency between the findings for perceptions of risk, risk 
aversion, and perceived probabilities and the estimated probability of ‘Pay’ for certain 
cultural subgroups may be due to an assumed role of government. From Table 3.4, 
Hispanics and Hispanic women believe that more state funds should be devoted to infant 
health when compared to whites and white women, respectively. Since water is usually 
supplied through municipal sources, it may be assumed that the state government should 
be responsible for increasing water quality. Since CVM methodology assesses valuation 
through WTP from individual income constraints, the assumed funding for increased 
water quality is through individual payment, not through public funds. The groups that 
believe more state funds need to be devoted may not state a high WTP even in the face of 
high perceptions of risk, because personal spending is not believed to be the mechanism 
for increased water quality. This is a possible explanation for the disassociation between 
CVM and risk perception findings for goods that have a public aspect of funding. 
Possible misestimations of valuation from CVM studies for certain subgroups for these 
goods may result. 
3.5. Conclusion  
 The subject of gender and race and their relation to environmental and public 
health decisions are increasingly becoming a topic of interest to those in many fields, 
especially economics, sociology, and psychology. The results from previous empirical 
studies on and gender race give mixed results across these fields. This study uses data 
previously collected by Loomis et al. (2009) on willingness to pay for increased water 
quality. In contrast to their results, the results of the present analysis reconfirm the 
possible inconsistent results of individual perceptions of risk, levels of risk aversion, and 
willingness to pay for cleaner water for some gender and race groups. The results show 
that for whites in general, men, and specifically white women, those with higher risk 
perception are willing to pay more for cleaner water and reduced risks.  However the 
results suggest that for Hispanics in general and Hispanic women specifically, those who 
perceive more risks are less likely to be willing to pay to reduce the risks. This finding for 
Hispanics and Hispanic women are contradictory to theory and motivate further research 
into the anomalous finding. 
 To further evaluate the findings, this paper creates an empirical model of risk 
perception that is consistent with the existing models of willingness to pay and risk 
aversion. Using the stated risk of infant death, mean group perceptions of risk, perceived 
probabilities of infant death, rates of absolute risk aversion, and willingness to pay for 
increased water quality are calculated. For men, whites, and white women, these 
calculations are consistent with the theoretical model, but are inconsistent for Hispanics 
and Hispanic women. 
 The data shows a consistency between group perceptions of risk and levels of 
absolute risk aversion. The estimates of the probability of paying the stated amounts are 
consistent with perceptions of risk and risk aversion for whites, white women, and men, 
suggesting that the estimates are possibly a good measure of valuation for these groups. 
On the other hand, for Hispanics, especially Hispanic women, the estimates of the 
probability of paying are inconsistent with group perceptions of risk and risk aversion. 
These findings suggest that for certain cultural subgroups, CVM may not elicit accurate 
measures of valuation for certain types of goods.  
 From a policy perspective, the results from this study suggest a possible 
misestimation of valuation for certain cultural subgroups by CVM studies with respect to 
goods that are publicly funded. Because of the use of CVM in benefit costs analyses on 
public policies, these results imply a possible inaccuracy of measurements of benefits, 
and ultimately may impact the adoption decision for health-related public policies. 
 An important area of future work is to create a survey that can capture not only 
perceptions of risk, level of risk aversion, and willingness to pay, but also the reason 
behind the inconsistency for certain groups. Future research is also recommended that 
determines the extent to which the results of this study extend to other cultural subgroups, 
different regions, and for different types of goods.  
 The results of this study are limited to the San Luis Valley of Colorado and 
should not be applied to the general population. The findings only apply to issues of 
water quality specific to high levels of nitrates in drinking water and should be extended 
to other goods with caution. Also, the sampling method led to a small sample of men, 
specifically Hispanic men that limited the results for these groups.   
 
Chapter 4: Theoretical Models of Social Preference-Based Behavior 
 When determining what motivates respondents’ stated WTP in CVM studies, an 
understanding of the nuances of individual preferences is central. Although the 
methodology of CVM assumes that individuals are motivated by self-interest only, many 
motives can affect the choices of individuals. Authors have shown that people deviate 
from the self-interest assumptions (Henrich, et al., 2004). “Many behaviors are better 
explained by social preferences; in choosing to act, individuals commonly take account 
not only of the consequences of their actions for themselves but for others as well” 
(Bowles, 2006 p. 96).  This chapter will delineate these different motives and explain 
how each enters into WTP.  
4.1 Self-Interest 
 Self-interest is an assumption about human behavior made in neoclassical 
economic theory. Stated clearly by Edgeworth “the first principle of economics is that 
every agent is actuated only by self-interest” (1881, p. 104). As outlined in Chapter 2, 
CVM relies heavily on this assumption in the methodology and modeling of WTP.  
Respondents are assumed to maximize the utility they receive through the direct 
consumption of market goods and the given level of the nonmarket good. Since the 
nonmarket good in question can be consumed by other individuals, the stated WTP
depends on the amount individuals want to consume themselves and the amount 
consumed by other people.  
Simple Case: Two individuals 
Assume that there are only two agents: Individual i and individual j. Individual i 
receives utility from the direct consumption of market goods, xi and nonmarket good pi, 
but not utility from the availability of the nonmarket good to individual j, pj. In the most 
simplistic case of self-interest, individuals will base their choices on: 
maxui = f (xi, pi )       (4.1) 
  s.t,        (4.2)  
Assuming that the price of x is Q, and the price of pi, and pj are one, the optimal level of 
x and pi will depend on the functional form of , but pj*=0. In the basic example 
where  
     (4.3) 




Resulting in ,  and . Income is denoted as I. 
 Contingent valuation techniques are commonly used to estimate the value of 
public goods-goods that are non-rival and non-excludable-such as clean air and military 
I =Qxi + pi + pj
f (xi, pi )











p*i = bI p* j = 0
defense. In these cases, the amount of good p devoted to individual i is indistinguishable 
to that devoted to individual j, where pi=pj. For these goods, individual i’s decision will 
be based on: 
   Max equation 4.1 




 In reality, the majority of goods and services provided and estimated through 
contingent valuation techniques are not pure public goods. Many goods and services, 
such as health vaccinations may be both rival and excludable, but still have a public 
aspect to them. For these types of goods, decisions are based on the budget constraint 
presented in equation 4.2 where individual i can choose the level of pi and pj 
independently. The results of both types of goods are included in each model below. 
If this assumption of self-interest holds true, then CVM studies should report that 
the valuation respondents place on the amount of good, p, for others to consume, pj, 
should be zero. But many economists are not naïve enough to assume that any stated 
preference relies solely on self-interest. There are a large number of motives that 
influence individuals besides that of pure self-interest. Some of these preferences have 
been estimated by previous CVM studies, like altruism (e.g Loomis et al., 2009), but 
evidence suggests that many more motives exist that influence decision-making (e.g. Falk 
and Fischbacher, 1998, Fehr and Schmidt 1999).  
 




p* j = p*i = bI
 
 
4.2 A Theory of Altruism 
 Generally speaking, the implication of altruism is that an individual’s utility 
depends not only on her own welfare, but on the welfare of others as well (Popp, 2001, p. 
341). Altruism can be incorporated into neoclassical theory since individuals are still 
maximizing their own utility. Unlike pure self-interest, those acting out of altruistic 
motives “take costly actions to increase the payoff of another actor, irrespective of the 
other actor’s previous action” (Camerer and Fehr, 2002). Therefore no strategic 
interaction needs to occur for altruism to enter into preferences. Because of the public 
nature of goods in which CVM estimates values, motives without strategic interaction are 
important.  
 A lot of work has been done that measures the existence of altruism in stated 
valuation. Some studies find that altruism plays little to no role in decision-making, and 
that individuals are motivated by self-interest (e.g. Deacon and Shapiro, 1975). But more 
recent, and possibly more sophisticated studies find that altruistic motives shape 
preferences especially for environmental and health related goods (e.g. Loomis et al., 
2009: Guagnano, Dietz and Stern, 1994: Popp, 2001).  
 Below is a very simple model that includes altruism and self-interest motivations 
in decision-making. Like the pure self-interest case, the objective of the individual is to 
maximize utility, which depends on personal consumption of xi and pi from , and 
the utility that individual j receives from pj, noted . The income constraint is the 
same as in the self-interest case.   
f (xi, pi )
g(pj )
       (4.5)
 
          s.t. equation 4.2 
 
where  is the degree to which an individual favors self-interest and  is the degree of 
altruism. Where 0   1 and 0   1. When f(xi,pi) is defined as in equation 4.3 and  
      (4.6) 





The optimal level of xi, pi, and pj, depend on income, I, the level of self-interest,  
and altruism, . Note that if individual  i is completely self-interested then =1 and =0, 
and the objection function ui, collapses down to the self-interested model noted above. 
On the other hand, if =0 and  = 1 a corner solution is chosen where  and 
. Using this simple model of human behavior, if individual i is willing to 
pay to have pj > 0, then altruism must be the motivation behind the statement of value.  
 The comparative statics may be the most important implications of behavior. 
Using the first order conditions, calculating total derivatives, and using Kramer’s rule to 
solve for individual i’s comparative statics give: , , , 
maxui = i f (xi, pi )+ ig(pj )










I =Qxi + pi + pj
p* j = I
x*i = p*i = 0
xi * > 0 xi * < 0 pi * > 0
, , and . That is, if individual i become more self-
interested, then the amount of market goods, xi, and pi consumed will increase, while the 
amount of the public good devoted to individual j will decrease. If on the other hand, 
individual i becomes more altruistic, then the opposite will happen: the amount of xi, and 
pi consumed will decrease, while pj will increase. Therefore individual i’s WTP for pi and 
pj will be consistent with these finding in cases where pi and pj are distinguishable. In 
cases of a pure public good where pi = pj, increases in either self-interest or altruism have 
inconclusive implication on WTP and will depend on the ultimate magnitudes of  and . 
Although altruism is a common extension of behavior used in CVM and evidence 
suggests that it plays a large role, there are limitations in assuming that any non-selfish 
responses must be due only to altruistic motivations. As the next sections will show, 
numerous studies have found that people are motivated by other social preferences 
beyond altruism and any model that accurately captures valuation must be flexible 
enough to account for additional motivations.  
4.3 Reciprocity 
 Altruistic motivations rely on individuals making costly decisions towards others 
regardless of the others’ motivations. Although the addition of altruism improves 
modeling of decision making, the modeling is still incomplete since many actions are in 
responses to beliefs of the intentions of others. Reciprocity11 is still another motivation 
that increases the accuracy of modeling and explaining human behavior. “Reciprocity 
Some make a distinction between strong and weak reciprocity. The notion of reciprocity that is used 
here relates to ideas of strong reciprocity
pi * < 0 pj * < 0 pj * > 0
means that people are willing to reward friendly actions and to punish hostile actions 
although the reward or punishment causes a net reduction in the material payoff of those 
who reward or punish” (Camerer and Fehr, 2002, p. 2). “In many cases, such behavior is 
in conflict with the twin hypotheses of rationality and material self-interest which are the 
foundations of orthodox economic theory” (Sethi, 2003, p. 2).  
 Reciprocity is commonly modeled using the models introduced by Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000), Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Levine (1998). The model 
introduced by Levine is used in this paper since in incorporates self-interest, altruism, and 
reciprocity12. Here individuals act to: 
     (4.7) 
      s.t. equation 4.2  
where .  and  have the same interpretation as above, but with different 
parameters with 0    1 and -1    1  since altruistic behavior is extended to punish 
as well as to reward. The coefficient, , 0    1, represents the motivation of individual 
i to reward individual j when individual i sees individual j behaving well, and punish 
individual j when individual i believes individual j is acting out of spite. Also , 0    1, 
represents the belief of the motivations behind other individuals. If =0, then the level of 
believed behavior of individual j plays no role in the behavior of individual i, and ui 
reduces down to that of a pure altruistic (if >0 or pure spite of <0). Adding  allows the 
model to explain why in some cases an individual is altruistic, and in another spiteful. 
Suppose that individual i has >0 and therefore is altruistic, and cares about individual j’s 
Levine’s model is augmented to include .




intentions; i.e. >0. If individual i feels that individual j is spiteful, i.e. <0, where < , 
then individual i will act in spite. Whereas if > , no matter the size of , then individual 
i will act as an altruist.  





Assuming that  + >0,  ,  , and . When 
incorporating reciprocity into the behavior of individual i, if individual i becomes more 
self-interested, the level of private goods and amount of personal consumption of the 
public good consumed by individual i increase, while the amount devoted in individual j 
will decrease. Also, since  ,  , and , if individual i 
becomes more of an altruist, then the consumption of market goods and personal 
consumption of the public good will decrease, while the amount that individual i devotes 
to j of the nonmarket good will increase. If < , then , ,and  
. That is, if the drive of altruism is less strong than that of the belief of 










I =Qxi + pi + pj
xi * > 0 pi * > 0 pj * < 0
xi * < 0 pi * < 0 pj * > 0
xi * < 0 pi * < 0
pj * > 0
individual i becomes more likely to reward (or punish) individual j. Also , 
, and  if >0. When individual i incorporates his or her feelings 
about the intentions of individual j at a higher level into his or her decisions, then the 
amount of xi and pi will decrease while pj will increase. Therefore WTP decisions will be 
consistent with these findings in cases where individual i can distinguish pi from pj. Again 
for pure public goods, where pi =pj, then changes in any of the above variable will lead to 
inconclusive implication on WTP.  
If = =0, then the utility function will collapse down to the pure self-interested 
behavior model. But studies have found that this is not the case. Individuals commonly 
act with altruistic, spiteful, and reciprocal behaviors.  Laboratory experiments are 
commonly conducted to determine the extent of altruism, self-interest, and reciprocity in 
experimental decisions. To test for the presence of social preferences, many experimental 
games have been conducted including prisoners’ dilemma (Sethi, 2003; Dawes, 1980), 
public goods, ultimatum (Camerer, 2003),  dictator (Camerer, 2003), and third party 
punishment games (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2001). Because of the nature of the public 
goods game, this paper will go into depth on these studies and conclusions of reciprocity. 
 
Public goods games 
 Public good games are a test of reciprocity and elucidate behaviors of punishment 
and generosity. In these games, subjects are grouped with other players under strict 
anonymity. Each player is given points redeemable for real money. In each round, each 
player places an amount of their points into a common account and the remainder in a 
xi * < 0
pi * < 0 pj * > 0
personal account. The total amount in the common account is the sum of all player’s 
contribution increased by a set percent known to the players before the start of the round.  
At the end of the round, players receive an equal portion of the common account plus the 
amount that was set aside in their personal account.  
Free riding, where players put the entire amount of initial points into their 
personal account, is the dominant strategy and corresponds to complete self-interest. 
However, public goods games find that only a fraction of players contribute nothing to 
the common account, with an average of one half of endowments being placed in 
common accounts (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). This shows that players exhibit some form 
of initial altruism in that they were willing to risk some of their endowment for the 
benefit of others. When the game is repeated for many rounds, studies find that most 
players contribute nothing in the final period (Gintis, 2000). This finding does not 
support theories of self-interest, as first thought, since in a surprise second public goods 
game after the final period of the first game is complete, players start again with a high 
level of common contributions (Andreoni, 1998). This behavior supports the explanation 
that in each group, there most likely are selfish players and other who behave reciprocally. 
Since those reciprocal players are willing to contribute if other players contribute, the 
existence of self-interested players causes those with reciprocal motives to notice and 
stop contributing to the common fund (Camerer and Fehr, 2002).  
Reciprocal behavior is prevalent when punishment is added to public goods 
games. Players are able to punish non-contributors at a cost to themselves. In these games, 
the first stage is the same as described in the standard public goods game. In the second 
stage, each player is informed of the contributions by all players in the group. Each 
player can punish other members by assigning punishment points that decreases the other 
member’s points. This punishment costs the punisher a set amount of points. If members 
are self-interested, then players should contribute nothing to the common account in the 
first round, and since punishment is costly, should also not punish other members in the 
second round. Studies find that not only do the majority of players contribute to the 
common account, but when the game is repeated, the number of players that contribute 
increases so that in latter periods close to 100% of the initial endowments are contributed 
(Camerer and Fehr, 2002; Gintis, 2000).    
The findings from public goods games indicate that people are not only motivated 
by self-interest. Altruism and reciprocity are motivations that influence behavior even at 
a personal cost.  Further work into public goods games show that social motivations go 
beyond simplistic reciprocity, but conformity to social norms play a large role in 
contributions (Shang and Croson, 2005). The need to include other social motivations 
will be incorporated by allowing for fairness and commitment.  
Although these games are called public goods games, they are not designed to 
measure the amount that individuals actually would be willing to contribute to public 
goods. Public goods games have not been implemented to measure the valuation of 
nonmarket goods. One of the limitations for these games is the use of strategic 
interactions between players which is not seen in public goods provisioning. But the use 
of strategic interaction can be an integral part of stated valuation in CVM studies if social 
norms or forms of identification influence valuation. The next two sections will introduce 




 The notion of fairness is often important in personal interaction with family 
members, friends, and peers. Considerations of fairness are not limited to personal 
interactions with others. Social behaviors are strongly related by notions of fairness 
including tax schedules (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998), support of public policies 
(Bowles and Gintis, 2000), and support for regulations of private industries (Zajac, 1995).  
Therefore fairness enters into strategic as well as non-strategic choices.    
Many authors do not distinguish behaviors motivated by reciprocity and those 
motivated by fairness (Fehr and Schmidt, 2000). But the definitions of the two indicate 
that there are differences between the two motivations that need to be examined. Whereas 
reciprocity is based on generosity and punishment, the main motive is not for fairness per 
se. Due to the motivation to promote fairness, the models of fairness presented here have 
also be labeled inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 2000).  One commonly used 
fairness/inequality aversion model was introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The 
model can explain self-interest and inequality aversion. A fair utility for individual i 
function is given by: 
        (4.8) 
 where i and j are the material payoffs for the two individuals in question, i i and 
i [0,1]. Since i i, an ‘unfair’ distribution of material payoffs where individual j 
receives more than i, the utility of individual i is affected more than an ‘unfair’ 
distribution where individual i receives more than j. The upper bound on i disallows 
Ui = i imax( j i, 0) imax( i j, 0)
individual i to be self-punishing. Given i’s  own material payoff, his utility will be 
maximized when i= j. 
 
Although adding the aversion to inequitable payoffs is an improvement to 
orthodox models, this specification has limitations. From a mathematical perspective, the 
max operator may make the utility function not twice continuously differentiable leading 
to solutions that are not unique. Knowledge about the material payoffs of each individual 
is required, which may be an unrealistic assumption when there are numerous individuals. 
The model is used to explain strategic behavior in interactions, and may not be 
appropriate for non-strategic behavior. Also, the model can be defined such that some 
individual’s payoffs are more important to individual i than others. This is contradictory 
to the basic idea of an inequality aversion concept of fairness, in which concerns about 
the identity of the other individuals should not impact an individual with high levels of 
fairness. The model is also limited to explaining self-interest and aversion to inequality 
and cannot explain other forms of social preferences. These limitations could be 
substantial when explaining stated preferences in CVM. Therefore the model introduced 
in this paper uses the idea of fairness, but tries to minimize the limitations of existing 
models. Behavior is based on: 
                 (4.9) 
         s.t.  equation 4.2 
where  and  are the same as above, and  is the average level of the nonmarket good 
available to individual i and j. Utility depends positively on the level of self-interest, 
maxui = i f (xi, pi )+ ig(pj ) i (pj p)
2
p
altruism, reciprocity, but negatively on the spread of the distribution of the nonmarket 
good13. If =0, then the utility function collapses down to that of reciprocity behavior.  
 Similar to the Fehr and Schmidt model, utility is maximized when pi=pj, ceteris 
paribus: the most fair and equitable distribution. But, unlike the Fehr and Schmidt model, 
this theory makes a strict distinction between motivations of reciprocity and fairness. 
Reciprocity is behavior that is based on the believed intentions on others, whereas 
fairness is the effect of how equitable the distribution of goods are to all. The benefit of 
modeling fairness this way is that it may be more applicable to instances of public goods 
and other nonmarket goods, where the identity of each individual is not known or plays 
no role in valuation. 





The comparative statistics of the fairness decisions are generally hard to interpret 
in such a way to give meaningful results and implications. Of those meaningful 
comparative statistics, in general , , and . Only when 
pj>pi and  is large enough, will . When the amount of the good devoted to 









2 i (pj p) = 0
I =Qxi + pi + pj
xi * < 0 pi * < 0 pj * > 0
pj * < 0
individual j is greater than that of individual i, increases in fairness behavior will decrease 
the amount of the good devoted to individual j and increase personal consumption of the 
good, i.e. .  
In cases of pure public goods, since , the utility function collapses to 
that of reciprocity. Therefore in cases of pure public goods, motives of fairness do not 
enter into WTP decisions.  
 Each of the behaviors mentioned above introduces motivations that directly effect 
the utility of individuals. Most models of self-interest and social preferences stop at this 
point and do not augment the constraints that individuals face in decision-making, and 
use the mainstream income constraint as the only binding constraint. Although this 
constraint is critical in explaining behavior, other constraints may exist that are central to 
understanding choices.  
4.5 Commitment 
Sen’s theory of commitment offers a determinant of decision-making that may 
explain social preferences. Commitment can be defined as “a person choosing an act that 
he believes will yield a lower level of personal welfare to him … when [he] acts on the 
basis of a concern for duty … [and] the action is really chosen out of the sense of duty 
rather than just to avoid the illfare resulting from the remorse that would occur if [he] 
were to act otherwise,” (Sen, 1977, p. 327) or “a sense of obligation going beyond the 
consequences” (Sen, 1977, p. 342). In essence, commitment can cause people to choose 
an action that will not maximize personal utility in order to fulfill a social or cultural goal 
for a group with whom the person has a sense of identity (Sen, 1985).  
pi * > 0
pi = pj = p
There is a divergence between seemingly unselfish choices that are influenced by 
altruism and that of commitment. Altruism concerns actions that are restricted to the 
extent that they will enter into a person’s own welfare function. Commitment goes 
beyond the constraints of altruism and allows choices that decrease a person’s welfare 
when the choice is made out of a sense of obligation (Sen, 1994) “(Altruism) alone does 
not require any departure from individual-welfare: but commitment does involve 
rejection of that assumption (Sen, 982, p.81).  
Altruism is a motive discussed heavily in environmental economics but the 
discipline has been silent regarding the role of commitment. But–as noted by Sen– 
commitment can help in understanding the behavior in environmental valuation (Sen, 
2005). Environmental movements and policies such as sustainable development, the 
reduction of emissions, and increased water quality can be better understood in the 
context of commitment since the benefits on an individual level in many cases do not 
outweigh the costs to the individuals striving for these environmental policies. Therefore 
a model of valuation must also include commitment. 
Primary to commitment is the concept of identity. The identity of an individual is 
that of social identity, or how individuals identify with others. Sen states that the 
emphasis on self-interest leaves mainstream economic theory unable to include ideas that 
individuals might identify with others in deciding their choices (Sen, 1999). Although 
many individuals identify with their class, race, gender, or other demographic groups, the 
existence of multiple social identifications, makes a control for these variables 
insufficient to measuring the effect of commitment. It is nearly impossible to assume how 
an indvidiual will act because of “conflicting demands [that] arises from different 
identities and affiliations,” (Sen, 1999, p.30). But this is not to overstate the role of 
commitment and identity, choice may be influenced but is not determined by social 
identification. “Social identities are indeed important. So is choice.” (Davis, 2004). 
Sen’s concept of commitment has not been fully explored in explaining 
motivation in willingness to pay decisions. Only one relevant study, conducted by Shiell 
and Rush (2003) explores the ability of CVM studies to capture motivations of 
commitment. The authors make the assumption that given a willingness to pay for 
vaccines decision, an individual motivated by commitment will have difficulty valuing a 
decision that only benefits others. This difficulty arises from the inability of individuals 
motivated by commitment “to internalize the trade-offs required to calculate the personal 
value of a health care good that only benefits other people, [since] respondents motivated 
by commitment are, instead, likely to report what they think is a reasonable contribution 
towards the cost of the program” (Shiell and Rush, 2003, p, 657). Findings suggest the 
existence of commitment amongst respondents that hindered their ability to accurately 
capture stated valuation in CVM studies.     
Since commitment is not the only influence on behavior, a model needs to include 
what Sen called self-centered welfare, self-welfare goal, and self-goal choice (Sen, 2002, 
pp.33-34). Although lumped together in standard economic theory, these three aspects are 
included in assumptions of self-interest. When modeling human behavior, these aspects 
of self-interest are incomplete without adding the motivation of commitment. But unlike 
the self-interest motivations, commitment does not enter into an individual’s utility, but 
the sense of identity places an additional constraint on choice. Including influences of 
commitment leads to the following model: 
Max equation 4.9 
s.t. equation 4.2 
 
Where  represents the level of commitment towards individual j. This level will be 
unique to individual i, since everyone has different levels of commitment towards others. 
The identity of individual j that receives pj will dictate the level of commitment. If an 
individual i identifies with individual j, then  may be relatively high. But if individual i 
does not identify with individual j, then  will approach 0. In essence, Sen states that to 
understand commitment we must understand how individuals identify with groups.  
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When the constraint  is binding, then . In this simple case, the 
existence of binding commitment can only increase the amount individual i is willing to 
devote, or the stated WTP to the consumption of the good by individual j. Even in cases 
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general, this simple case does not explore the effect that commitment for other goods has 
on decisions.  
 
Market Goods Case 
 In reality, individual i may have the option to provide market goods for individual 
j, especially if there is a relationship between the two. Assume that the consumption of 
market goods by individual j that are provided by i is represented by the vector xj. 
Assuming the utility of individual i is that described in equation 4.9, then i’s utility does 
not depend on individual j’s consumption of market goods, xj. Expanding the idea of 
commitment to include individual j’s consumption of xj, i’s decisions are based on:  
  Max equation 4.9 
st      (4.10) 
   
   
where Xij represents the minimum amount of market goods that individual i must provide 
to j, based on commitment.  




    











2 i (pj p) 1 + 2 = 0
I =Qxi + pi + pj
  and 
 
If is a non-binding constraint, then i’s decisions will be the same as in the 
simple case with no market commitment to individual j. When is binding, then 
,  , , and . Therefore, when 
commitment exists for market goods, this may decrease the amount individual i is willing 
to pay to have pi and pj available, even when the consumption of these are positively 
associated with individual i’s utility. Extrapolating this idea to CVM, if individual i has a 
binding commitment to individual j, then the stated willingness to pay out-of-pocket will 
be lower than when the commitment is non-existent or non-binding. Binding commitment 
to market goods, Xij, will reduce the amount of disposable income allocated to all other 
goods and services by individual i. In the context of willingness to pay for a nonmarket 
good, this binding commitment will reduce the amount of disposable income allotted to 
the payment of the good, thus reducing the stated willingness to pay. This finding also 




 To show how the existence of commitment can decrease disposable income, and 
therefore, the stated willingness to pay for a nonmarket good, even when it is positively 
related to utility, an example will be used. Assume that there are now three individuals: 
individuals 1, 2, and 3. Individuals 1 and 2 are asked to pay for the nonmarket good, p, 
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self-interested, has little sense of altruism and reciprocity, and no sense of fairness. On 
the other hand, individual 2 is motivated very little by self-interest, but is highly 
motivated by altruism and positive reciprocity. For simplicity, also assume that individual 
2 is not motivated by fairness. Using the utility function from equation 4.9, assume that 
the following represents the utility of individual 1 and 2 respectively: 
     (4.11) 
   (4.12) 
If f(x,pi) and g(pj) are assumed to be of the form in equations 4.3 and 4.5 respectively, 
a=b=c=.5, and P1=P2=0 where commitment to xj is not accounted for, then the decisions 
of individual 1 and 2 will be based on: 
                         (4.13) 
 (4.14) st 
   
and 
 (4.15) 
                         (4.16) st
   
For individual 1, x1*=22.7, p1*=45.5, and p3*=9.1. Because of the difference in behavior 
of individual 2, x2*=7.1, p2*=14.3, and p3*=71.4. Since individual 2 is motivated less by 
self-interest and more by altruism and positive reciprocity, then he or she should be 
willing to pay more for a higher quantity of p, than individual 1. 
u1 = .5 f (x1, p1)+.5g(p3) 0(p3 p)
2
u2 = .1 f (x2, p2 )+.5g(p3) 0(p3 p)
2
maxu1 = .5(.5log x1 +.5log p1)+.5(.5log p3) 0(p3 p)
2
p3 0
maxu2 = .5(.5log x2 +.5log p2 )+.5(.5log p3) 0(p3 p)
2
p3 0
I =Qx1 + p1 + p3 +Qx3
I =Qx2 + p2 + p3 +Qx3
 When integrating commitment for x3 into decision-making, an inconsistent result 
can be found. Assuming the same behavior as before, but now commitment for x3 is 
added. Suppose that individual 1 has no commitment for x3, but individual 2 has a very 
high level of commitment where X13=45. Now, decisions for individual 1 and 2 will be 
based on:  
Max equation 4.13  








In this case individual 1 will behave the same as when commitment for x3 was not 
incorporated; x1*=22.7, p1*=45.5, and p3*=9.1. Whereas the behavior of individual 2 will 
drastically change and x1*=.714, p1*=1.43, and p3*=7.14. Now comparing the 
willingness to pay to have p available for oneself and for individual 3, when including 
commitment for market goods, individual 1 should now willing to pay more than 
individual 2, since individual 1 demands more of the public good than 2.  
 In this example, it becomes obvious that with high levels of commitment towards 
the consumption of market goods by others, individuals may be willing to pay very little 





utility. This example shows the importance of properly incorporating commitment 
behavior into utility models, but also presses the question of the appropriate payment 
vehicle in CVM methodology. When individuals are asked their willingness to pay for a 
good out of their own pockets, the opportunity cost is the decrease in consumption of 
market goods, and the decrease in providing market goods for others. But, in most cases, 
the nonmarket good is not provided by out-of-pocket payments from individuals, but 
funded by existing tax funds. When the good is provided by tax funds, then the 
opportunity cost is a decreas in other public goods. With this payment vehicle, the level 
of commitment that one has towards the consumption of market goods by others will not 
influence one’s willingness to pay for the nonmarket good. Since–as seen in the 
example–incorporating this commitment can decrease willingness to pay, when the good 
in question is provided by tax funds using CVM methodology that uses an individual 
payment vehicle may give incorrect valuations of the publicly funded good. In these 
cases, using the correct payment vehicle is essential to measuring valuation for public 
goods. 
4.6 Conclusion 
 Although mainstream economic theory relies on assumption of self-interest in 
modeling behavior, studies show that human behavior is influenced by much more than 
pure self-interest. Social preferences play a substantial role in the choices made by 
individuals. Inclusion of altruism, reciprocity, fairness, and commitment are critical for 
modeling human behavior. This chapter shows that in the presence of social preferences, 
identifying the proper constraints to decision-making is critical to understanding and 
properly modeling choice, especially in the presence of commitment. The use of proper 
constraints becomes even more important in the context of contingent valuation where 
choice of income constraint may have critical effects on valuation measurements. The 
next chapter will explain why accurate modeling and using proper income constraints are 
important to CVM. The chapters will also explore a study to determine the extent to 
which motivations discussed in this chapter enter into valuation.  
Chapter 5: Gender Differences in Willingness to Pay for Vaccination Programs 
The prevalence of social preferences influencing behavior in experimental studies 
suggests that behavior is subject to more than just pure self-interest (e.g. Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999: Andreoni, 1998). Public goods games give ample evidence for social 
preferences along with self-interest as strong influences on behavior (e.g Shange and 
Croson, 2005). There is no reason to assume that behavior within these controlled 
experiments deviates from real world experiences and individual decisions. It would 
therefore be expected that social preferences, along with self-interest, influence 
individual public goods decisions in the real world.  
Experimental economics has captured the motivations and decisions made by 
subjects in a controlled environment (e.g. Camerer and Fehr, 2002: Gintis, 2000). 
Although the experimental literature gives a convincing idea of how individuals act in 
situations with strategic interactions, it has not addressed actions with non-strategic 
interactions of public goods. In many cases a non-strategic framework may be of more 
importance since many public good decisions are made at a public level-such as 
referendum voting-where choices are private and strategic interactions are non-existent.  
One way to quantify the influences of choices with public implications without 
strategic interactions is through CVM. CVM is a method that measures valuation, but can 
also include measures of preferences if designed correctly. Because of the ability to 
construct the CVM survey instrument to measure influence on decisions, it is a good tool 
to use as a counterpart to public good games in experimental economics. Since decisions 
in CVM studies should expose similar motivations as in public goods games, social 
preferences are likely to also influence stated valuation for nonmarket goods.  
The findings from Chapter 3 suggest an inconsistent result for valuation for 
certain cultural sub-groups: specifically Hispanics and Hispanic women. One potential 
explanation for this inconsistent result is that Hispanics and Hispanic women believe that 
more state funds should be devoted to infant health when compared to whites and white 
women, respectively. Since water is usually supplied through municipal sources, it may 
be assumed by these groups that the state government should be responsible for paying 
and providing increased water quality. For groups that believe more state funds need to 
be devoted to infant health and increased water quality, a high WTP may not be stated-
even in the face of high perceptions of risk, because they may believe that the 
government, not individuals should pay. Generalizing this finding suggests that when in 
practice, public funds are used to pay for the nonmarket good in question, a more realistic 
payment vehicle of a reallocation of existing public funds may extract more accurate 
estimates of valuation in CVM studies. This study will explore the effect of alternative 
payment vehicle choices. 
This chapter will analyze a CVM study measuring the value that Colorado State 
University students place on meningococcal disease and Human papillomavirus (HPV) 
vaccinations. This study will be used to estimate the extent to which social preferences 
influence stated valuation. Using the theoretical model introduced in chapter 4, the extent 
of self-interest, altruism, reciprocity, fairness, and commitment will be separately 
estimated for multiple different treatments within the sample. 
This study utilizes two treatments, each including two willingness to pay 
questions. These different WTP questions will be used to assess the effect that the 
payment vehicle has on stated valuation. One treatment measures individual willingness 
to pay for an out-of-pocket payment for vaccinations, while the second treatment uses a 
referendum payment vehicle of willing to vote for an universal increase in communal 
fees that provide vaccinations and the willingness to vote for a reallocation of already 
existing communal fees.  
5.1 Augmented Willingness-to-Pay Methodology  
 Traditional CVM models typically assume that an individual’s willingness to pay 
for a nonmarket good or service is based on the following: 
Max U = f (market goods, public good in question; socioeconomic status, demographics) 
St. Income Constraint 
There is no specific inclusion of preferences that influence behavior. It is commonly 
assumed that self-interest is the only determinant of behavior, but is not specifically 
included in the modeling of willingness to pay (Champ, 2003). Socioeconomic and 
demographic variables are typically used as a proxy for preferences. Some specific 
studies have incorporated altruistic motives in models of willingness to pay. But as 
mentioned in chapter 4, this is generally the limitation of social preference modeling 
within CVM studies. 
 Standard CVM methodology assumes that decisions about nonmarket goods are 
made subject to an individual’s income constraint. Because of this assumption, 
individuals are typically asked their willingness to pay for increased quality or quantity of 
the nonmarket good given an out-of-pocket payment either through a market-like 
transaction or an increase in tax fees.   
 The current study differs by incorporating social preferences outlined in chapter 4 
and by augmenting the payment vehicles to include reallocation of existing public funds 
to pay for the change in the nonmarket good. To capture these changes, the general model 
of decision-making will be dependent on: 
Max U = f (market goods, public good in question; socioeconomic status, demographics, 
preferences) 
St. Budget Constraint 
Where preferences are social preferences and motivations of self-interest. The budget 
constraint can be either personal income or a communal budget depending on the 
situation given.  
The methodology utilized in chapter 3 will also be used here. The method adopted 
in the present study uses a logit model for approximations of dichotomous choice based 
willingness to pay. Instead of including dummy variables for gender, separate logit 
regression models are completed for each gender. As stated in Chapter 3, running 
separate regressions is an improvement over adding gender as a dummy variable since 
gender has been shown to interact with other independent variables in significant ways 
(Figart, 1997). Not adequately controlling for these interactions runs the risk of using 
underspecified modeling. 
5.2 Survey Background 
  
The study conducted by Shiell and Rush (2003) suggests that commitment plays a 
role in behavior, but the traditional methodology utilized by CVM cannot capture value 
in the presence of commitment when the good in questions affects others. Using this 
conclusion reached by the authors and integrating in forms of social preferences, this 
study uses a similar methodology as Shiell and Rush (2003) but augments it to fit the 
goals of the current study and the limitations of the current data. In the previous study 
individuals were asked two valuation questions regarding various vaccination programs. 
To separate motives of self-interest and motives of commitment, individuals were first 
asked a dichotomous choice willingness to pay question about out-of-pocket payments 
for a vaccination program that will only pay for the individual to be vaccinated. Results 
of this valuation question were used to separate self-interest motivations from the second 
dichotomous choice asking willingness to pay for a communal vaccination program for 
only the poorest 10%, used to measure commitment motivations. To further capture 
motives influencing willingness to pay choices, respondents were asked follow-up 
questions in an interview. The responses to these questions were used to determine the 
extent that commitment influences behavior and the limitation it places on traditional 
valuation methods. 
 Using the methodology presented by Shiell and Rush (2003), this study also uses 
vaccination programs to measure motivations of behavior. Because of current limitations 
on data collection, this study assesses valuation amongst college students at Colorado 
State University. Therefore vaccination programs for diseases that affect college students 
were utilized. Time limitations also prohibited the use of follow-up interviews. To assess 
the influences on behavior, but work within the time constraints, statements were created 
that encompassed these influences on behavior in an attempt for respondents to indicate 
the influence that each had on their WTP decisions. The specifics of the present study are 
included in the following sections. 
 Based on the age and experience of most college students at Colorado State 
University, meningococcal disease and human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination were 
chosen. HPV was chosen because of the recent medical awareness and its prevalence 
amongst college age individuals. Within the last year, Fort Collins has been the center for 
a meningococcal disease epidemic. Colorado State University health services provided 
vaccinations, free of charge to all students and faculty under the age of 29. Numerous 
emails and statements were disseminated to students and faculty members that included 
information about meningococcal disease and the current outbreak.   
5.2.1 Meningococcal disease  
Meningococcal disease has been the cause of death for four people in Fort Collins 
and one in Denver from 2010-2011, with many more hospitalized. Although many types 
of meningococcal disease exist, meningococcal sepsis has been thought to be the cause of 
the deaths and hospitalizations in Fort Collins. 
 Even with antibiotics, approximately 1 in 10 victims infected with 
meningococcal meningitis will die, and may exceed 40% in patients with meningococcal 
sepsis, that seen in the current epidemic in Colorado. However, about as many survivors 
of the disease lose a limb or their hearing, or suffer permanent brain damage. The sepsis 
type of infection is much more deadly, and results in a severe blood poisoning called 
meningococcal sepsis that affects the entire body. In these cases, bacterial toxins rupture 
blood vessels and can rapidly shut down vital organs. Within hours, patient's health can 
change from seemingly good to mortally ill (Anderson et al, 1997). 
The incidence of meningococcal disease during the last 13 years ranges from 1 to 
5 per 100,000 in developed countries, and from 10 to 25 per 100,000 in developing 
countries. During epidemics, the incidence of meningococcal disease approaches 100 per 
100,000. There are, on average, approximately 2,600 cases of bacterial meningitis per 
year in the United States. 
Meningococcal disease causes life-threatening meningitis and sepsis conditions. 
In the case of meningitis, bacteria attack the lining between the brain and skull called the 
meninges. Infected fluid from the meninges then passes into the spinal cord, causing 
symptoms including stiff neck, fever and rashes. The meninges (and sometimes the brain 
itself) begin to swell, which affects the central nervous system. As the bacteria multiply 
and move through the bloodstream, it sheds concentrated amounts of toxin. The 
endotoxin directly affects the heart, reducing its ability to circulate blood, and also causes 
pressure on blood vessels throughout the body. As some blood vessels start to 
hemorrhage, major organs like the lungs and kidneys are damaged (Goldacre et al, 2003). 
College students, especially freshmen are more susceptible to meningococcal 
disease, mainly due to behavior. Therefore, college students have been the target of 
meningococcal disease vaccinations. Because of the high mortality rate, the best 
treatment for meningococcal disease is vaccination. Vaccines for meningococcal disease 
have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and available since 
1981. Each vaccine can prevent 2 of the 3 most commonly occurring strains in the US. 
The vaccine can reduce the incidence of infection, hospitalization, and death by nearly 
70%. Meningococcal vaccines cannot prevent all types of the disease, but they do protect 
many people who might become sick if they did not get the vaccine. A booster of the 
vaccine is recommended every 2-4 years.   
Up to half of the people who receive meningococcal vaccines have mild side 
effects, such as redness or pain where the shot was given. These symptoms usually last 
for one or two days. A small percentage of people who receive the vaccine develop a 
fever. Severe reactions, such as a serious allergic reaction, are very rare. A nervous 
system disorder called Guillain-Barré Syndrome has been reported. This happens so 
rarely that it is currently not possible to tell if the vaccine might be a factor. 
5.2.2 Human papillomavirus (HPV) 
Human papillomavirus (HPV) is the most common sexually transmitted disease in 
the United States. Studies have shown that 10% to 46% of all sexually active women are 
infected at any given point in time, with a potential lifetime risk of infection of 70% or 
greater. The risk for sexually active men is less well defined, but prevalence has been 
estimated between 10% and 20%. Men and women in their 20s, particularly the 20- to 
24-year age-group, have been found to be at especially high risk, with many of these high 
rates of infection found among college students (Lambert, 2001). 
HPV types that are found preferentially in cervical cancer have been designated as 
‘high-risk’ types. Conversely, those found primarily in genital warts and nonmalignant 
lesions were labeled as ‘low-risk’ types. High-risk types of HPV have been well 
established as the most important causative factor of cervical cancer in women. Every 
year, around 12,000 women are diagnosed with cervical cancer and around 5,000 die 
from the disease. In addition, more than 700,000 cases of high-grade cervical dysplasia 
are detected every year in the United States, the precursor of cervical cancer. Cervical 
cancer accounts for almost 12% of all cancers in women, and so represents the second 
most frequent gynecological malignancy in the world (zur Hausen, 2002). 
There are no known treatments for HPV, making prevention of HPV the key 
factor in the prevention of cervical cancer. On June 8, 2006, the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approved the use of a vaccine to prevent infection from two types 
of ‘high-risk’ HPV types that are responsible for about 70% of the cases of cervical 
cancer worldwide. The vaccine consists of three separate vaccination injections and is 
highly effective in preventing infection with the types of HPV targeted. Currently, the 
vaccine is only approved for women between the ages of 10 and 26. Studies have shown 
that vaccination prevents nearly 100% of the precancerous cervical cell changes caused 
by the types of HPV targeted by the vaccine for up to 4 years after vaccination among 
women who were not infected at the time of vaccination. 
The HPV vaccine work like other immunizations that guard against viral infection. 
They are thought to protect primarily by causing the production of antibodies that prevent 
infection and, consequently, the development of cervical cell changes (as seen on Pap 
tests) that may lead to cancer. Although these vaccines can help prevent HPV infection, 
they do not help eliminate existing HPV infections. Thus far, no serious side effects have 
been known to be caused by the vaccines. The most common problems have been brief 
soreness and other local symptoms at the injection site. These problems are similar to 
ones commonly experienced with other vaccines. The vaccines have not been sufficiently 
tested during pregnancy and, therefore, should not be used by pregnant women.14 
14 US National Institute of Health website. www.cancer.gov
5.3 Vaccination Survey Format 
 The data for this analysis come from paper surveys completed by Colorado State 
University students enrolled in various undergraduate economic courses on a voluntary 
basis during class time. The willingness to pay for meningococcal disease and HPV were 
of interest along with the difference between alternate payment vehicles. The surveys 
included two dichotomous choice willingness to pay questions. With each disease, two 
treatments were created to capture the effect of the different payment vehicles.  In the 
first treatment (referred to hereafter as treatment ‘Individualist’), respondents were asked 
a dichotomous choice pertaining to their willingness to pay from their own income 
(referred to hereafter as Program 1) a stated amount in order to be vaccinated against the 
chosen disease. Respondents were also asked another dichotomous choice question 
(referred to hereafter as Program 2), given the same cost as in Program 1, to make a 
vaccine available to one other Colorado State University student. The second treatment 
pertained to campus wide vaccination programs (referred to hereafter as treatment 
‘Communitarian’). In this treatment, respondents were asked two dichotomous choice 
willingness to pay questions about implementing a vaccination program that would make 
available a vaccine for all willing students. The first willingness to pay question (Program 
1) included in the Communitarian treatment, had an associated cost of increased student 
fees for all Colorado State University students, while the second willingness to pay 
question (Program 2), was associated with a reallocation of existing student fees, with a 
cost of reduced funds available to other student services. Therefore, four different survey 
instruments are included in the study: two treatments for each disease15.   
15 A copy of each treatment is included in the appendix
 Respondents were asked if they would be willing to pay a random, but preselected 
amount of money, ranging from $10 to $400 to have the associated vaccination program 
available. This range was based on a survey of actual costs of the vaccinations. For 
example, respondents given the Individualist HPV survey were asked about both Program 
1 and Program 2 outlined in the top half of Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Sample WTP Questions from Survey Instruments 
A choice of ‘Yes’ for questions 14 or 15 will decrease the risk of cervical cancer by 70% 
in women vaccinated. 
 
If you are female answer question 14. If you are male, proceed to question 15. 
14. Would you pay an out-of-pocket price of $X to receive the vaccine yourself? 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
15. However you responded in question 14, you also have the opportunity to contribute funds 
for other students to receive the vaccine. The cost of administering one vaccination is $X. 
Would you be willing to donate a one time out-of-pocket price of $X to provide the vaccine 
free of charge to another Colorado State University student who may not otherwise be 
vaccinated? 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
If either proposal passes, the risk of cervical cancer will be reduced by 70% in women 
vaccinated 
 
Proposal 1: An increase in all students’ semester fees by $X to have the vaccine available for 
all female students. 
 The program will be funded by a new special student fee.  
 The costs of the program would have to be paid by you and other Colorado State University 
students.  
 Because you would be paying $X in additional student fees for the program, it would 
reduce the amount of available money for spending on your personal consumption. 
 
Would you vote for the proposed increase in your semester students fees of $X to have the 
vaccine available for all Colorado State University students? 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
Proposal 2: A reallocation of existing student fees, amounting to $X per student, away 
from other student services (rec center, classroom services, etc.) to fund availability of 
the vaccine free for all female Colorado State University students.  
 The program will not increase your student fees. 
 Payments for the program will be in the form of a reallocation of your student fees from 
other student services (for example, reallocation of fees from the Lory Student Center, 
Campus Recreation Center, University Facility Fee, Student Legal Services, Conflict and 
Resolution, Athletics, etc.). 
 Thus, paying for the program would reduce the amount of other student services that are 
currently available.  
Would you vote for this reallocation of student fees that would provide vaccinations for all 
students at the cost of other student services? 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
 
Respondents were directed that the cost would be an out-of-pocket cost in order to ensure 
that the respondents assumed the proper opportunity cost. Respondents given the 
Communitarian treatment of the HPV survey were asked the willingness to pay questions 
shown in the second part of Table 5.1. 
To ensure that respondents were aware of the opportunity cost associated with 
both willingness to pay questions, the survey used the technique outlined by Bergstrom, 
Boyle and Yabe (2004). In both willingness to pay questions, the associated costs and 
opportunity costs were explained to the respondent. In the second valuation question, 
respondents were given a list of the programs that could have funding decreased if 
proposal 2 were to pass. As indicated by Bergstrom, Boyle and Yabe (2004), in order to 
have the respondent understand the true opportunity cost of a reallocation of resources 
required for proposal 2 (Program 2), an understanding of the trade-offs prior to valuation 
questions is crucial. Therefore, prior to introducing either potential policy change, 
respondents were informed of student fees, given a list of programs funded by student 
fees, and then asked to rank how important each of these programs were to the individual 
student. Although this assessment was not vital to the valuation for the Individualist 
treatment, in order to keep the treatments similar, respondents were asked to rank these 
programs in both treatments.  
 Social preferences are important in individual decision-making as discussed in 
chapter 4. To measure the effect of social preferences on valuation for vaccinations, 
respondents were asked the influence of self-interest and social preferences on their 
willingness to pay decisions. Each preference motivation was given as a statement in 
which respondents were asked to rank their level of agreement to each.  
 Regardless of the disease or treatment, to capture the extent to which self-interest 
influenced valuation of vaccinations, each respondent was asked to rank, from 1 to 5, 
their agreement with the following statement: 
‘I want to protect myself from (disease)’ 
The higher the rank, the more influential self-interest was in the respondent’s willingness 
to pay decisions. 
 Altruism has been indicated, along with self-interest, as another potential 
motivation in responses to willingness to pay questions. In this study, all respondents 
were ask the following in order to estimate the influence of altruism on valuation: 
‘I want others to be able to be protected against (disease)’ 
This statement was chosen since it incorporates individual decisions that allow-not force-
others to be voluntarily vaccinated. This statement associates altruism with providing the 
vaccine for others, but places the decision of vaccination on the other individuals. 
 Sen’s theory of commitment has seen very little integration in nonmarket 
valuation studies, excluding that conducted by Shiell and Rush (2003). The current study 
tries to estimate the influence of commitment on valuation through the following 
statement: 
‘We all should be committed to protecting the health and safety of the CSU community’ 
Where the emphasis is on the respondent’s association with the CSU community.  
 As explained in chapter 4, experimental economics demonstrates the relevance of 
social preferences in decision-making: specifically reciprocity and fairness. Fairness, 
unlike reciprocity, is not dependent on one’s beliefs regarding the motivations of others. 
In this context, fairness is associated with the respondent providing vaccinations for 
others in order to be fair to all. Fairness motivations in valuation was assessed through 
respondent’s agreement to the following: 
‘It seems fair to me to contribute a fair share to help others be vaccinated’ 
To capture the influence of reciprocity in vaccination decisions, respondents gave their 
level of agreement to the following: 
‘CSU students deserve protection against (disease)’ 
This statement encompasses the idea of reciprocity as the motive to aid others who have 
been deemed to act well and to punish those who have acted badly. The term ‘deserve’ 
was selected since it was thought to best capture this motivation.  
 As the model introduced in chapter 4 indicates, the total effect of reciprocity also 
depends of the influence that one’s beliefs of other’s motivations have on individual 
decisions. To capture the belief of others, after each non-selfish willingness to pay 
question, individuals were asked the dichotomous choice question: 
Do you believe that the majority of Colorado State University students would be 
willing to vote in favor of ‘proposal’? 
 Respondents were also asked about their experience and beliefs of the particular 
disease and about their demographic and socioeconomic status. Knowing that many 
college students either rely on their parents, scholarships, or other external sources of 
funding, respondents were asked about their personal income, parent’s income, and their 




5.3 The Data 
 Prior to collecting the data for this study, both focus groups and pretests were 
performed. Two focus groups of 4-5 volunteers were conducted, from which the survey 
instruments were altered to ensure understanding and validity of the instrument amongst 
respondents. Pretests were then performed and the data was analyzed. The results from 
the pretests suggested that the format and questions were appropriate for the purposes of 
the study. The survey instruments were approved by Human Subjects at Colorado State 
University and the implementation of the surveys were permitted.   
To capture protest votes, questions were included that measured the respondent’s 
belief of the overall safety of vaccines and the belief that socially unacceptable sexual 
behavior is the primary cause of the diseases. In total, 868 surveys were completed. 
Those responses that include either a strong feeling that vaccinations are unsafe or the 
belief that socially unacceptable sexual behavior was the root cause of the spread of the 
disease were considered protest votes. After discounting protest votes, the effective 
sample size is 843.  Of the 843-sample size, 435 represented meningococcal disease, 
while the other 408 represented HPV, and 446 represented the Individualist treatment, 
while 397 represented the Communitarian treatment. The sample includes 403 females 
and 438 males. Minorities are underrepresented in the data, with 723 respondent’s 
identifying as White, while only 17 identify themselves as Black or African American, 33 
as Asian or Asian American, 45 as Hispanic or Latino, 18 as another race or ethnicity, 
and 5 did not respond. The average age of the sample respondent is 20. Most of the 
respondents have very low incomes with 697 respondents reporting an annual income of 
less than $10,000 and only 5 reporting an annual income of more than $100,000. Only 69 
reported having a spouse of live-in partner.  
5.4. Testable Hypotheses 
Based on the interdisciplinary risk perception literature, the feminist literature, 
and the results from the study reported in chapter 4, we would expect gender and race 
difference in perceptions of risks associated with the diseases, social preferences, and 
therefore, willingness to pay for the various vaccination programs. Because of the low 
sample of minorities, the current study cannot explore racial difference. The following 
gender based hypotheses will be tested: 
H1: There are gender differences in those previously vaccinated for 
meningococcal disease 
H2: Female’s beliefs about how susceptible they are to contacting the disease is   
different than males’ beliefs 
H3: The influence of social preference and self-interest in vaccination program 
decisions are different between females and males   
H4: The probability that males are willing to pay for a given vaccination program 
is different than women’s probability 
 
The two different treatments (Communitarian and Individualist), and the two 
willingness to pay questions (Program 1 and Program 2) will be used to compare the 
impact of different payment vehicles and the differences in willingness to pay for self-
vaccination verses non-self vaccination. The following hypotheses will test the 
differences amongst the different willingness to pay questions:  
H5: The probability that respondents are willing to pay for self-vaccination is 
different than the probability of payment for non-self vaccination for treatment 
‘Individualist’ 
H6: The probability that respondents are willing to pay for vaccination proposal 
1 is different than the probability of payment for proposal 2 for treatment 
‘Communitarian’ 
 
The diseases included in the study were chosen because of their prevalence 
among college age students and the potential for gender differences. The impact of 
meningococcal disease does not seem to have a gender component, but the same is not 
true for HPV. HPV is only commonly diagnosed in women and the main impact of the 
disease is only felt by women, as it is the main cause of cervical cancer in women. These 
ideas are tested using the following hypotheses: 
H7: There are no difference in the probability of willingness to pay for 
Meningococcal disease vaccinations between males and females 
H8: There are gender differences between the probability of willingness to pay for 
HPV vaccination programs 
5.5 Results 
Gender differences reported are not only based on the hypotheses listed in section 




5.5.1 Mean Gender Differences 
Table 5.2 shows the gender difference in demographic and socioeconomic 
variables along with experience with the given diseases. Test results determining the 
significance of gender differences are presented in the following tables.   
Table 5.2 Gender Differences in Demographic, Socioeconomic Status, and Experience16 
Variable  Category Men Women 
Income       
  Below $10,000 74.61% 89.24% 
  $10,000-19,999 16.85% 8.31% 
  $20,000-49,999 6.07% 1.71% 
  $50,000-100,000 1.57% 0.49% 
  Over $100,000 0.90% 0.24% 
                   Gender differences   z = 5.599*** 
Age   20.6 19.8 
                   Gender differences   z = 4.247*** 
Previously vaccinated (Meningococcal 
disease)   71% 86% 
                  Gender differences   chi2 =  14.2026*** 
Parent's Income      
  Below $10,000 0.01843318 0.017857143 
  $10,000-19,999 0.025345622 0.030612245 
  $20,000-49,999 0.14516129 0.239795918 
  $50,000-100,000 0.387096774 0.397959184 
  Over $100,000 0.423963134 0.31377551 
               Gender differences   z =   3.784*** 
Know someone who has been 
diagnosed   5% 14% 
              Gender differences   chi2 =  14.453*** 
 
16 The sample difference statistics were determined using Chi2 tests for dichotomous variables and Wilcox-
Mann-Whitney tests for categorical variables. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Based on the results in Table 5.2, women within the sample have a lower mean 
income, are younger, and have parents with lower mean incomes than the men included 
in the sample. Women were also found to be more likely to have previously been 
vaccinated for meningococcal disease than men. This finding supports hypothesis H1: 
there are gender differences in previous vaccinations. Women are also more likely to 
have stated that they know someone who has been diagnosed with either meningococcal 
disease or HPV. 
Many variables of interest were included to capture the influences and beliefs of 
the disease. Because the study includes a potential payment of a reallocation of student 
fees, respondents were asked how important current uses of student fees are to them. 
Each of these categorical variables were coded as a 1 if respondents indicated that they 
strongly disagreed with the statement, 2 indicated the respondent agrees with the 
statement, 3 if the respondent was neutral, 4 for agree, and a 5 was coded when the 
respondent strongly agreed with the statement. In Table 5.3, gender differences in general 
beliefs associated with the diseases and the importance of current programs funded by 
student fees are shown.   
As seen in Table 5.3, there are many differences in the beliefs held by males when 
compared to those held by females. The women surveyed were much more likely to feel 
that they had knowledge of the diseases prior to the survey when compared to men. 
Women also feel that they are more susceptible to contracting both diseases than men, 
although there is no evidence that women have a higher probability in contracting either 
disease. This result confirms hypothesis H2 and supports the findings from the risk 
perceptions literature that women perceive higher risks than men.   
Table 5.3: Gender Difference is Beliefs17 
Variable  Category Men Women 
Information    69%  90% 
    chi2=  51.1527 *** 
Susceptible      
  1 18.36% 15.64% 
  2 26.77% 33.80% 
  3 30.09% 28.77% 
  4 22.12% 31.56% 
  5 2.65% 5.87% 
      z =  -2.127** 
Important for the CSU community to be 
vaccinated      
  1 1.77% 0.72% 
  2 6.42% 3.14% 
  3 27.43% 19.81% 
  4 45.13% 47.34% 
  5 19.25% 28.99% 
    z =  -4.487* 
Student legal services    
  1 5.11% 2.17% 
  2 11.97% 8.70% 
  3 33.48% 29.95% 
  4 38.36% 44.20% 
  5 11.09% 14.98% 
    z =  -3.289*** 
Conflict and resolution services    
  1 11.06% 4.35% 
  2 19.25% 13.77% 
  3 36.28% 34.30% 
  4 26.11% 38.89% 
  5 7.30% 8.70% 
    z =  -4.815*** 
  
 Colorado State University student fees are used for many campus wide programs 
and services. Of the services identified in the survey, gender differences were only found 
17 The sample difference statistics were determined using Chi2 tests for dichotomous variables and Wilcox-
Mann-Whitney tests for categorical variables. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
in the stated importance of two. Women in the sample believe that student fees used to 
fund student legal services and Conflict and Resolution services are more important than 
the men in the sample. There were no gender differences found in the importance placed 
on student fees funding the Lory Student Center, the Recreational Center, and student 
athletics.  
 For each category of behavior influences on program choice, significant gender 
differences are found.  From Table 5.4, women are found to state a higher influence of 
self-interest on their willingness to pay decisions along with those of altruism, reciprocity, 
fairness, and commitment. Hypothesis H3 is supported by the data for all social 
preference, in conjunction with gender differences in self-interest motivations.  
Relying on the model developed in chapter 4, the influences of self-interest and 
social preference should allow an estimate of WTP. Vaccination behavior should depend 
on: 
maxui = i f (xi, pi )+ ig(pj ) i (pj p)
2
 
st I =Qxi + pi + pj  
pj Pi  
 
But as expressed in chapter 4, it is impossible to determine the effect of these influences 
on behavior, a priori, without information on the functional form of the utility function.  




Table 5.4: Gender Difference is Influences of Behavior18 
Self-Interest    
  1 1.55% 0.48% 
  2 2.65% 1.21% 
  3 13.05% 6.52% 
  4 45.80% 35.75% 
  5 36.95% 56.04% 
    z =  -6.035*** 
Altruism    
  1 0.66% 0.48% 
  2 1.11% 0.48% 
  3 11.73% 6.76% 
  4 53.10% 44.20% 
  5 33.41% 48.07% 
     z =  -4.606*** 
Fairness    
  1 6.86% 3.38% 
  2 19.91% 15.70% 
  3 31.19% 33.33% 
  4 31.86% 34.78% 
  5 10.18% 12.80% 
    z =  -2.494** 
Commitment    
  1 0.66% 0.72% 
  2 2.43% 1.21% 
  3 20.35% 15.46% 
  4 56.86% 57.25% 
  5 19.69% 25.36% 
    z =  -2.600*** 
Reciprocity    
  1 1.99% 0.24% 
  2 3.32% 1.21% 
  3 20.58% 13.77% 
  4 51.77% 49.76% 
  5 22.35% 35.02% 
    z =  -4.990*** 
 
18 The sample difference statistics were determined using Chi2 tests for dichotomous variables and Wilcox-
Mann-Whitney tests for categorical variables. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
5.5.2 Logit Regressions 
   
 The methodology adopted for the logit regression modeling will be the same as in 
chapter 3. Due to data limitations, race differences will not be analyzed, leaving only 
gender differences to be investigated. The logit regression results are reported in tables 
below. Gender differences based on logit regressions are reported for each disease, 
treatment, and willingness to pay question separately, leading to eleven different models.    
 Based on economic theory, the probability of willingness to pay should depend on 
the stated cost of the vaccination program and income levels. As described above, 
respondents were given a cost associated with the particular vaccination program that 
ranged between $10 and $400. Personal annual income (without any external funds) was 
asked as a categorical variable with income level less than $10,000 code as 1, incomes 
between $10,000 and $19,999 coded as 2, incomes of $20,000 to $49,999 coded as 3, 
$50,000 to $100,000 coded as 4, and annual incomes more than $100,000 coded as 5. 
Motivations that influence choice, whether social preferences or self-interest, should also 
impact the probability of willingness to pay for vaccinations.  
 For Program 1 of the Individualist treatment for both diseases, the probability that 
a respondent will be willingness to pay, indicated by a ‘Yes’ response, should be follow: 
Prob (WTP > cost) = f (cost, self-interest, beliefs of community vaccination, income) 
Since the choice only directly affects the respondent, the influence of self-interest on 
behavior was included. Given the information contained in the survey instrument, 
respondents were aware of the communal health implications of vaccination programs 
that help halt the transmission of highly communicable disease. Even if only for personal 
health safety reasons, the variable, ‘It is important for the CSU community to be 
vaccinated’, also a categorical variable, may substantially influence choice, and was 
included in modeling. The results are shown in Table 5.5.  
Table 5.5 Logit Gender Differences in Individualist Willingness to Pay Vaccination Program 1 
 Meningococcal Meningococcal HPV 
VARIABLES Women Men Women 
        
Cost -0.0216*** -0.00813*** -0.00739*** 
 (0.00546) (0.00214) (0.00215) 
Self-Interest 2.232*** 0.810** 0.707 
 (0.685) (0.403) (0.458) 
It is important for the CSU community to be 
vaccinated 1.132** 1.291*** 1.071*** 
 (0.538) (0.366) (0.378) 
Income 6.01e-05 1.06e-06 2.13e-05 
 (0.000101) (5.17e-05) (2.11e-05) 
Constant -14.38*** -8.073*** -6.322*** 
  (3.630) (1.990) (2.230) 
Pseudo R2 0.4918 0.2899 0.2652 
Log Likelihood  -33.79 -56.49 -48.51 
Observations 106 117 96 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
 Only women’s results are reported for HPV since men cannot receive the HPV 
vaccination and therefore male respondents were instructed to skip the question. Since 
the cost of vaccination programs is a one-time, out-of-pocket cost for the vaccine only for 
the respondent, the significant downward sloping demand curve for each logit supports 
The Law of Demand. It would also seem that the income level of the respondent would 
also influence willingness to pay. But the results from Table 5.5 do not support this 
hypothesis since the coefficient on income is not significant in any model. Also, because 
the willingness to pay for Program 1 will only provide the vaccine for the respondent, it 
is hypothesized that only influences of self-interest will be indicative of willingness to 
pay decisions. This hypothesis is supported by the results for meningococcal disease, but 
not for HPV. A belief that it is important for the CSU community to be vaccinated was a 
strong predictor of willingness to pay. This coefficient may suggest that the 
communicable aspect of the diseases encourages support for community vaccinations, if 
only out of a desire to protect oneself.   
The model of willingness to pay for Program 2 of the Individualist treatment, like 
that presented in Table 5.5, should also depend on the cost of the vaccination program 
along with the relevant income level. Since the cost of the vaccination program is to pay 
for a vaccine for one other Colorado State University student, influences of social 
preferences, not self-interest are more indicative of respondents’ willingness to pay for 
the program. The willingness of a respondent to pay for another’s vaccination may 
depend on his or her belief of other Colorado State University students’ decision to also 
pay for the same program. The probability of willingness to pay for this program is 
assumed to be based on: 
Prob (WTP > cost) = f (cost, social preferences, beliefs of others, income) 
The results are shown in Table 5.6.  
From the results (Table 5.6), only for meningococcal disease is there a significant 
downward sloping demand curve. This result may be because every student had the 
opportunity to be vaccinated for free at the Colorado State University health center, 
making current willingness to pay for the vaccination of another very sensitive to the cost. 
The belief that others will also be willing to pay is significantly related for 
meningococcal disease and for women’s willingness to pay for HPV vaccinations. The 
only significant social preference on willingness to pay is that of fairness. Since  
Table 5.6 Logit Gender Differences in Individualist Willingness to Pay Vaccination Program 2 
 Meningococcal Meningococcal HPV HPV 
VARIABLES Women Men Women Men 
Cost -0.0185** -0.00677* -0.00601 -0.00268 
 (0.00752) (0.00358) (0.00423) (0.00220) 
Belief 3.725* 3.461*** 1.942** 0.736 
 (2.024) (1.011) (0.941) (0.713) 
Fairness 2.545*** 1.619*** 1.641*** 1.560*** 
 (0.741) (0.477) (0.534) (0.383) 
Income -0.000158 -0.000194* -1.94e-05 -1.16e-05 
 (0.000195) (0.000107) (4.26e-05) (1.83e-05) 
Constant -9.043*** -5.578*** -6.770*** -6.563*** 
 (2.672) (1.815) (2.072) (1.469) 
Pseudo R2 0.516 0.4157 0.3678 0.2956 
Log Likelihood -20.03 -33.06 -28.26 -43.09 
Observations 106 117 79 119 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
respondents are asked their willingness to pay for a vaccine to be available for another 
student, if the respondent feels that it is his or her responsibility to pay a fair share of 
others’ vaccinations, then this will increase the probability of willingness to pay. Again, 
income does not play a significant role in willingness to pay, except for men’s 
willingness to pay for meningococcal disease vaccinations.  
 Many vaccination programs, especially during outbreaks, are similar to the 
current program at Colorado State University where public funds finance the vaccination 
of the associated population. In these cases, the use of an individual out-of-pocket 
payment vehicle for a single vaccine is not in line with reality and may lead to inaccurate 
estimates of willingness to pay. For Program 1 of the Communitarian treatment, 
individuals are asked if they would be willing to vote for an increase in student fees of 
the stated amount. As stated above, respondents are also informed that if the majority of 
students vote ‘Yes’ for the program, then vaccines will be available for all willing 
Colorado State University students.  
Economic theory would predict that probabilities of willingness to pay for any 
program would depend on the associated cost to respondents. Many students do not 
personally pay for student fees, and may rely on parents, scholarships, or other external 
sources of funds to pay for student fees. Therefore, personal income may not be a good 
indicator of behavior. Instead, respondents were asked to rank their agreement to the 
statement, ‘I pay for student fees out of my own pocket’. This categorical variable was 
coded as a 1 if the respondent strongly disagreed, a 2 if ‘disagreed’ was specified, 3 if the 
respondent felt that the statement was neutral, 4 if ‘agree’ was marked, and 5 if the 
respondent indicated ‘strongly agree’.  Because of the communal aspect of the program, 
decisions should also depend on the beliefs of others’ and the influence of social 
preferences. Behavior should rely on: 
Prob (WTP > cost) = f (cost, beliefs of others, social preferences, self-payment of fees) 
Results are shown in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7 Logit Gender Differences in Communitarian Willingness to Pay Vaccination Program 1  
 Meningococcal Meningococcal HPV HPV 
VARIABLES  Women  Men Women  Men  
Cost -0.0119** -0.00631 -0.00487* -0.00103 
 (0.00462) (0.00388) (0.00283) (0.00219) 
Belief 2.942*** 1.593** 1.295* 2.524*** 
 (0.988) (0.663) (0.733) (0.761) 
Fairness 1.342*** 1.421*** 1.655*** 1.218*** 
 (0.375) (0.401) (0.448) (0.342) 
I personally pay for student fees -0.322 -0.0798 -0.263 -0.152 
 (0.242) (0.204) (0.216) (0.217) 
Constant -4.297*** -5.866*** -5.870*** -5.057*** 
  (1.589) (1.868) (1.883) (1.508) 
Pseudo R2 0.4929 0.4112 0.3485 0.3571 
Log Likelihood -32.74 -35.48 -37.78 -38.48 
Observations 105 103 90 93 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
The willingness to pay the stated amount for Program 1 of the Communitarian 
treatment for meningococcal disease and HPV do not seem to vary much between 
genders (Table 5.7). Women follow The Law of Demand, wherein this group exhibits a 
negative coefficient on the cost variable for both diseases. Although not significant, the 
coefficients on cost for men are negative, indicating a non-positive slope. For both 
genders the belief that the respondent has of others also being willing to pay for the 
vaccination program is a strong determinant of the respondent’s willingness to pay. Of all 
of the social preferences, including motivations of self-interest, the only significant 
influence was that of fairness. For both genders, a higher stated motivation of fairness 
indicates a higher probability of willingness to pay for the vaccination program. Since the 
willingness to pay question has a cost of increased student fees, the variable ‘fees’ was 
included which measures how much of student fees the respondent pays out of their own 
pocket. Surprisingly, the coefficient on this variable is not significant for either gender or 
for either disease.  
For both diseases, vaccination Program 2 of the Communitarian treatment asked 
respondents their willingness to reallocate student fees away from other services already 
funded by student fees, in order to provide the vaccination program. Therefore, like 
Program 1 of the Communitarian treatment, decisions should rely on the cost, belief of 
others, fees, and social preferences. But unlike the other treatments, the opportunity cost 
of reallocating funds for vaccinations is a decrease in funding for other services financed 
by student fees. From this, the probability of willingness to pay should follow: 
 
Prob (WTP > cost) = f (cost, beliefs of others, self-payment of fees, social preferences,  
other services funded by student fee) 
Results are outlined in Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8 Logit Gender Differences in Communitarian Willingness to Pay Vaccination Program 2 
 Meningococcal Meningococcal HPV HPV 
VARIABLES Women Men Women Men 
Cost 0.00230 -0.000637 0.00197 2.57e-05 
 (0.00211) (0.00234) (0.00205) (0.00253) 
Belief 3.389*** 3.974*** 2.332*** 3.988*** 
 (0.642) (0.718) (0.591) (0.773) 
I personally pay for student fees 0.165 0.436* 0.431* -0.00836 
 (0.204) (0.230) (0.220) (0.258) 
Conflict resolution -0.852** 0.166 0.651** 0.594* 
 (0.383) (0.288) (0.288) (0.337) 
Fairness 1.186*** 0.979*** 0.835** 0.775** 
 (0.325) (0.359) (0.336) (0.367) 
Constant -3.802** -7.442*** -7.195*** -6.267*** 
  (1.835) (2.217) (1.971) (1.967) 
Pseudo R2 0.4048 0.5235 0.3106 0.5354 
Log Likelihood -43.3 -34.34 -40.81 -29.18 
Observations 105 104 89 91 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
 Because of the nature of the opportunity cost, it is not surprising that the cost of 
the program is not a significant indicator of willingness to reallocate funds (Table 5.8). 
Similar to the findings for the Communitarian Program 1 (Table 5.7), Table 5.8 indicates 
that the belief that respondents have about others’ support for the program is a significant 
indicator of the respondent’s willingness to reallocate. The amount of student fees paid 
by the respondents is only significantly related to the probability of willingness to support 
the reallocation of student fees for males for meningococcal vaccinations and females for 
HPV vaccinations. Motivations of fairness again are significant predictors of the 
probability of respondents being willing to reallocate funds. Because the opportunity cost 
of the vaccination program is a reduction in the funds allocated to other student services, 
the importance placed on each service by respondents was tested. In the end, only the 
importance placed on Student Conflict and Resolution Services was found to be related to 
the probability of being willing to reallocate. Interesting, this relationship for HPV 
vaccinations is in the opposite direction then would be hypothesized: The higher the 
stated importance for this service, the more likely respondents are willing to reallocate 
funds.  
 Of central importance to the current study are gender differences in support for 
various vaccination programs. To determine if the men and women sampled have 
significantly different coefficients of the reported regressions, Chow likelihood ratio tests 
are conducted to determine significant gender differences. As seen in Table 5.9, men and 
women responded significantly different from one another to Program 1 of the 
Individualist WTP question regarding meningococcal disease and to Program 2 of the 
Individualist WTP question regarding HPV. Although some other differences may seem 
large that are not significantly different, for many programs, there is absolutely no 
evidence that men and women value vaccination programs differently. 
Table 5.9 Chow Likelihood Ratio Tests of Gender Differences    
Meningococcal HPV 
Individualist Treatment 
    Program 1 LR chi2  =  19.86*** 
  Prob > chi2 =  0.0013 
    Program 2 LR chi2  =  4.23 LR chi2  =  22.98*** 
  Prob > chi2 =  0.517 Prob > chi2 =  0.00003 
Communitarian Treatment  
    Program 1 LR chi2  =  3.6 LR chi2  =  3.58 
  Prob > chi2 =  0.609 Prob > chi2 =  0.612 
    Program 2 LR chi2  =  10.17 LR chi2  =  4.86 
Prob > chi2 =  0.1175 Prob > chi2 =  0.5881 
 
 To further explore valuation of vaccination programs and the existence of gender 
differences, the following section discusses the mean WTP and probabilities of paying.  
5.5.3 Mean WTP and Probabilities of Paying for Vaccinations 
 To test the remaining hypotheses, mean willingness to pay and probabilities of 
groups’ willing to pay for vaccination programs are calculated. Based on the willingness 
to pay models introduced in section 5.5.2, the mean willingness to pay is calculated by: 
 MeanWTP = 1
Cost
(ln(1+ e ))  
Where Cost is the coefficient of cost from the associated logit regression, and 
represents the sum of the other coefficients from the same logit regression. This 
calculation of mean WTP relies on the principle of a downward sloping demand curve. 
Therefore, its use is only applicable for those regressions with a significant negative 
coefficient on the variable ‘Cost’. Based on the results of the regressions noted above, 
Table 5.10 gives the mean WTP for those models fitting this criterion. 
Of the limited results presented in Table 5.9, there is a vast difference in mean 
WTP between women and men for Program 1 of the Individualist treatment for 
meningococcal disease. Although both mean WTP values are vary small, men are willing 
to pay $.31 on average, while women are only willing to pay $.01. Colorado State 
University implemented a program that vaccinated all willing students, free of charge, 
which was in place during the application of the survey. Since respondents where aware 
of a free option to receive a meningococcal vaccine, many may not have been willing to 
pay for its availability, explaining the very low mean WTP values. Since women are the  
 
Table 5.10 Mean WTP for Vaccination Program by Gender 
Women Men 
Individualist Treatment 
    Program 1 
        Meningococcal $0.01 $0.31 
        HPV $1.43 
    Program 2 
        Meningococcal $3.28 * 
        HPV * * 
Communitarian Treatment   
    Program 1 
        Meningococcal $45.35 * 
        HPV $8.34 * 
    Program 2 
        Meningococcal * * 
        HPV * * 
  
ones impacted by HPV infections, it may explain why women seem to be willing to pay 
more for the HPV vaccine given the same program and treatment. An interesting 
observation from Table 5.10 is that women seem to have an opposite trend in mean WTP 
for the Communitarian treatment. For those women sampled, the mean WTP for Program 
1 of the Communitarian treatment for meningococcal disease vaccinations is over five 
times that for HPV vaccinations. Women seem to act very differently under the 
Communitarian treatment when compared to the Individualist treatment.   
The values of mean WTP are restrictive since many of the vaccination programs 
cannot be valued using this method. Another measure of valuation is the probability that 
the average individual from the represented group would be willing to pay the stated 
amount (a ‘yes’ choice) for a given vaccination program is dependent on: 
Mean Prob (WTP > cost) = 1 1
1+ e 0+ ixi
 
Where o + i xi represents the vector of coefficients from the logit regression results in 
section 5.5.2 and xi is a vector of the sample means of the associated variables. The 
probability of ‘Yes’, or WTP for each vaccination program and treatment are shown in 
Table 5.11. 











Within the sample, women have a lower probability of paying out of their pocket 
to be vaccinated against meningococcal disease, with only a 6.1% chance of paying, 
when compared to men who have a much higher probability of paying, with a 35.5% 
chance. Women seem to be much more likely to pay out-of-pocket for a personal HPV 
vaccination than for meningococcal disease. From Table 5.11, the probability that women 
are willing to pay for self-vaccination for HPV is nearly eight times the probability of 
self-vaccination against meningococcal disease. Many contingent valuation studies limit 
19 Confidence intervals were created at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels to test the significance between the 
gender mean probabilities of willingness to pay. Because of the relatively low number of observations, no 
significant gender difference was found.   
 Women Men 
Individualist Treatment     
    Program 1     
        Meningococcal 0.0610 0.3547 
        HPV 0.4788   
    Program 2     
        Meningococcal 0.0384 0.2536 
        HPV 0.1337 0.1283 
Communitarian Treatment     
    Program 1     
        Meningococcal 0.1553 0.1366 
        HPV 0.2371 0.2452 
    Program 2     
        Meningococcal 0.5170 0.4198 
        HPV 0.6597 0.5213 
methodology to only include that of the Individualist treatment of program 1. With this 
limited methodology, this study would conclude that women have a lower mean WTP for 
the meningococcal vaccine, and thus have a lower valuation for meningococcal disease 
vaccines. But, as recently seen at Colorado State University, when there is an outbreak of 
infectious diseases, many community programs are instituted to stop the outbreak. In 
some cases, therefore, an individual out-of-pocket payment vehicle is not the appropriate 
payment vehicle for valuation estimation. 
Program 2 of the Individualist treatment assessed willingness to pay out-of-pocket 
to provide a vaccine to one other Colorado State University student. The gender 
difference in willingness to pay for HPV is not significant: women have a probability of 
paying .1337, while men have a slightly lower probability of .1283. These results suggest 
that there is no gender difference in valuation of having a HPV vaccination available to 
another student. Regarding the probability to pay for another’s meningococcal 
vaccination, men have a probability of paying that is nearly seven time higher than 
women, with a .2536 probability, compared to women’s probability of .0384. Similar to 
the results for the Individualist treatment of Program 1, men seem to have a higher 
valuation, although not significant in this sample, for meningococcal disease vaccinations 
when the payment vehicle is an out-of-pocket payment from the respondent.  
The results presented in Table 5.11 in conjunction with Table 5.9, specifically for 
the Communitarian treatments, show a different trend in gender valuation of vaccination 
programs. Where significant gender differences exist for the Individualist treatment 
where women were found to have seemingly lower valuation, no significant gender 
differences are found in the Communitarian treatment.  
The results of valuation for vaccinations through the reallocation of student fees is 
very different from the results for the other programs and payment vehicles. The 
probability that either gender would pay for either disease is substantially higher than in 
the other categories. Also, evidence suggests that women respond very differently to the 
different treatments.  Whereas women have very low probabilities of paying for the 
meningococcal vaccines in the Individualist treatment, those probabilities seem to 
increase, specifically for Program 2 of the Communitarian treatment.  
Although Table 5.9 suggests support for hypothesis H4 for Program 1 for 
meningococcal disease and for Program 2 for HPV in the Individualist treatment, there 
are no significant differences in the probability of paying. The same results hold for 
hypothesis H5. There are no significant differences found between the probabilities of 
paying for either program for either treatment, although in some cases sample differences 
are drastic. For instance, the mean probability of women paying for HPV vaccinations in 
Program 2 is approximately three times their probability of paying for Program 1 of the 
Individualist treatment. Therefore, hypotheses H4 and H5 cannot be substantiated from 
the survey data. 
Hypothesis H6 is also not supported. Both men and women show increases in 
their probability of paying for Program 2 compared to Program 1 of the Communitarian 
treatment for both diseases, but the differences are not significant. Reallocating student 
fees to fund communal vaccination programs seems to be most popular amongst 
Colorado State University students.  
Since there are no gender differences in contracting, or the effects of 
meningococcal disease, while there are substantial gender differences for HPV, it was 
hypothesized that there would be no gender differences in the probability of willingness 
to pay for the meningococcal vaccination (H7), but there would be significant gender 
differences for HPV vaccination programs (H8). Consistent with this reasoning, there are 
no significant gender differences in the probability of paying for meningococcal disease, 
giving evidence to accept H7. Although evidence seems to support hypothesis H8 for the 
Individualist treatment, the insignificant findings on probability of WTP suggests that H8 
cannot be supported.  
5.6 Discussion  
 From the results presented in this study, some gender differences are apparent 
throughout the sample, but are not always statistically significant. Focusing on gender 
differences in key variables, the sample indicates that even amongst college students, 
significant gender differences are apparent. Within those surveyed, men are found to have 
a higher annual income and have parents with higher incomes than the women sampled. 
Women were significantly more likely to feel that they are susceptible to contracting 
meningococcal disease and HPV, more likely to have been previously vaccinated against 
these diseases, known someone that was diagnosed with these diseases, and feel that it is 
important for the Colorado State University community to be vaccinated against disease. 
Women were found to state that self-interest was more influential in their willingness to 
pay decisions than men, along with all other social preferences. These findings suggest 
that women, on average, should have a higher probability of being willing to pay for 
vaccinations. But as seen in the programs, this hypothesis is not substantiated, and in 
some cases, results suggest the opposite. These finding suggest that under the current 
methodology of contingent valuation and payment vehicles, results may not accurately 
capture valuation, especially for women. Using an alternative methodology, Program 2 of 
the Communitarian treatment tests if altering the payment vehicle to a more realistic 
payment method and including non-selfish influences of behavior, will create a model 
that more accurately estimates valuation. From the results of this study, the new 
methodology does create considerably different valuation for vaccination programs. 
Whereas the results using the traditional methodology indicate differences in valuation, 
with women have lower stated valuation, no gender differences are found using the 
alternative methodology. Although not significant, the sample suggests that when 
possible gender differences exist using the traditional payment vehicles of out-of-pocket 
payments and tax referendums (both programs of the Individualist treatment and Program 
1 of the Communitarian treatment), men have seemingly higher valuations, as apposed to 
women having possibly higher valuation using the alternative payment vehicle. Unlike 
the findings using traditional methodology, this trend supports theory. As presented in 
Chapter three, those with a higher perception of risk should have a higher probability of 
paying, controlling for appropriate variables, to reduce those risks. In the current study, 
women are found to perceive themselves are as being more susceptible, and therefore 
perceive a higher risk associated with the stated diseases. Using Chapter 3’s theory, 
women should therefore have a higher probability of paying for the vaccination programs. 
But only in the new methodology is this relationship indicated, even though the results 
are not statistically significant. These findings show the need for larger sample sizes to 
determine if any gender differences do exist.  
 The alternative and newer methodology presented in the current study also assesses 
the prevalence of behavior influences on choice. As seen in Table 5.2, women sampled 
have a higher stated influence of self-interest, altruism, reciprocity, fairness, and 
commitment on their willingness to pay choices when compared to men. From tables 5.5-
5.8, at least one of these preferences directly influence the model of behavior, and 
indirectly, the belief of other’s decision also play a significant role. Social preferences 
and accounting for self-interest play a significant role in properly modeling behavior. Not 
including these preferences may lead to underspecified modeling. When the models are 
reduced to not include influences of self-interest, social preferences, and the belief of 
others, the results show a convergence of the willingness to pay amongst genders. For 
example, Table 5.11 shows that for those sampled, the probability of women supporting  
Program 1 of the Individualist treatment for meningococcal disease was 0.061, while men 
had only a 0.3547 probability, resulting in magnitude difference between the gender of 
nearly 5. When these influences on behavior are not included in the model, that 
magnitude of difference dropped to 1.8655. This result of a more homogenous 
willingness to support vaccination programs amongst genders was not only found in this 
example, but was found for all of the programs, except for Program 2 of the 
Communitarian treatment for HPV, as seen in Table 5.12. 
 The logit results from all estimates that do not include influences on behavior are 
presented in the appendix. These findings suggest that by not including these influences 
on behavior within CVM studies, the models used are underspecified, and not only give 
inaccurate estimates of valuation, but may also disregard potentially significant gender 
differences.   
 
 
Table 5.12 Gender differences in mean prob (WTP > cost) without social and self-interest preferences 
along with comparisons when including these influences 
  Women Men 
Magnitude of Gender 
Difference w/o Social 
and Self-Interest 
Preferences 
Magnitude of Gender 
Differences Including 




    Program 1 
        Meningococcal 0.061 0.3547 1.8655 4.8148 
        HPV 0.4788     
    Program 2       
        Meningococcal 0.0384 0.2536 0.2779 5.6042 
        HPV 0.1337 0.1283 0.0467 0.0404 
Communitarian 
Treatment       
    Program 1       
        Meningococcal 0.1553 0.1366 0.0173 0.1204 
        HPV 0.2371 0.2452 0.0107 0.0342 
    Program 2       
        Meningococcal 0.517 0.4198 0.0650 0.1880 
        HPV 0.6597 0.5213 0.1683 0.2098 
 
5.7 Conclusions  
    
 The results of this study suggest the importance of a realistic payment vehicle and 
the inclusion of social and self-interest motivations on willingness to pay choices. 
Traditional payment vehicles of out-of-pocket payments or voting for increases in 
individual payments towards communal funds may provide correct estimates for 
valuation of goods and services when these vehicles accurately reflect the mode of 
payment for the proposed policy or program. But in the case of community based 
programs like the meningococcal vaccination program at Colorado State University-
where funding of the program is not provided by an out-of-pocket payment, but through a 
reallocation of already existing communal funds-a payment vehicle that properly 
represents this reallocation should be taken into consideration, when possible in CVM 
studies.  
 This study also indicates that proper modeling of valuation and choice in CVM 
should include measures of social preferences and motivations of self-interest. Without 
these influences, distortions of valuation may exist, and gender differences that do exist 
may be invisible due to underspecified modeling. This study shows that there are gender 
differences in perceptions, motivations, and valuation. Therefore, the accurate use of 
payment vehicles and inclusion of social and self-interest motivations may be critical to 
measuring gender differences in valuation of goods and services. 
 The sample used in the present study creates many limitations to the extrapolation of 
the results presented here to other goods and services and to other populations. The 
limited sample size available for this study leads to very restrictive results from the 
analyses and suggest the need for larger sample sizes when available. The results only 
apply to valuation of HPV and meningococcal vaccinations and should not be used as a 
basis for estimates of valuation for other goods and services. Also, the results only hold 
for students at Colorado State University enrolled in the specific economic courses 
sampled, and should not be generalized to other populations. The limited number of 
minorities in the sample along with the low variation in personal incomes also limits the 
results. Focusing on gender differences without including class or racial differences may 
limit full estimations of cultural differences among the sample.   
Chapter 6: Conclusions 
This dissertation began with an extensive exploration of the theory and seemingly 
paradoxical results between the economic literatures of contingent valuation method, risk 
aversion, and the interdisciplinary literature of risk perceptions, specifically with regard 
to race and gender differences. Although CVM has important policy implications, its 
traditional methodology brings about numerous critiques that indicate the results of CVM 
studies may have potential flaws.  
 To explore the inconsistency between the literatures and in an attempt to correct 
as many of the critiques as possible, a theoretical model is generated that connects the 
contingent valuation theory to that of risk aversion and perceptions of risk. Insights from 
the risk perception literature are used to create a model of absolute risk aversion that is 
directly tied to valuation from CVM. Data from a previously collected dataset by Loomis 
et al (2009) is fit to the model. The results reinforce the inconsistency found between the 
risk perception and contingent valuation literatures and indicate a possible weakness with 
traditional methodology used by contingent valuation studies. The findings from the data 
also suggest that one of potential reason for the apparent inconsistent results is the 
payment vehicle chosen by CVM studies.  
 The existence of social preferences has been well established in the experimental 
literature and is formally modeled including influences of self-interest, altruism, 
reciprocity, fairness, and commitment in the context of stated willingness to pay in 
contingent valuation studies. The models suggest that the existence of some social 
preferences, specifically commitment, may explain some of the inconsistencies between 
the relevant literatures.   
 A dichotomous choice stated valuation study on various vaccination programs 
was conducted among college students at Colorado State University. The findings 
indicate some gender differences in willingness to pay for vaccination programs and 
suggest that the payment vehicle may have effects on valuation. The choice of the 
payment vehicle seems to influence WTP findings, especially in the context of gender 
effects and may indicate an understated valuation placed on the program by women when 
the traditional payment vehicle is utilized.  
The inclusion of social preferences is a significant improvement to modeling of 
valuation, and when not included, may lead to underspecified models that ignore existing 
gender differences. When the probabilities of paying for the various vaccination 
programs that are based on models that do not include significant social and self-interest 
preferences, are compared to the models including these influences, there is a 
convergence of gender differences in WTP when the influences are not included. This 
finding suggests that the traditional methods used by CVM studies may miss gender 
differences that truly exist. 
This dissertation has discussed some of the issues surrounding the traditional 
methodology used by CVM, especially with respect to race and gender differences. 
Solutions to help correct these issues are introduced and tested, giving policy makers 
alternative methodologies for use in estimating valuation for nonmarket goods and health 
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Appendix Chapter 3 
Below are the survey instruments used by Loomis et. al (2009). Two instruments 
were developed and utilized by the study; consequential and non-consequential.  
A.3.1 Consequential Survey Instrument 
The following is the consequential or real instrument in which respondents had to 
give a certain amount to pay for bottled water: 
 
Section 1  This section asks some general questions about you and your drinking 
water. 
Note: “Tap water” means water that comes out of the faucet in you kitchen. 
 
1) How long have you lived in ________________County,   
Colorado?___________ 
 
2)  a)  Overall, how would you rate the taste of your tap water? 
 Poor       Below Average       Average      Above Average      Excellent 
      
b) Overall, how would you rate the smell of your tap water? 
 Strong unpleasant smell      Somewhat unpleasant smell 
 Noticeable smell       No smell     
 
c) Overall, how would you rate the appearance of your tap water? 
 Colored (brown, red, yellow)       Very Cloudy       Cloudy                         
 Slightly cloudy  Normal appearance 
 
d) Overall, how would you rate the safety of your tap water? 
 Poor       Below Average       Average      Above Average      Excellent  
Don’t Know 
 
3) List any problems that you think your tap water has. 
 
 
4)  Do you use a water filter system at home to purify your tap water?    
 Always   Often          Sometimes     Never (Go to question 5) 
     If you use a filter system in your home, what type is it? 
              Filter Pitcher        Faucet Mounted       Under-sink       Refrigerator      
 
5)  How much money do you spend on each of the following over the course of a typical 
month?  
  
     
Bottled Water (for use at home only)  
  None  $1-$10  $11-24   $25-$49   $50 or more 
 
 Filter System at home (maintenance or replacement filters)  
  No System              Less than $25    More than $25 
   
6)  Does the water in your home come from a well on your property? 
  Yes    No (if “No” skip to question 7) 
6a)  Do you have your well water tested?  
 Yes    No (if “No” skip to question 7) 
6b)  How often do you have your well-water tested? 
 Once a year     Once every two years   Every five years 
 
6c)  Does your well water meet standards when tested? 
 Yes      No 
 
7)  Check any of the items below that you think can be a source of nitrate contamination 
in drinking water. 
 Fertilizer Runoff          Natural Deposits           Decaying Plant Matter 
 Fossil Fuels       Sewage             Landfill Runoff 
 Steel Factories      Discharge from Coal-burning Factories 
 Leaching from Ore-processing Sites            Leaching from Septic Tanks 
 
8)  Check any of the items that you think can help you avoid drinking water with high 
levels of nitrate. 
 Under-sink Filter  Faucet-mounted Filter  Filter Pitcher (e.g., Brita  filters) 
 Bottled Water          Boiling Tap Water  
           
9)  Have you heard about the quality of your community’s drinking water? 
   Yes    No 
 
10)  Do you read the water quality information included in your water bill?     Always  
 Sometimes               Never             Don’t receive a water bill 
 
11)  Do you prepare formula for an infant (a child under one year old)?   
   Yes    No (if “No” skip to question 12) 
 11a)  How old is the infant?_______________ 
11b)  Do you use bottled water to prepare infant formula? 
             Always  Often           Sometimes       Never 
 
 
12)  Have you or a woman in your household been pregnant in the last three years? 
   Yes    No (if “No” skip to question 13) 
12a)  While pregnant, how often did you or a woman in your household buy bottled water 
to drink at home? 
       Always         Often            Sometimes          Never 
12b)  While nursing, how often did you or a woman in your household buy bottled water 
to drink at home? 
 Always          Often          Sometimes      Never      Didn’t Nurse 
 
13)  Do you have health insurance? 
  Yes    No (If no, skip to question 14) 
 13a)  Does your insurance cover emergency room care? 
   Yes    No 
 13b)  Is your family (spouse and/or children) covered? 
   Yes    No 
 
14)  If you have children, how much does a visit to the doctor for your child usually cost 
you? 
  $0           $5 - $20        $21 - $30        $31 - $50        $51 - $70        
 $71 - $90         $91 - $100         $100 + 
      14a)  Does an adult in your household have to miss work in order to take a child to 
the doctor or hospital? 
  Yes    No 
 
Section 2   This section asks about your beliefs regarding infants’ health (consider 
infants to be children under 1 year of age). 







1)  If drinking water is safe for 
adults, it is also safe for infants. 
     
2)  If infants consume water 
contaminated with nitrate, it can 
     
be harmful to their health. 
3)  If adults consume water 
contaminated with nitrate, it can 
be harmful to their health. 
     
4)  It is natural for infants to 
become ill more often than 
adults. 
     
5)  The infants in my community 
are never ill due to pollution. 
     
6)  My friends and family are 
concerned with infants’ health 
issues. 
     
7)  The parents I know are 
worried about the health of their 
infants. 
     
8)  It is possible to reduce the 
exposure infants have to 
pollution.  
     
9)  It is possible to prevent 
infants from becoming seriously 
ill due to environmentally caused 
illnesses.  
     
10)  Only people with infants 
living in their home need to be 
concerned about pollution. 
     
11)  Parents, not the public, have 
the sole responsibility for 
protecting their infants from 
harm. 
     
12)  More state and community 
resources need to be devoted to 
infant health issues. 
     
13)  There is too much emphasis 
placed on issues regarding 
infants’ health. 
     
If you are NOT currently caring for an infant, skip to question 1 of Section 
3. 
   
14)  My infant(s) are not exposed 
to dangerous environmental 
contaminants. 
     
15)  I can ensure that my infant(s) 
do not become ill due to 
environmental contaminants. 
     
16)  I can afford to take my 
infant(s) to the doctor when they 
are ill. 
     
17)  I can prevent my infant(s) 
from becoming seriously ill. 
     
 
Section 3  This section asks what you think about the quality of your drinking 
water. Please fill in the bubble corresponding to your responses for questions 1 







1)  My community has safe 
drinking water. 
     
2)  My home’s drinking water 
(straight from the faucet) does not 
have unsafe levels of nitrate. 
     
3)  My friends and family are 
worried about our drinking water. 
     
4)  Most of the people I know 
would take steps to ensure that 
their drinking water is safe. 
     
5)  Nitrate in drinking water is an 
unavoidable occurrence.  
     
6)  It is important to me to test the 
quality of my home’s drinking 
water. 
     
7) It is the government’s 
responsibility to ensure that my 
drinking water is safe. 
     
 
Section 4   We are now going illustrate some risk information for you to help you 
get used to the way in which risk information is presented as pie charts. Please read 
the information and then choose which chart represents the greatest risk. 
 
In the first example, the gray pie wedge represents the fraction or proportion of 1000 
accidents which involve Car A and Car B. The larger the gray slice, the greater the risk. 
As long as the bottom numbers in the fractions (as in this case, 1000) are the same, the 
larger the top number, the larger the risk.  
1)  The following charts represent the risk (in number of accidents out of 1000) of being 
involved in a fatal car crash in two different types of car.  
Car A Car B 
  
 
Which car poses the greatest risk? ___________________ 
 
 
2)  The following charts represent the risk (in number of park visitors out of 1000) of 
being attacked by a mountain lion in two different national parks. 
Park A Park B 
  
 
Which park poses the greater risk? _______________ 
 
1) The correct answer is A. The top number for A (150) is greater than the top 
number for B (60). 
2) The correct answer is A. The top number for A (15) is greater than the top 
number for B (6). 
 
 
Section 5   This section contains a choice task for you to complete.  We have listed 
below some important information, which you may or may not be aware of, about 
nitrate in water.  Please read this information before you continue. 
 Your community is one of many in Colorado that is at risk for nitrate contamination 
of its drinking water. 
 Both public water supplies and private wells can be affected. 
 Because infants do not have fully developed digestive systems, drinking nitrate 




 Consuming nitrate contaminated drinking water places infants at risk for a condition 
called “blue baby syndrome” that is caused by depleting the oxygen in the blood. 
 Symptoms of “blue baby syndrome” include a bluish tint to the infant’s skin, 
shortness of breath, shock, brain damage, coma, and death. 
 Using bottled water or water that has had the nitrate removed to prepare formula will 
eliminate negative health effects caused by nitrate contaminated drinking water for 
infants, but will not reduce risks from other sources. 
 
What follows is some information concerning different choices you have to reduce 
health risks to infants associated with exposure to nitrate contamination of drinking 
water.  Please read through the following information and for each pair of options, 
choose the option that you feel is best.   
 
Options for Preparing Infant Formula 
Option A   Option B    
Use tap water    Use bottled water   
 
*Option B may have other potential benefits in addition to reducing exposure to nitrate. 
 
Effects of Over-exposure to Nitrate Contaminated Drinking Water 
 
   Risk of Temporary     Risk of Permanent 
Cost   Shock              Brain Damage        Risk of Death 
Total, one-time           Risk of infant   Risk of infant     Risk of infant 
cost of the option        experiencing  experiencing     dying 
in dollars                  decrease in blood             damage to the brain  
          pressure and a       
                 weak, rapid pulse  
  
 
In the packet containing this survey, you were also given a voucher for $_____. In the 
next part of the survey you will be asked whether you would purchase or not purchase 
various amounts of bottled water. This water would help to reduce your infant’s exposure 
to water with excessive levels of nitrate. 
If you purchased the water, the health risks to your child from nitrate 
contaminated drinking water (as well as other potential drinking water contaminants) 
would be reduced. The amount by which these risks would go down for a given amount 
of water is presented on the sheet for each choice. Purchasing the bottled water would not 
reduce risks to your child to zero because she would still face all of the normal risks that 
do not come from drinking contaminated water.  
If you would not purchase the water, your child would continue to face the risks 
associated with drinking contaminated water (either by drinking the water by itself or by 
drinking formula that was prepared with contaminated water). The total risk that your 
child would face if you chose not to purchase the water is also presented on the sheet for 
each choice.  
You will be asked to make 4 choices in total. Choosing between Option A and 
Option B will allow you to either: actually purchase bottled water for your infant using 
money provided by Colorado State University or keep the money that it would take to 
purchase the water. 
 At this time, look over the voucher that was attached to your survey. You will see 
that it is good for a dollar amount that matches the highest cost given for bottled water on 
the four choice tasks. Once you have completed the survey, send the completed survey 
along with the signed voucher back to us in the self-addressed postage-paid envelope that 
we have provided. Once we have received the surveys and vouchers back, we will 
randomly select one of your four choices between A and B in Section 5. If on that 
particular task you chose “Do Nothing,” you will receive a check for the full amount 
listed on the voucher. If, on the other hand, you chose “Purchase Bottled Water,” you will 
receive a pre-paid punch-card to obtain the bottled water from a local grocery store. If the 
value of the punch-card is less than the dollar amount given on the voucher, you will be 
sent a check for the difference. 
 
For this task, we want you to compare Option A to Option B and choose the option you 
would actually pick if you had to pay the cost shown. 
*Risk information is presented in the number of infants in your community out of 1,000 
who will be affected. 
 
Effects Option A    
Do Nothing 
Option B  
Buy Bottled Water for an Infant 
in Your Household 









Which option do you choose?  _____ 
Why did you choose that option? 
 
 
For this task, we want you to compare Option A to Option B and choose the option you 
would actually pick if you had to pay the cost shown. 
*Risk information is presented in the number of children in your community out of 1,000 













Effects Option A                                                 
Do Nothing 
Option B     
Buy Bottled Water for an in 
Your Household 









Which option do you choose? _____ 






For this task, we want you to compare Option A to Option B and choose the option you 
would actually pick if you had to pay the cost shown. 
*Risk information is presented in the number of children in your community out of 1,000 
















Effects Option A                                          
Do Nothing 
Option B     
Buy Bottled Water for an 
Infant in Your Household 




100/1000  60/1000 
 
 
Which option do you choose? _____ 






For this task, we want you to compare Option A to Option B and choose the option you 
would actually pick if you had to pay the cost shown. 
*Risk information is presented in the number of children in your community out of 1,000 
















Effects Option A                                             
Do Nothing 
Option B     
Buy Bottled Water for an Infant 
in Your Household 
 Cost $0 $500 
Risk of 100/1000  80/1000 
 
Which option do you choose? _____ 





Section 5   This section asks for some general demographic information. 
1)  Age _____ 
 
2)  What is your gender?  Male                 Female 
 
3)  Occupation _____________________________ 
 




















5)  Ethnicity (Check all that apply) 
 African American 
 American Indian 
 Asian American 
 European American 
 Hispanic/Latino 
 Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 
 Other (__________________) 
 
6)  Do any of your children (under the age of 18) live in your community? 
  Yes    No    I have no children. 
 
7)  Do any of your grandchildren (under the age of 18) live in your community? 
  Yes    No    I have no grandchildren. 
 
8)  Do any of your nieces or nephews (under the age of 18) live in your community? 
  Yes   No   I have no nieces or nephews. 
 
 
9)  Yearly Household Income from all Sources 
 $0 - $10,000         $10,001 - $20,000        $20,001 - $30,000        $30,001 - 
$40,000         $40,001 - $50,000           $50,001 + 
 
A.3.2 Non Consequential Survey Instrument 
The following is the non-consequential or hypothetical instrument in which 
respondents did not have an opportunity cost of giving a certain amount to pay for bottled 
water: 
 
Section 1  This section asks some general questions about you and your drinking 
water. 
Note: “Tap water” means water that comes out of the faucet in you kitchen. 
 
1)  How long have you lived in ________________County,  Colorado?___________ 
 
2)  a)  Overall, how would you rate the taste of your tap water? 
 Poor       Below Average       Average      Above Average      Excellent 
      
e) Overall, how would you rate the smell of your tap water? 
 Strong unpleasant smell       Somewhat unpleasant smell                                               
 Noticeable smell       No smell     
 
f) Overall, how would you rate the appearance of your tap water? 
 Colored (brown, red, yellow)       Very Cloudy     Cloudy         Slightly cloudy 
 Normal appearance 
 
g) Overall, how would you rate the safety of your tap water? 
 Poor       Below Average      Average      Above Average      Excellent 
 Don’t Know 
 




4)  Do you use a water filter system at home to purify your tap water?  Always   
 Often          Sometimes     Never (Go to question 5) 
     If you use a filter system in your home, what type is it? 
              Filter Pitcher        Faucet Mounted       Under-sink       Refrigerator      
 
5)  How much money do you spend on each of the following over the course of a typical 
month?  
 Bottled Water (for use at home only)  
  None  $1-$10  $11-24   $25-$49   $50 or more 
 Filter System at home (maintenance or replacement filters)  
  No System              Less than $25    More than $25  
 
6)  Does the water in your home come from a well on your property? 
  Yes    No (if “No” skip to question 7) 
6a)  Do you have your well water tested?  
 Yes    No (if “No” skip to question 7) 
6b)  How often do you have your well-water tested? 
 Once a year     Once every two years   Every five years 
6c)  Does your well water meet standards when tested? 
 Yes      No 
 
7)  Check any of the items below that you think can be a source of nitrate contamination 
in drinking water. 
 Fertilizer Runoff          Natural Deposits           Decaying Plant Matter 
 Fossil Fuels       Sewage             Landfill Runoff 
 Steel Factories      Discharge from Coal-burning Factories 
 Leaching from Ore-processing Sites            Leaching from Septic Tanks 
 
8)  Check any of the items that you think can help you avoid drinking water with high 
levels of nitrate. 
 Under-sink Filter  Faucet-mounted Filter  Filter Pitcher (e.g., Brita  filters) 
 Bottled Water          Boiling Tap Water  
           
9)  Have you heard about the quality of your community’s drinking water? 
   Yes    No 
 
10)  Do you read the water quality information included in your water bill?          
Always  Sometimes               Never             Don’t receive a water bill 
 
11)  Do you prepare formula for an infant (a child under one year old)?   
   Yes    No (if “No” skip to question 12) 
 11a)  How old is the infant?_______________ 
11b)  Do you use bottled water to prepare infant formula? 
             Always  Often           Sometimes       Never 
 
12)  Have you or a woman in your household been pregnant in the last three years? 
   Yes    No (if “No” skip to question 13) 
12a)  While pregnant, how often did you or a woman in your household buy bottled water 
to drink at home? 
       Always         Often            Sometimes          Never 
12b)  While nursing, how often did you or a woman in your household buy bottled water 
to drink at home? 
 Always          Often          Sometimes      Never      Didn’t Nurse 
 
13)  Do you have health insurance? 
  Yes    No (If no, skip to question 14) 
 13a)  Does your insurance cover emergency room care? 
   Yes    No 
 13b)  Is your family (spouse and/or children) covered? 
   Yes    No 
 
14)  If you have children, how much does a visit to the doctor for your child usually cost 
you? 
  $0           $5 - $20        $21 - $30        $31 - $50        $51 - $70        
 $71 - $90         $91 - $100         $100 + 
      14a)  Does an adult in your household have to miss work in order to take a child to 
the doctor or hospital? 
  Yes    No 
 
 
Section 2   This section asks about your beliefs regarding infants’ health (consider 
infants to be children under 1 year of age). 







1)  If drinking water is safe for 
adults, it is also safe for infants. 
     
2)  If infants consume water 
contaminated with nitrate, it can 
be harmful to their health. 
     
3)  If adults consume water 
contaminated with nitrate, it can 
be harmful to their health. 
     
4)  It is natural for infants to 
become ill more often than adults. 
     
5)  The infants in my community 
are never ill due to pollution. 
     
6)  My friends and family are 
concerned with infants’ health 
issues. 
     
7)  The parents I know are 
worried about the health of their 
infants. 
     
8)  It is possible to reduce the 
exposure infants have to 
pollution.  
     
9)  It is possible to prevent infants 
from becoming seriously ill due 
to environmentally caused 
illnesses.  
     
10)  Only people with infants 
living in their home need to be 
concerned about pollution. 
     
11)  Parents, not the public, have 
the sole responsibility for 
protecting their infants from 
harm. 
     
12)  More state and community 
resources need to be devoted to 
     
infant health issues. 
13)  There is too much emphasis 
placed on issues regarding 
infants’ health. 
     
If you are NOT currently caring for an infant, skip to question 1 of Section 3.    
14)  My infant(s) are not exposed 
to dangerous environmental 
contaminants. 
     
15)  I can ensure that my infant(s) 
do not become ill due to 
environmental contaminants. 
     
16)  I can afford to take my 
infant(s) to the doctor when they 
are ill. 
     
17)  I can prevent my infant(s) 
from becoming seriously ill. 
     
 
 
Section 3  This section asks what you think about the quality of your drinking 
water. Please fill in the bubble corresponding to your responses for questions 1 







1)  My community has safe 
drinking water. 
     
2)  My home’s drinking water 
(straight from the faucet) does not 
have unsafe levels of nitrate. 
     
3)  My friends and family are 
worried about our drinking water. 
     
4)  Most of the people I know 
would take steps to ensure that 
their drinking water is safe. 
     
5)  Nitrate in drinking water is an 
unavoidable occurrence.  
     
6)  It is important to me to test the 
quality of my home’s drinking 
water. 
     
7) It is the government’s 
responsibility to ensure that my 
drinking water is safe. 
     
 
Section 4   We are now going illustrate some risk information for you to help you 
get used to the way in which risk information is presented as pie charts. Please read 
the information and then choose which chart represents the greatest risk. 
 
In the first example, the gray pie wedge represents the fraction or proportion of 1000 
accidents which involve Car A and Car B. The larger the gray slice, the greater the risk. 
As long as the bottom numbers in the fractions (as in this case, 1000) are the same, the 
larger the top number, the larger the risk.  
1)  The following charts represent the risk (in number of accidents out of 1000) of being 
involved in a fatal car crash in two different types of car.  
Car A Car B 
  
Which car poses the greatest risk? ___________________ 
 
 
2)  The following charts represent the risk (in number of park visitors out of 1000) of 
being attacked by a mountain lion in two different national parks. 
Park A Park B 
  
 
Which park poses the greater risk? _______________ 
 
1) The correct answer is A. The top number for A (150) is greater than the top 
number for B (60). 
2) The correct answer is A. The top number for A (15) is greater than the top 
number for B (6). 
 
Section 5   This section contains a choice task for you to complete.  We have listed 
below some important information, which you may or may not be aware of, about 
nitrate in water.  Please read this information before you continue. 
150/1000 60/1000 
15/1000 6/1000 
 Your community is one of many in Colorado that is at risk for nitrate contamination 
of its drinking water. 
 Both public water supplies and private wells can be affected. 
 Because infants do not have fully developed digestive systems, drinking nitrate 
contaminated water can have negative effects on infants’ health, but it will not affect 
adults. 
 Consuming nitrate contaminated drinking water places infants at risk for a condition 
called “blue baby syndrome” that is caused by depleting the oxygen in the blood. 
 Symptoms of “blue baby syndrome” include a bluish tint to the infant’s skin, 
shortness of breath, shock, brain damage, coma, and death. 
 Using bottled water or water that has had the nitrate removed to prepare formula will 
eliminate negative health effects caused by nitrate contaminated drinking water for 
infants, but will not reduce risks from other sources. 
 
What follows is some information concerning different choices you have to reduce 
health risks to infants associated with exposure to nitrate contamination of drinking 
water.  Please read through the following information and for each pair of options, 
choose the option that you feel is best.   
 
Options for Preparing Infant Formula 
Option A   Option B    
Use tap water    Use bottled water   
 
*Option B may have other potential benefits in addition to reducing exposure to nitrate. 
 
Effects of Over-exposure to Nitrate Contaminated Drinking Water 
 
   Risk of Temporary     Risk of Permanent 
Cost   Shock              Brain Damage        Risk of Death 
Total, one-time           Risk of infant   Risk of infant     Risk of infant 
cost of the option        experiencing  experiencing     dying 
in dollars                     decrease in blood damage to the brain  
           pressure and a       
                         weak, rapid pulse  
  
In the next part of the survey you will be asked whether you would purchase or 
not purchase various amounts of bottled water. This water would help to reduce your 
infant’s exposure to water with excessive levels of nitrate. 
If you purchased the water, the health risks to your child from nitrate 
contaminated drinking water (as well as other potential drinking water contaminants) 
would be reduced. The amount by which these risks would go down for a given amount 
of water is presented on the sheet for each choice. Purchasing the bottled water would not 
reduce risks to your child to zero because she would still face all of the normal risks that 
do not come from drinking contaminated water.  
If you would not purchase the water, your child would continue to face the risks 
associated with drinking contaminated water (either by drinking the water by itself or by 
drinking formula that was prepared with contaminated water). The total risk that your 
child would face if you chose not to purchase the water is also presented on the sheet for 
each choice.  
You will be asked to make 4 choices in total.  
 
 
For this task, we want you to compare Option A to Option B and choose the option you 
would actually pick if you had to pay the cost shown. 
*Risk information is presented in the number of infants in your community out of 1,000 
who will be affected. 
Effects Option A    
Do Nothing 
Option B  
Buy Bottled Water for an Infant 
in Your Household 




















Which option do you choose?  _____ 
Why did you choose that option? 
 
 
For this task, we want you to compare Option A to Option B and choose the option you 
would actually pick if you had to pay the cost shown. 
*Risk information is presented in the number of children in your community out of 1,000 
who will be affected. 
 
  
Effects Option A                                                 
Do Nothing 
Option B     
Buy Bottled Water for an in 
Your Household 





















Which option do you choose? _____ 
 
Why did you choose that option? 
 
 
For this task, we want you to compare Option A to Option B and choose the option you 
would actually pick if you had to pay the cost shown. 
*Risk information is presented in the number of children in your community out of 1,000 
who will be affected. 
 
  
Effects Option A                                          
Do Nothing 
Option B     
Buy Bottled Water for an Infant 
in Your Household 
















Risk of 9/1000 6/1000 
 
Which option do you choose? _____ 





For this task, we want you to compare Option A to Option B and choose the option you 
would actually pick if you had to pay the cost shown. 
*Risk information is presented in the number of children in your community out of 1,000 
who will be affected. 
Death* 
  
Effects Option A                                             
Do Nothing 
Option B     
Buy Bottled Water for an Infant 
in Your Household 
















Risk of 9/1000 3/1000 
 
Which option do you choose? _____ 




Section 5   This section asks for some general demographic information. 
1)  Age _____ 
 
2)  What is your gender?  Male                 Female 
 
3)  Occupation _____________________________ 
 
4)  Number of Years of Schooling:________________ 
 
5)  Ethnicity (Check all that apply) 
 African American 
 American Indian 
 Asian American 
 European American 
 Hispanic/Latino 
 Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 
 Other (__________________) 
 
6)  Do any of your children (under the age of 18) live in your community? 
  Yes    No    I have no children. 
 
7)  Do any of your grandchildren (under the age of 18) live in your community? 
  Yes    No    I have no grandchildren. 
 
8)  Do any of your nieces or nephews (under the age of 18) live in your community? 





9)  Yearly Household Income from all Sources 
 $0 - $10,000        $10,001 - $20,000         $20,001 - $30,000         $30,001 - 
$40,000         $40,001 - $50,000           $50,001 +
 
 Four treatments were created and used for the study in chapter 5. Meningococcal 
disease HPV both had a individual and community treatment.  
A.5.1 Meningococcal Disease Individual Treatment 
Campus Vaccination Programs:
The Case of Meningococcal Disease 
 
 
Tell Us What You Think! 
 
 
        Department of Economics 
Part 1 – Information about meningococcal disease 
Please read the following information, which may affect how you answer the questions 
in this survey. 
 
Who gets it? 
 
Meningococcal disease has been the cause of death for four people in Fort Collins and 
one in Denver during 2011, with many more hospitalized.  
 College students, especially freshmen are more susceptible to meningococcal 
disease, mainly due to behavior.  
 Meningococcal disease is not transferred through the air, but through direct 
contact with a carrier of the disease, mainly through saliva.  
 College students’ lifestyle includes very close contact with others and sharing of 
items that may contain saliva.  
 Although many types of meningococcal disease exist, meningococcal sepsis has 
been thought to be the cause of the deaths and hospitalizations in Fort Collins.  
 
How is it dangerous? 
 
Meningococcal disease is a very dangerous disease with high mortality rates.  
 There are approximately 2,600 cases of meningococcal disease per year in the 
United States on average. 
 Even with antibiotics, approximately 1 in 10 victims of meningococcal meningitis 
will die  
 Another 40% of survivors lose a limb or their hearing, or suffer permanent brain 
damage. 
 Within hours, a patient's health can change from seemingly good to mortally ill 
 40% of patients with meningococcal sepsis will die, the variety seen in the current 
Colorado State University epidemic 
 
How to avoid meningococcal disease? 
Because of the high mortality rate even with proper treatment, the best strategy toward 
meningococcal disease is vaccination. 
 A vaccine for meningococcal disease has been approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and available since 1981. 
 This vaccine can prevent 2 of the 3 most commonly occurring strains in the US. 
 The vaccine can reduce the incidence of infection, hospitalization, and death by 
nearly 70% 
 A booster of the vaccine is recommended every 2-4 years 
 
Who can get the vaccine? 
 Anyone over the age of 2 can receive the vaccine. 
Is the vaccine risky? 
 Up to about half of people who get meningococcal vaccines have mild side 
effects, such as redness or pain where the shot was given. These symptoms 
usually last for one or two days. A small percentage of people who receive the 
vaccine develop a fever.  
 Severe reactions, such as a serious allergic reaction, are very rare. 
 A nervous system disorder called Guillain-Barré Syndrome has been reported. 
However, this happens so infrequently that it is currently not possible to tell if the 
vaccine might be a factor. 
Part 2 – Questions about your experience and belief 
 
1. Have you ever been diagnosed with meningococcal disease? 
 ____ Yes   ____ No 
 
2. To your knowledge, have any of your close friends or family members ever been 
diagnosed with meningococcal disease? 
 ____ Yes   ____ No 
 
3. Prior to reading the information in this survey, were you familiar with meningococcal 
disease? 
 ____ Yes  _____ No 
 
4. The meningococcal disease vaccination is not part of the routine set of vaccinations in 
the US and is not required by the University. Have you ever received a meningococcal 
disease vaccination? 
 ____ Yes  _____ No 
 
Keeping in mind the information you have just read, please check the box 
corresponding to how you agree or disagree with statements 5 through 8 
 
  Strongly  Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
  Agree       Disagree 
5. I believe that I am 
susceptible to contracting 
meningococcal disease           
6. I generally believe that 
vaccines are safe           
7. I believe it is important 
for the Colorado State 
University community to 
be vaccinated for 
meningococcal disease           
8. I believe the spread of 
meningococcal disease is 
primarily due to socially 





A number of campus-wide programs, including some health services, are funded either 
through out-of-pocket fees paid by individuals, or by student fees paid by all students. 
We are interested in how highly you value a sample of campus-wide programs funded by 
student fees (which total $31 million annually). 
 
For items 9-13, please check the box corresponding to the importance you attach to 
each of the following campus-wide services: 
 
  Very  Important Somewhat Not very Not  
  Important   Important Important Important 
9. Lory Student 
Center           
10. Rec Center 
           
11. Student Legal 
Services           
12. Conflict and 
Resolution Services           
13. Athletics 
           
 
Part 3 – Your response to a vaccination program proposal  
 
Colorado State University, in response to the high number of meningococcal disease 
infections, introduced a program last year that provided vaccines for meningococcal 
disease free of charge for most students. Due to budget cuts, Colorado State University 
has to halt the program. 
 The risk of death from meningococcal disease is 4 out of 10,000 without the 
vaccine.  
 The risk of death decreases to 1 out of 10,000 when vaccinated. 
 A choice of ‘Yes’ for questions 14 or 15 will decrease the risk of death from 4 
out of 10,000 to 1 out of 10,000 for the vaccinated person. 
 
14. Would you pay an out-of-pocket price of $X to receive the vaccine yourself? 
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No  
 
15. However you responded to question 14, you also have the opportunity to contribute 
funds for other students to receive the vaccine. The cost of administering one vaccination 
is $X. Would you be willing to donate, $X out of your own pocket to provide the vaccine 
free of charge to another Colorado State University student? 
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
16. Do you believe that the majority of other Colorado State University students would 
be willing to donate $X to allow other students to be vaccinated? 
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
Part 4 – Attitudes influencing your choices in the part 3 
Please check the box corresponding to how you agree or disagree with statements 17 
through 21. 
 
  Strongly  Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
  Agree       Disagree 
17. I want to protect myself 
from meningococcal disease           
18. I want others to be able to 
be protected against 
meningococcal disease           
19. It seems fair to me to 
contribute a fair share to help 
others be vaccinated           
20. We all should be 
committed to protecting the 
health and safety of the CSU 
community           
21. CSU students deserve 
protection against 
meningococcal disease           
 
Part 5 – Other questions 
 
For statistical purposes, this section will ask some confidential demographic 
information. 
 
22. What is your gender?  
 
        ____ Female    ____ Male 
 
23. What is your age? _____ 
  
24. How would you categorize your race/ethnicity? 
 ___ Black or African American 
 ___ Asian or Asian American 
 ___ Hispanic or Latino 
 ___ White or Caucasian 
 ___ Other 
 
25. Do you live in a college dormitory?       
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
26. Are you married or do you have a household partner with whom you share financial 
responsibility? 
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 





agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
27.  I pay for CSU tuition out of 
my own pocket           
28.  I pay for student fees out of 
my own pocket           
29.  I pay for living expenses out 
of my own pocket           
 
30. In which range is your parent’s annual household income? 
 
 ___Under $10,000 
 ___ $10,000 - $19,999 
 ___ $20,000 - $49,999 
 ___ $50,000 - $99,999 
 ___ Over $100,000 
 
31. In which range is your annual personal income (without any contribution from 
parents)? 
 ___Under $10,000 
 ___ $10,000 - $19,999 
 ___ $20,000 - $49,999 
 ___ $50,000 - $99,999 





A.5.2 Meningococcal Disease Community Treatment 
Part 1 – Information about meningococcal disease 
Please read the following information, which may affect how you answer the questions 
in this survey. 
 
Who gets it? 
 
Meningococcal disease has been the cause of death for four people in Fort Collins and 
one in Denver during 2011, with many more hospitalized.  
 College students, especially freshmen are more susceptible to meningococcal 
disease, mainly due to behavior.  
 Meningococcal disease is not transferred through the air, but through direct 
contact with a carrier of the disease, mainly through saliva.  
 College students’ lifestyle includes very close contact with others and sharing of 
items that may contain saliva.  
 Although many types of meningococcal disease exist, meningococcal sepsis has 
been thought to be the cause of the deaths and hospitalizations in Fort Collins.  
 
How is it dangerous? 
 
Meningococcal disease is a very dangerous disease with high mortality rates.  
 There are approximately 2,600 cases of meningococcal disease per year in the 
United States on average. 
 Even with antibiotics, approximately 1 in 10 victims of meningococcal meningitis 
will die  
 Another 40% of survivors lose a limb or their hearing, or suffer permanent brain 
damage. 
 Within hours, a patient's health can change from seemingly good to mortally ill 
 40% of patients with meningococcal sepsis will die, the variety seen in the current 
Colorado State University epidemic 
 
How to avoid meningococcal disease? 
Because of the high mortality rate even with proper treatment, the best strategy toward 
meningococcal disease is vaccination. 
 A vaccine for meningococcal disease has been approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and available since 1981. 
 This vaccine can prevent 2 of the 3 most commonly occurring strains in the US. 
 The vaccine can reduce the incidence of infection, hospitalization, and death by 
nearly 70% 
 A booster of the vaccine is recommended every 2-4 years 
 
Who can get the vaccine? 
 Anyone over the age of 2 can receive the vaccine. 
 
Is the vaccine risky? 
 Up to about half of people who get meningococcal vaccines have mild side 
effects, such as redness or pain where the shot was given. These symptoms 
usually last for one or two days. A small percentage of people who receive the 
vaccine develop a fever.  
 Severe reactions, such as a serious allergic reaction, are very rare. 
 A nervous system disorder called Guillain-Barré Syndrome has been reported. 
However, this happens so infrequently that it is currently not possible to tell if the 
vaccine might be a factor 
 
Part 2 – Questions about your experience and beliefs 
1. Have you ever been diagnosed with meningococcal disease? 
 ____ Yes   ____ No 
 
2. To your knowledge, have any of your close friends or family members ever been 
diagnosed with meningococcal disease? 
 ____ Yes   ____ No 
 
3. Prior to reading the information in this survey, were you familiar with meningococcal 
disease? 
 ____ Yes  _____ No 
 
4. The meningococcal disease vaccination is not part of the routine set of vaccinations in 
the US and is not required by the University. Have you ever received a meningococcal 
disease vaccination? 
 ____ Yes  _____ No 
 
Keeping in mind the information you have just read, please check the box 
corresponding to how you agree or disagree with statements 5 through 8 
 
  Strongly  Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
  Agree       Disagree 
5. I believe that I am 
susceptible to contracting 
meningococcal disease           
6. I generally believe that 
vaccines are safe           
7. I believe it is important 
for the Colorado State 
University community to 
be vaccinated for 
meningococcal disease           
8. I believe the spread of 
meningococcal disease is 
primarily due to socially 
unacceptable sexual 
behavior            
 
A number of campus-wide programs, including some health services, are funded either 
through out-of-pocket fees paid by individuals, or by student fees paid by all students. 
We are interested in how highly you value a sample of campus-wide programs funded by 
student fees (which total $31 million annually). 
 
For items 9-13, please check the box corresponding to the importance you attach to 
each of the following campus-wide services: 
 
  Very  Important Somewhat Not very Not  
  Important   Important Important Important 
9. Lory Student 
Center           
10. Rec Center 
           
11. Student Legal 
Services           
12. Conflict and 
Resolution Services           
13. Athletics 
           
 
 
Part 3 – Your response to a vaccination program proposal  
 
Colorado State University, in response to the high number of meningococcal disease 
infections, introduced a program last year that provided vaccines for meningococcal 
disease free of charge for most students. Due to budget cuts, Colorado State University 
has to halt the program and two new proposals have been initiated to replace the previous 
program. You will be asked a question about each proposal.  
 The risk of death from meningococcal disease is 4 out of 10,000 without the 
vaccine.  
 The risk of death decreases to 1 out of 10,000 when vaccinated. 
 If either proposal passes, the risk of death will decrease from 4 out of 10,000 to 
1 out of 10,000 for those vaccinated. 
  
Proposal 1: An increase in all students’ semester fees by $X to have the vaccine 
available for all students. 
 The program will be funded by a new special student fee  
 The costs of the program would have to be paid by you and other Colorado State 
University students.  
 Because you would be paying $X in additional student fees for the program, it 




14. Would you vote for the proposed increase in your semester students fees of $X to 
have the vaccine available for all Colorado State University students? 
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
 
15. Do you believe that the majority of Colorado State University students would be 
willing to vote in favor of Proposal 1? 
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
  
 
Proposal 2: A reallocation of existing students fees, amounting to $X per student, 
away from other student services (rec center, classroom services, etc.) to fund the 
availability of the vaccine free for all Colorado State University students.  
 The program will not increase your student fees 
 Payments for the program will be in the form of a reallocation of your student 
fees from other student services (for example, reallocation of fees from the Lory 
Student Center, Campus Recreation Center, University Facility Fee, Student 
Legal Services, Conflict and Resolution, Athletics, etc.). 
 Thus, paying for the program would reduce the amount of other student services 
that are currently available.  
 
16. Would you vote for this reallocation of student fees that would provide vaccinations 
for all students at the cost of other student services? 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
17. Do you believe that the majority of Colorado State University students would be 
willing to vote in favor of Proposal 2? 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
Part 4 – Attitudes influencing your choices in Part 3 
 
Please check the box corresponding to how you agree or disagree with statements 17 
through 21. 
  Strongly  Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
  Agree       Disagree 
17. I want to protect myself 
from meningococcal disease           
18. I want others to be able to 
be protected against 
meningococcal disease           
19. It seems fair to me to 
contribute a fair share to help 
others be vaccinated           
20. We all should be           
committed to protecting the 
health and safety of the CSU 
community 
21. CSU students deserve 
protection against 
meningococcal disease           
 
Part 5 – Other questions 
 
For statistical purposes, this section will ask some confidential demographic 
information. 
 
22. What is your gender?  
 
        ____ Female    ____ Male 
 
23. What is your age? _____ 
  
24. How would you categorize your race/ethnicity? 
 ___ Black or African American 
 ___ Asian or Asian American 
 ___ Hispanic or Latino 
 ___ White or Caucasian 
 ___ Other 
 
25. Do you live in a college dormitory?       
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
26. Are you married or do you have a household partner with whom you share financial 
responsibility? 
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 





agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
27.  I pay for CSU tuition out of 
my own pocket           
28.  I pay for student fees out of 
my own pocket           
29.  I pay for living expenses 
out of my own pocket           
 
30. In which range is your parent’s annual household income? 
 
 ___Under $10,000 
 ___ $10,000 - $19,999 
 ___ $20,000 - $49,999 
 ___ $50,000 - $99,999 
 ___ Over $100,000 
 
31. In which range is your annual personal income (without any contribution from 
parents)? 
 ___Under $10,000 
 ___ $10,000 - $19,999 
 ___ $20,000 - $49,999 
 ___ $50,000 - $99,999 





A.5.3 HPV Individual Treatment 
Part 1 – Information about HPV 
 
Please read the following information, which may affect how you answer the questions 
in this survey. 
 
Who gets HPV? 
 
Human papillomavirus (HPV) is the most common sexually transmitted disease in 
America.  
 10% to 46% of all sexually active women are infected at any given point in time, 
with a potential lifetime risk of infection of 70% or greater.  
 The infection rate for sexually active men is estimated to be 10% to 20%.  
 Young adults, particularly college students, have been found to be at especially 
high risk of contracting HPV. 
 
How is it dangerous? 
 
HPV causes several types of secondary health risk. 
 The key risk is cervical cancer in women. Nearly all cervical cancer cases have 
been tied to ‘high risk’ HPV types. 
 Although high risk HPV does not cause cervical cancer in men, they can be 
carriers and infect future sexual partners.  
 Genital warts and non-malignant lesions are found with HPV types labeled as 
‘low-risk’ types.  
 High-risk types of HPV have been well established as the most important 
causative factor of cervical cancer in women. 
 Every year, around 12,000 women are diagnosed with cervical cancer and around 
5,000 die from the disease. 
 More than 700,000 cases of high-grade cervical dysplasia are detected every year 
in the United States, the precursor of cervical cancer. 
 Cervical cancer accounts for almost 12% of all cancers in women, and so 
represents the second-most frequent gynecological malignancy in the world. 
 
How to avoid HPV? 
There are no known treatments for HPV, making prevention of HPV the key factor in the 
prevention of cervical cancer. 
 Aside from abstaining from sexual activity, the only known guaranteed 
prevention is vaccination. 
 On June 8, 2006, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the use 
of a vaccine to prevent infection from two types of ‘high-risk’ HPV. 
 This vaccine prevents infection of about 70 percent of the cases of cervical cancer 
worldwide. 
 Studies have shown that vaccines prevent nearly 100 percent of the precancerous 
cervical cell changes caused by the types of HPV. 
 The vaccine has been proven effective for up to 4 years after vaccination among 
women who were not infected at the time of vaccination. 
 
Who can get the vaccine? 
 
 The vaccine is only approved for use in women ages 10-26.  
 
Is vaccination risky? 
 
The HPV vaccines work like other immunizations that guard against viral infection.  
 Although these vaccines can help prevent HPV infection, they do not help 
eliminate existing HPV infections.  
 Thus far, no serious side effects have been shown to be caused by the vaccines.  
 The most common problems have been brief soreness and other local symptoms 
at the injection site.  These problems are similar to ones commonly experienced 
with other vaccines.  
 The vaccine has not been sufficiently tested during pregnancy and, therefore, 
should not be used by pregnant women. 
Part 2 – Questions about your experience and beliefs 
 
1. Have you ever been diagnosed with high risk HPV? 
 ____ Yes   ____ No 
 
2. To your knowledge, have any of your close friends or family members ever been 
diagnosed with high risk HPV? 
 ____ Yes   ____ No 
 
3. Prior to reading the information in this survey, were you familiar with high risk HPV 
and its link to cervical cancer? 
 ____ Yes  _____ No 
 
4. The HPV vaccine is not part of the routine set of vaccinations in the US and is not 
required by the University. Have you ever received a HPV vaccine?         
 ____ Yes  _____ No 
 
Keeping in mind the information you have just read, please check the box 
corresponding to how you agree or disagree with statements 5 through 8 
 
  Strongly  Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
  Agree       Disagree 
5. I believe that I am 
susceptible to contracting 
high risk HPV.           
6. I generally believe that 
vaccines are safe.           
7. I believe it is important for 
the Colorado State 
University community to be 
vaccinated for high risk 
HPV.           
8. I believe the spread of 
high risk HPV is primarily 
due to socially unacceptable 
sexual behavior.           
 
 
A number of campus-wide programs, including some health services, are funded either 
through out-of-pocket fees paid by individuals, or by student fees paid by all students. 
We are interested in how highly you value a sample of campus-wide programs funded by 
student fees (which total $31 million annually). 
 
For items 9-13, please check the box corresponding to the importance you attach to 
each of the following campus-wide services: 
 
  Very  Important Somewhat Not very Not  
  Important   Important Important Important 
9. Lory Student 
Center           
10. Rec Center 
           
11. Student Legal 
Services           
12. Conflict and 
Resolution Services           
13. Athletics 
           
 
 
Part 3 – Your response to a vaccination program proposal 
Colorado State University has the HPV vaccine available at a set price for every willing 
female student currently enrolled at the university. This vaccine is administered at 
Hartshorn Health center for all willing female recipients.  
 
Currently, Colorado State University has 13,526 female students, making up 51.3% of all 
enrolled students.  
 The vaccine reduces the risk of being infected with high-risk types of HPV by 
70% if previously uninfected.  
 A choice of ‘Yes’ for questions 14 or 15 will decrease the risk of cervical 
cancer by 70% in women vaccinated. 
 
If you are female answer question 14. If you are male, proceed to question 15. 
 
14. Would you pay an out-of-pocket price of $400 to receive the vaccine yourself? 
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
15. However you responded in question 14, you also have the opportunity to contribute 
funds for other students to receive the vaccine. The cost of administering one vaccination 
is $400. Would you be willing to donate a one time out-of-pocket price of $400 to 
provide the vaccine free of charge to another Colorado State University student who may 
not otherwise be vaccinated? 
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
16. Do you believe that the majority of Colorado State University students would be 
willing to donate $400 to allow others to be vaccinated? 
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
Part 4 – Attitudes influencing your choices in Part 3 
Please check the box corresponding to how you agree or disagree with statements 17 
through 21. 
  Strongly  Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
  Agree       Disagree 
17. I want to protect myself from 
high risk.           
18. I want others to be able to be 
protected against high risk HPV           
19. It seems fair to me to 
contribute a fair share to help 
others be vaccinated.           
20. We all should be committed 
to protecting the health and safety 
of the CSU community.           
21. CSU students deserve 
protection against high risk HPV           
 
Part 5 – Other questions 
For statistical purposes, this section will ask some confidential demographic 
information. 
 
22. What is your gender?  
 
        ____ Female    ____ Male 
 
23. What is your age? _____ 
  
24. How would you categorize your race/ethnicity? 
 ___ Black or African American 
 ___ Asian or Asian American 
 ___ Hispanic or Latino 
 ___ White or Caucasian 
 ___ Other 
 
25. Do you live in a college dormitory?       
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
26. Are you married or do you have a household partner with whom you share financial 
responsibility? 
 








agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
27.  I pay for CSU tuition out of 
my own pocket           
28.  I pay for student fees out of 
my own pocket           
29.  I pay for living expenses out 
of my own pocket           
 
30. In which range is your parent’s annual household income? 
 
 ___Under $10,000 
 ___ $10,000 - $19,999 
 ___ $20,000 - $49,999 
 ___ $50,000 - $99,999 
 ___ Over $100,000 
 
31. In which range is your annual personal income (without any contribution from 
parents)? 
 ___Under $10,000 
 ___ $10,000 - $19,999 
 ___ $20,000 - $49,999 
 ___ $50,000 - $99,999 
 ___ Over $100,000 
 
A.5.4 HPV Community Treatment 
Part 1 – Information about HPV 
 
Please read the following information, which may affect how you answer the questions 
in this survey. 
 
Who gets HPV? 
 
Human papillomavirus (HPV) is the most common sexually transmitted disease in 
America.  
 10% to 46% of all sexually active women are infected at any given point in time, 
with a potential lifetime risk of infection of 70% or greater.  
 The infection rate for sexually active men is estimated to be 10% to 20%.  
 Young adults, particularly college students, have been found to be at especially 
high risk of contracting HPV. 
 
How is it dangerous? 
 
HPV causes several types of secondary health risk. 
 The key risk is cervical cancer in women. Nearly all cervical cancer cases have 
been tied to ‘high risk’ HPV types. 
 Although high risk HPV does not cause cervical cancer in men, they can be 
carriers and infect future sexual partners.  
 Genital warts and non-malignant lesions are found with HPV types labeled as 
‘low-risk’ types.  
 High-risk types of HPV have been well established as the most important 
causative factor of cervical cancer in women. 
 Every year, around 12,000 women are diagnosed with cervical cancer and around 
5,000 die from the disease. 
 More than 700,000 cases of high-grade cervical dysplasia are detected every year 
in the United States, the precursor of cervical cancer. 
 Cervical cancer accounts for almost 12% of all cancers in women, and so 
represents the second-most frequent gynecological malignancy in the world. 
 
How to avoid HPV? 
 
There are no known treatments for HPV, making prevention of HPV the key factor in the 
prevention of cervical cancer. 
 Aside from abstaining from sexual activity, the only known guaranteed 
prevention is vaccination. 
 On June 8, 2006, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the use 
of a vaccine to prevent infection from two types of ‘high-risk’ HPV. 
 This vaccine prevents infection of about 70 percent of the cases of cervical cancer 
worldwide. 
 Studies have shown that vaccines prevent nearly 100 percent of the precancerous 
cervical cell changes caused by the types of HPV. 
 The vaccine has been proven effective for up to 4 years after vaccination among 
women who were not infected at the time of vaccination. 
 
Who can get the vaccine? 
 
 The vaccine is only approved for use in women ages 10-26.  
 
Is vaccination risky? 
 
The HPV vaccines work like other immunizations that guard against viral infection.  
 Although these vaccines can help prevent HPV infection, they do not help 
eliminate existing HPV infections.  
 Thus far, no serious side effects have been shown to be caused by the vaccines.  
 The most common problems have been brief soreness and other local symptoms 
at the injection site.  These problems are similar to ones commonly experienced 
with other vaccines.  
 The vaccine has not been sufficiently tested during pregnancy and, therefore, 
should not be used by pregnant women. 
 
Part 2 – Questions about your experience and beliefs 
 
1. Have you ever been diagnosed with high risk HPV? 
 ____ Yes   ____ No 
 
2. To your knowledge, have any of your close friends or family members ever been 
diagnosed with high risk HPV? 
 ____ Yes   ____ No 
 
3. Prior to reading the information in this survey, were you familiar with high risk HPV 
and its link to cervical cancer? 
 ____ Yes  _____ No 
 
4. The HPV vaccine is not part of the routine set of vaccinations in the US and is not 
required by the University. Have you ever received a HPV vaccine?         
 ____ Yes  _____ No 
 
Keeping in mind the information you have just read, please check the box 
corresponding to how you agree or disagree with statements 5 through 8 
 
  Strongly  Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
  Agree       Disagree 
5. I believe that I am 
susceptible to contracting 
high risk HPV.           
6. I generally believe that 
vaccines are safe.           
7. I believe it is important for 
the Colorado State 
University community to be 
vaccinated for high risk 
HPV.           
8. I believe the spread of 
high risk HPV is primarily 
due to socially unacceptable 
sexual behavior.           
 
 
A number of campus-wide programs, including some health services, are funded either 
through out-of-pocket fees paid by individuals, or by student fees paid by all students. 
We are interested in how highly you value a sample of campus-wide programs funded by 
student fees (which total $31 million annually). 
 
 
For items 9-13, please check the box corresponding to the importance you attach to 
each of the following campus-wide services: 
 
  Very  Important Somewhat Not very Not  
  Important   Important Important Important 
9. Lory Student 
Center           
10. Rec Center 
           
11. Student Legal 
Services           
12. Conflict and 
Resolution Services           
13. Athletics 
           
 
Part 3 – Your response to a vaccination program proposal 
 
Colorado State University has the HPV vaccine available at a set price for every willing 
female student currently enrolled at the university. This vaccine is administered at 
Hartshorn Health center for all willing female recipients.  
 
Currently, Colorado State University has 13,526 female students, making up 51.3% of all 
enrolled students. In the face of the impact of HPV on students, Colorado State 
University has two new proposals that would provide vaccines for all willing female 
recipients. You will be asked a question about each proposal 
 The vaccine reduces the risk of being infected with high-risk types of HPV by 
70% if previously uninfected.  
 If either proposal pass, the risk of cervical cancer will be reduced by 70% in 
women vaccinated 
 
Proposal 1: An increase in all students’ semester fees by $X to have the vaccine 
available for all female students. 
 The program will be funded by a new special student fee.  
 The costs of the program would have to be paid by you and other Colorado State 
University students.  
 Because you would be paying $X in additional student fees for the program, it 




14. Would you vote for the proposed increase in your semester students fees of $X to 
have the vaccine available for all Colorado State University students? 
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
15. Do you believe that the majority of Colorado State University students would be 
willing to vote in favor of Proposal 1? 
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
 
Proposal 2: A reallocation of existing student fees, amounting to $X per student, 
away from other student services (rec center, classroom services, etc.) to fund 
availability of the vaccine free for all female Colorado State University students.  
 The program will not increase your student fees. 
 Payments for the program will be in the form of a reallocation of your student 
fees from other student services (for example, reallocation of fees from the Lory 
Student Center, Campus Recreation Center, University Facility Fee, Student 
Legal Services, Conflict and Resolution, Athletics, etc.). 
 Thus, paying for the program would reduce the amount of other student services 
that are currently available.  
 
16. Would you vote for this reallocation of student fees that would provide vaccinations 
for all students at the cost of other student services? 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
17. Do you believe that the majority of Colorado State University students would be 
willing to vote in favor of Proposal 2? 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
Part 4 – Attitudes influencing your choices in the part 3 
 
Please check the box corresponding to how you agree or disagree with statements 18 
through 22. 
  Strongly  Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
  Agree       Disagree 
18. I want to protect myself from 
high risk HPV           
19. I want others to be able to be 
protected against high risk HPV           
20. It seems fair to me to 
contribute a fair share to help 
others be vaccinated           
21. We all should be committed 
to protecting the health and safety 
of the CSU community           
22. CSU students deserve 
protection against high risk HPV           
 
 
Part 5 – Other questions 
For statistical purposes, this section will ask some confidential demographic 
information. 
 
22. What is your gender?  
 
        ____ Female    ____ Male 
 
23. What is your age? _____ 
  
24. How would you categorize your race/ethnicity? 
 ___ Black or African American 
 ___ Asian or Asian American 
 ___ Hispanic or Latino 
 ___ White or Caucasian 
 ___ Other 
 
25. Do you live in a college dormitory?       
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 
26. Are you married or do you have a household partner with whom you share financial 
responsibility? 
 
 ____ Yes  ____ No 
 





agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
27.  I pay for CSU tuition out of 
my own pocket           
28.  I pay for student fees out of 
my own pocket           
29.  I pay for living expenses out 
of my own pocket           
 
30. In which range is your parent’s annual household income? 
 
 ___Under $10,000 
 ___ $10,000 - $19,999 
 ___ $20,000 - $49,999 
 ___ $50,000 - $99,999 
 ___ Over $100,000 
 
 
31. In which range is your annual personal income (without any contribution from 
parents)? 
 ___Under $10,000 
 ___ $10,000 - $19,999 
 ___ $20,000 - $49,999 
 ___ $50,000 - $99,999 
 ___ Over $100,000 
 
A.5.5 Results Without Social and Self-interest Preferences 
 
Table A.5.2.1 Logit Gender differences in Individual Willingness to Pay Vaccination Program 1 Without 
Social and Self-interest Preferences 
 Meningococcal Meningococcal HPV HPV 
VARIABLES Women Men Women Men 
Cost -0.0201*** -0.00800*** -0.00712*** -0.00835* 
 (0.00502) (0.00214) (0.00209) (0.00501) 
com 1.618*** 1.617*** 1.388*** -0.701 
 (0.457) (0.362) (0.363) (0.613) 
Income -0.191 0.0221 0.236 0.357 
 (0.527) (0.393) (0.472) (0.506) 
Constant -5.692*** -6.028*** -4.471*** 1.720 
 (1.992) (1.569) (1.361) (2.404) 
Observations 107 120 102 26 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
Table A.5.2.2 Logit Gender differences in Individual Willingness to Pay Vaccination Program 2 Without 
Social and Self-interest Preferences 
 Meningococcal Meningococcal HPV HPV 
VARIABLES Women Men Women Men 
cost -0.0131*** -0.0104*** -0.00462** -0.00389** 
 (0.00401) (0.00341) (0.00225) (0.00181) 
fees -0.297 -0.133 -0.408** -0.101 
 (0.183) (0.162) (0.175) (0.159) 
Constant 1.116* 0.342 0.980* 0.0579 
 (0.641) (0.575) (0.571) (0.557) 
Observations 106 107 93 100 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
 
Table A.5.2.3 Logit Gender differences in Community Willingness to Pay Vaccination Program 1 Without 
Social and Self-interest Preferences 
 Meningococcal Meningococcal HPV HPV 
VARIABLES Women Men Women Men 
Cost -0.0102** -0.00683** -0.00820** -0.00386* 
 (0.00448) (0.00327) (0.00355) (0.00219) 
Income -0.289 -1.006* 0.363 0.0850 
 (0.679) (0.596) (0.601) (0.301) 
Constant -0.570 0.327 -0.816 -1.041** 
 (0.870) (0.760) (0.695) (0.488) 
Observations 107 120 86 121 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
Table A.5.2.3 Logit Gender differences in Community Willingness to Pay Vaccination Program 2 Without 




 Meningococcal Meningococcal HPV HPV 
VARIABLES Women Men Women Men 
cost 0.000299 -0.00151 0.00250 5.77e-05 
 (0.00145) (0.00151) (0.00176) (0.00145) 
resolut -0.346 0.178 0.576*** 0.346* 
 (0.260) (0.179) (0.223) (0.182) 
fees -0.0668 0.169 0.0259 -0.0818 
 (0.146) (0.140) (0.165) (0.149) 
Constant 1.373 -0.929 -1.864* -0.810 
 (1.055) (0.726) (0.990) (0.745) 
Observations 106 107 93 98 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1   
